Art and Peripheral Digital Activity by Meyer, Jon
Meyer, Jon. 2019. Art and Peripheral Digital Activity. Doctoral thesis, Goldsmiths, University of
London [Thesis]
http://research.gold.ac.uk/26466/
The version presented here may differ from the published, performed or presented work. Please
go to the persistent GRO record above for more information.
If you believe that any material held in the repository infringes copyright law, please contact
the Repository Team at Goldsmiths, University of London via the following email address:
gro@gold.ac.uk.
The item will be removed from the repository while any claim is being investigated. For
more information, please contact the GRO team: gro@gold.ac.uk
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Art and peripheral digital activity  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jon Meyer 
Goldsmiths College 
University of London 
Department of Art 
PhD Art 
2019 
 
 
 
 
  
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 3 
Abstract 
 
As digital technologies have become more pervasive, this thesis argues, there has been 
an accompanying expansion of a phenomenon here called ‘peripheral digital activity.’ 
This activity includes unplanned and unexpected events that arise in conjunction with 
digital technologies and that are poorly classified using conventional notions of 
‘interaction,’ ‘user experience,’ or purposeful ‘use.’ To ground this idea, the thesis looks 
to artistic strategies that might critically investigate the concept of peripheral digital 
activity, in this case arguing that Alfred North Whitehead’s philosophy of organism, with 
its emphasis on whole-part relations, holds special relevance. The thesis proposes an 
original Whitehead-centred analysis of art as a manner or ‘mode’ of decision procedure. 
Developing this analysis via Whitehead’s notion of actual entities and through a 
discussion of digital function, the thesis examines the practice of contemporary artist 
Tino Sehgal. Reading through theories of social and participatory art, the thesis arrives 
at Sehgal’s proposition of ‘cleaner conceptualism.’ Outlining a systems-based 
interpretation of cleaner conceptualism, Sehgal’s constructed situations are contrasted 
with the idea of art as a decision procedure proposed by Sol LeWitt. Whereas LeWitt 
organizes his idea of decision procedures as a dualist critique of instrumental 
rationalism, Sehgal creates a new mode of monist decision procedure. Using this monist 
strategy, Sehgal mobilises participants, collectors, and curators in a way that is 
entangled with and presupposes digital function even as his practice foregrounds non-
technological body-to-body human engagement. The thesis claims that Sehgal’s practice 
is one strategy for critically investigating the effects of peripheral digital activity. 
Proposing directions for future research, the thesis ends with a Coda that provides a 
preliminary analysis of the paintings Laura Owens as a diagnostic tool for investigating 
digital functional augmentation.   
     
  
 
  
  
 4 
Acknowledgements 
A special thanks to my wife, Andrea Lauermann, and our daughter, Leonie Sol Meyer, 
who have given me constant love and support.  I also wish to thank my primary 
supervisor, John Chilver, for his many years of patient, inspiring and forthright 
commentary, and my second supervisor, Michael Newman, for incisive and opportune 
feedback. I am extremely grateful for the assistance and guidance I have received along 
the way, especially from Camille Cauti, John Cussans, Kristen Kreider, Suhail Malik, Dawn 
Peterson, Andrea Phillips, Kate Smith, Edgar Schmitz, and Joseph Tanke. I wish to thank 
the Goldsmiths Department of Art for institutional assistance and support. Finally, I 
would like to acknowledge my thesis examiners, Michael Halewood and Mark Harris. 
This thesis engages with Alfred North Whitehead’s philosophy of organism. My 
reading of Whitehead is independent, conducted outside of contact with the process 
philosophy community, and the result of only a few years of concentrated effort. What 
headway I have made is due to a wealth of secondary literature. I have endeavoured to 
credit those authors appropriately throughout the body of thesis.   
 
  
 5 
Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ 4	
Abbreviations ................................................................................................................. 6	
Preface............................................................................................................................ 7	
1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 10	
The Digital Periphery ................................................................................................. 10	
Art Research and the Digital Periphery ...................................................................... 12	
Art as Decision Procedure ......................................................................................... 15	
Thesis Outline............................................................................................................ 19	
2. Whitehead-centred Research ................................................................................... 22	
The Whitehead Revival .............................................................................................. 22	
Media Theory and Metacomputation ........................................................................ 24	
Humanities and the Social Sciences ........................................................................... 26	
A Whitehead Methodology? ...................................................................................... 30	
Working with Analogies ............................................................................................. 33	
3. Actual Entities ........................................................................................................... 38	
The Bifurcation of Nature .......................................................................................... 38	
Setting a Scope .......................................................................................................... 40	
Actual Entities and Lifecycles ..................................................................................... 41	
Prehensions............................................................................................................... 46	
Mentality................................................................................................................... 48	
Aesthetics.................................................................................................................. 50	
Maculate Conception ................................................................................................ 54	
4. Digital Entities........................................................................................................... 59	
Whitehead and the Digital ......................................................................................... 59	
Functional and Object-Oriented Programming .......................................................... 62	
General Function ....................................................................................................... 66	
Digital Function and General Function ....................................................................... 68	
The Bifurcation of the Digital ..................................................................................... 70	
Mereology ................................................................................................................. 72	
5. Tino’s Handshake ...................................................................................................... 77	
Artologies .................................................................................................................. 77	
Tino Sehgal ................................................................................................................ 81	
Tino’s Handshake ...................................................................................................... 84	
Participatory Art ........................................................................................................ 88	
Cleaner Conceptualism .............................................................................................. 90	
Art as Decision Procedure (revisited) ......................................................................... 95	
Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 100	
Coda: Anonymous Painting ........................................................................................ 102	
Laura Owens ........................................................................................................... 102	
Two Responses: Atemporality and Flux ................................................................... 107	
Anonymity ............................................................................................................... 110	
Functional Augmentation ........................................................................................ 113	
Painting as Diagnostic .............................................................................................. 116	
Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 118	
 
  
 6 
Abbreviations 
Consistent with other literature on Alfred North Whitehead, the following abbreviations 
are used for citations from Whitehead’s major books (listed chronologically in the order 
of original publication). Page numbers for Process and Reality use the 1978 Corrected 
Edition throughout. 
 
CN   The Concept of Nature (1964) [1920], Cambridge University Press. 
SMW  Science and the Modern World (1970) [1925], Free Press. 
RM Religion in the Making (1996) [1926], Fordham University Press. 
SYM Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect (1985) [1927], Fordham University Press. 
FR The Function of Reason (1958) [1929], Beacon Press. 
PR  Process and Reality (1978) [1929], Corrected Edition, edited by David Ray Griffin 
and Donald W. Sherburne, Free Press. 
AI  Adventures of Ideas (1967) [1933], Free Press. 
MT  Modes of Thought (1968) [1938], Free Press. 
ESP Essays in Science and Philosophy (1947). Philosophical Library.  
  
 7 
Preface 
The seeds of this project were sown in 2007 while I was on the Goldsmiths MFA Fine Art 
program. At the start of my MFA, I was making software-based artworks. For example, 
in one work I hacked a version of the classic Asteroids arcade game, flipping the 
movement of the bullets. Instead of the bullets firing from the ship towards the edge of 
the screen, the bullets began at the edge of the screen and moved towards the ship. 
This inverted the game logic, so that, rather than using asteroids as targets, players used 
them as shields to prevent inevitable suicide. The competitive aspect of the game was 
preserved but its narrative upended. I found the results intriguing, but I quickly 
discovered that a significant portion of my audience were not familiar enough with the 
original game to be able to determine the intervention I had made. I started looking for 
ways to combine software and digital elements with modes of making that were 
incontrovertibly gestures in art, where the digital component could not so easily be 
dismissed as niche genre art. I moved offscreen and started creating marks on paper.  
 
 
Jon Meyer, One mile long line.  
Inkjet print, 24 x 18cm, 2007. 
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One mile long line, an inkjet print on a piece of paper, was the first artwork I created in 
this hybrid software/paper mode of making. It prompted prolonged discussions about 
how and why it was—or was not—a work of art. Is it a synthesis of a squiggle or an 
actual squiggle, and does it matter? Do we know that it is the distance described or that 
any hand was involved? Isn’t it merely a flattened grid of black-and-white pixels held in a 
digital image and printed? How does digitally measured activity relate to endurance-
based artworks and ballpoint-pen abstractions from the 1960s or to Duchamp’s mile of 
string?  
 
Jon Meyer, Ten thousand squiggles sorted by length.  
Inkjet print, 100 x 100 cm, 2007. 
 
The introduction of a metric, precisely 5,280 feet of marking activity, caused the work to 
fall somewhere between the conventions of mark making and those of industrialized 
software processes.  
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As a result, I found myself asking questions such as:  
• Where is the tipping point between the idea of an artist’s economy of line and 
art as a line economy? 
• How are agency and authorship located within such hybrid software/paper 
practices when the artist also writes the software?  
• How does participation, as a division between passive and active elements, play 
out within such dynamic systems?  
• Why does something as seemingly straightforward as One mile mobilize an art 
practice, while more algorithmically sophisticated artworks had not?  
In my PhD, I continued examining the role of the hand in a technologized gesture. In 
my drawing practice, I created a plethora of different drawing tools that were arduous 
and inefficient or unfamiliar to use. For example, one drawing tool emitted only one 
inch of line per hour. The research followed phenomenological lines, gravitating to 
Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time with his notions of Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit 
(‘ready-to-hand’ and ‘present-at-hand’).  
Through the course of this research, I started questioning the adequacy of terms I 
had been using, including notions such as interactivity, media, tool, algorithm, or 
technology, as ways of describing the experiences of my drawing practice. I began 
researching different unifying perspectives, initially through the notion of embodiment. 
In the course of this research, I listened to a lecture by Judith Butler on Alfred North 
Whitehead (Butler 2010). In a move I later discovered is the starting premise of Steven 
Shaviro’s book Without Criteria (Shaviro 2012, viii), I tried to imagine my project with 
Whitehead taking the place of Heidegger. The research changed direction. I ceased 
trying to understand ‘interaction’ and started asking myself what I had excluded from 
my experience that might be discovered if I paid due attention. In this thesis, I further 
develop this idea through a Whitehead-centred investigation of peripheral digital 
activity. 
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1. Introduction 
What are appropriate strategies and practices in contemporary art to critically 
investigate and reconfigure the effects of peripheral digital activity without 
reducing it to affective interactivity?  
The Digital Periphery 
The aim in this thesis is to apprehend the digital not in terms of ‘interactive experience’ 
or ‘user experience’ but simply as experience. Notions of interactivity and user 
experience reflect the habit, especially in the field of human-computer interaction, to 
conceive of the digital in terms of purposeful use. Complex networked binary decision 
systems generate much more than purposeful use. They produce numerous experiences 
that are unthought or unplanned, as ‘users’ are caught in moments of surprise when 
they encounter the non-useful tones of the digital. The glitch-art movement is one 
example of a strategy in which the brittleness of peripheral activity in technical systems 
is explored and aestheticized, reclaiming and reconfiguring it as a positive valuing within 
art. This thesis seeks to critically investigate these kinds of aesthetic strategies in more 
systemic terms. Let us begin by defining the terms more analytically.  
I define the digital as the totality of internet-connected Turing-complete software 
programmable devices, plus any coupled devices that have the capacity to communicate 
with internet-connected devices electronically. The digital, in this case, is a vast, 
heterogeneous global system consisting of more than ten billion devices and many 
billions of lines of software instructions. It transports more than 4 exabytes of data on a 
daily basis and is deeply imbricated with social and material transformations. It is 
expanding on an exponential basis.  
What all digital devices have in common—their lingua franca, the justification for 
identifying ‘the’ digital as a singular—is that any one device may connect to any other, 
exchanging data in a common binary protocol. Such interoperability means that 
ontologically, at least in principle, the digital is flat. Net Neutrality is the name of one 
movement that seeks to preserve this principle. 
The digital cannot be understood in the abstract. Mainstay theorizations of the 
digital have tended to study the digital through interactive digital media, where 
individuals or small groups interact with a proportionately small number of devices.  
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In this thesis, I instead investigate what I call peripheral activity. I define peripheral 
activity as non-conscious, unintended, unanticipated, or unplanned activity—incidental 
activity that arises on the periphery of an individual’s awareness, yet whose possible 
(non-peripheral) consequentiality can be large. Peripheral digital activity is peripheral 
activity which arises in conjunction with the heterogeneous complex systems of the 
digital as those systems listen, track, monitor, and prompt human behaviour indirectly, 
algorithmically, beyond conscious awareness, outside of direct perceptual discernment 
or intelligibility. Peripheral digital activity contrasts with (and often takes place 
alongside) purposeful and affective interaction. Peripheral digital activity has become a 
significant part of how online agencies gather, analyse, and use digital data.  
To give some concrete examples, in a recent news article, a Tinder user submitted a 
request to the Tinder dating site asking for any personal data that the site had collected 
on that individual. The response was an 800 page document (Duportail 2017). The 
document included many details that the user was unaware Tinder had collected. In the 
article, Alessandro Acquisti, professor of information technology at Carnegie Mellon 
University, explains: 
What you are describing is called secondary implicit disclosed information. Tinder 
knows much more about you when studying your behaviour on the app. It knows how 
often you connect and at which times; the percentage of white men, black men, Asian 
men you have matched; which kinds of people are interested in you; which words you 
use the most; how much time people spend on your picture before swiping you, and so 
on. Personal data is the fuel of the economy. Consumers’ data is being traded and 
transacted for the purpose of advertising. (Duportail 2017) 
The Tinder user, Judith Duportail, wrote, ‘I am horrified … The dating app knows me 
better than I do, but these reams of intimate information are just the tip of the iceberg. 
What if my data is hacked—or sold?’ (Duportail 2017). Duportail correctly identifies that 
peripheral digital activity is not simply a stored document. It is activity that is further 
acted upon as digital agencies seek to influence buying, voting, dating, viewing, learning, 
sharing, and other human behaviours.  
In a second example, Greg Milner reports of a couple who entered a destination into 
a car GPS device and followed the computed route (Milner 2016). They became lost in 
the desert and subsequently died, an occurrence now frequent enough that emergency 
workers call it ‘death by GPS.’ The story illustrates how habituation through purposeful 
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digital interaction can be accompanied by unconscious, unintended, unanticipated, and 
in this case lethal activity, or what I characterize as peripheral digital disorientation. 
As a third example, Mark Zuckerberg, shortly after the U.S. election, issued the 
statement that it was a ‘pretty crazy idea’ to suggest that Facebook software was in any 
way a factor in the election’s outcome.1 Within a week, he changed his position, 
claiming it was a problem Facebook was already working on. Zuckerberg is responsible 
for the deployment of considerable digital resources. His backtracking effort is evidence 
of large-scale peripheral digital disorientation through which Zuckerberg unwittingly 
became responsible for unquantified effects in the activities of a national election. 
These three examples, I believe, point towards an increasing amount of activity that 
arises in conjunction with the use of digital devices, but which remains under-
investigated. This thesis therefore seeks to open up an investigation of peripheral 
activity in digital experiences within and through art. 
Art Research and the Digital Periphery 
In the context of art, the research question stated in the first sentence can now be 
refined: What are appropriate strategies in contemporary art to critically investigate and 
reconfigure the actions and knowledges of peripheral digital activity? In other words, 
what ontologies are suitable for making explicit the kinds of inhabituations that result 
from peripheral digital activity, inhabituations that include the possibility of death by 
GPS? What epistemologies are suitable for the kinds of knowing that peripheral digital 
activity constitutes? What hermeneutics are useful to give a ‘voice’ to peripheral digital 
activity, to express its horror or its delight? How do these epistemologies, ontologies, 
and hermeneutics relate to the existing gestures and movements of contemporary art, 
which have not, so far, articulated well-developed positions in relation to phenomena 
such as secondary implicit disclosed digital information or peripheral digital 
disorientation? 
I believe the development of such a critique is important in order to discover and 
create worlds with expanded forms of peripheral digital awareness. The aim is to 
                                                        
1 Based on Zuckerberg’s comments on 11 November 2016 saying fake news, as an influencer in the 
election, was a ‘crazy idea.’ After the media quoted employees at Facebook saying, ‘What’s crazy is for him 
to come out and dismiss it like that,’ Zuckerberg issued a follow-up a week later, saying, ‘We’ve been 
working on this problem for a long time,’ and outlining the steps in further plans to address the fake-news 
issue (Zuckerberg 2016a, 2016b, 2016c; Frenkel 2016). 
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consciously reconfigure and inhabit the digital periphery and to re-narrate its stories of 
horror and death.  
However, such an analysis is challenging. It concerns two distinct areas: subjective 
experiences and computational systems. The research question is posed in terms of the 
forms of practice relevant in contemporary art, requiring further articulation of 
subjectivity and computation in terms of the gestures, histories, sites, and activities of 
contemporary art. Computation, subjectivity, and art each correspond to distinct 
disciplinary lineages, with their own traditions of epistemology, ontology, and 
hermeneutics. The phenomenon under consideration in this thesis, peripheral digital 
activity in relation to contemporary art, manifests as hybrid and complex events that do 
not fall neatly within one disciplinary area. The difficulty is compounded by the 
challenge, methodologically, of studying such events non-reductively, without, for 
example, reducing art to an instrumental role, reifying the phenomenon illustratively, or 
recasting it as interactive user experience. What is required is a starting point in the 
analysis that is able to travel across different perspectives while at the same time 
respecting the different disciplinary lineages and showing humility in terms of the kinds 
of partial and incomplete outcomes that are achievable. Again, such an analysis cannot 
be conducted in the abstract, necessitating the identification of particular artworks and 
artistic practices able to address strategies or forms of practice in contemporary art that 
can critically address peripheral digital activity.  
I believe substantialist subject-predicate ontologies of subjects and objects, and their 
associated epistemologies, are poorly suited for an investigation of a phenomenon such 
as peripheral digital activity. In the case of the couple in the car in the desert, the 
individuals may have comprehended the series of decisions that ultimately led to their 
demise and may have identified the GPS unit as the ‘object’ responsible. In many cases, 
however, peripheral digital activity gives rise to subjective affective experiences in which 
there is no easy way of recovering any such explanation. This inexplicability is manifest 
in the anxiety of the individual who realizes her peripheral digital activity on a Tinder 
website could unleash highly relevant yet intractable consequences. Her statement that 
Tinder ‘knows me better than I do’ is an attempt to construe peripheral digital activity in 
the guise of a knowing subject, Tinder. Yet the user admits the horror of this phantom 
construal, with its poorly defined sense of ‘know,’ even as she continues to use Tinder. 
The difficulty with peripheral digital activity is that there may be no easily identifiable 
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object available on which a subject-object ontology may form or on which predictions of 
object-based behaviour can be hoisted. We need fresh ontologies and better ways of 
habituating ourselves to peripheral digital activity if we are to avoid unconscious actions 
in a context of exponentially expanding digital technologies unleashing the equivalent of 
mass GPS death. 
The problems of subject-predicate ontologies in relation to digital networked 
subjectivities have been widely aired. Numerous researchers have proposed considering 
alternative ontologies. Jussi Parikka looks at software art as an ‘art of the imperceptible’ 
(Parikka 2010, 116) and proposes to theorize software art ecologically using Deleuzo-
Guattarian processual philosophy and notions of ‘assemblies’ (2010, 119). Bruno Latour 
has spoken at length on the need to theorize the social in terms of networks and has 
specifically addressed the issues of digital networks as sociotechnical assemblages that 
redistribute action (Latour 2010, 1–2). In the introduction to The Speculative Turn, Levi 
Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman assert that anglophone continental 
philosophy is vigorously pursuing multiple non-Cartesian ontological visions. They argue 
that we must find adequate ways to address ‘looming ecological catastrophe, and the 
increasing infiltration of technology into the everyday world (including our own bodies)’ 
(Bryant, Srnicek, and Harman 2011, 3). Alexander Galloway even goes as far as to 
suggest that the fecundity of new philosophical ontologies of ‘speculative realist’ 
philosophers Ray Barrier, Iain Hamilton Grant, Levi Bryant, Quentin Meillassoux, Graham 
Harman and others should be considered in relation to the ‘object-oriented’ ontologies 
of computer programming languages. He sees similarities between these philosophies 
and ’the structure of ontological systems and the structure of the most highly evolved 
technologies of post-Fordist capitalism’ (Galloway 2013, 347). David Berry, agreeing with 
Galloway, suggests that new developments in the digital bring forth requirements for 
new ontologies and metaphysics, and this in turn necessitates critical appraisals of the 
‘metaphysics of the computational’ (Berry 2014, 5).   
I am sympathetic towards this cause. In this thesis, I adopt Alfred North Whitehead’s 
metaphysics and philosophy of organism as the guiding theoretical framework. I have 
chosen Whitehead for a number of reasons. First, as I will argue in Chapter 4, 
Whitehead’s philosophy both predates and anticipates software patterns in ways that 
suggest his philosophy has a special relevance in considerations of the digital. Second, 
within discussions both of contemporary art and digital technologies, I believe 
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Whitehead remains an under-appreciated figure. Third, as a ‘flat’ ontology, Whitehead’s 
metaphysics has the advantage of being both broad in its applicability and also widely 
investigated by a number of different communities. Fourth, I affirm Judith Jones’s 
assertion that it is crucial to the historical development of process philosophy that 
‘numerous contending images of individual reality be developed, to create a body of 
work conceptually rich enough to challenge the long-standing attachment to substance-
ontological notions of individual existence’ (Jones 1998, 217). This thesis seeks to 
contribute towards such a contending image.  
Art as Decision Procedure 
For the purposes of the research question we started with, in this study, in place of a 
subject-predicate ontology, I adopt Alfred North Whitehead’s speculative approach 
outlined in his philosophy of organism. Whitehead’s relevance to the digital will, I hope, 
become apparent over the course of this text. Here, to begin, I use Whitehead’s 
methods of ‘genetic’ and ‘coordinate’ analysis to start outlining a partial ontology for 
peripheral digital activity in art (for a helpful overview of coordinate and genetic 
analysis, see Auxier and Herstein 2017, 112–41). This analysis will be further elaborated 
in subsequent chapters.  
Let us begin with the assertion that there is something called art, or ‘art as a whole,’ 
something that exists and that can be further subdivided. We can scrutinize art and 
discern art movements, histories, artworks, artists, art lovers, art buyers. Perhaps in this 
scrutiny we encounter Cady Noland’s Chicken in a Basket (1989), which recently sold for 
more than $300,000.  
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Cady Noland, Chicken in a Basket (1989), wire basket, rubber 
chicken, boxes, bottle, flags, baster, bungee, and beer cans,  
7 1/2 x 19 x 12 in (19.1 x 49.5 x 30.5 cm). 
 
If we accept that art exists, and that Chicken in a Basket is a part of art, this suggests 
we establish units of analysis in our study of such art. One common unit of analysis is 
the individual artwork, the basket and its contents as a unity, a ‘work.’ For our purposes 
in this study, we want a unit of analysis useful in making explicit the effects of peripheral 
digital activity.  
In this thesis, our unit of analysis is coordinated through the notion of a ‘decision 
procedure.’ Before continuing, we need to be clear about the status of this notion. I do 
not identify a decision procedure in art as simply a straightforward, purposeful choice, 
such as is sometimes inferred by Marcel Duchamp’s identification of the readymade as a 
‘choice’ (Tomkins and Duchamp, Marcel 2013, 51–54). I am proposing a way of thinking 
of a decision procedure as something that arises as an event, that may be unplanned 
and unintended, but whose consequentiality involves valuing art in some way. Such a 
model of a decision procedure is not a ‘theory’ of art based on an identification of art 
with intentional choice. The order of explanation is the other way around. When I 
scrutinize Cady Noland’s Chicken in a Basket within the scope and purposes of this 
project, I discern that there was a decisive occasion or event. The event has certain 
features I describe below, such that a rubber chicken—plus all the things that led up to it 
and surround it—ended up in a basket and subsequently became salient as art. Whether 
this was planned or intuitive or took several days or only an instant is not immediately 
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clear, but I can say, from my vantage now, that something decisive happened in terms of 
art. The concrete experiences of art compel us to appeal to such an explanation. 
Noland’s rubber chicken, as a concrete thing in the world, is the reason for this thesis, or 
at least one of them. Randall Auxier Gary Herstein put it more formally: ‘concrete 
existence explains the abstract aspects of experience and not vice-versa’ (Auxier and 
Herstein, 2017, 2, emphasis theirs). In framing art as a decision procedure, my aim, in 
Chapter 5, will be to claim that art is able to create new modes or manners of decision 
procedure. With this in mind, in the rest of this section I begin to outline the notion of a 
decision procedure being developed here. 
A decision procedure in art is an ‘event’ in the sense of a definite coming together of 
multiple agencies through which, simultaneously, participants are engaged, there is a 
valuing of art, and the decision procedure itself is choreographed. In one such event, a 
rubber chicken and some cans and a basket gained a definiteness in a valuing of art.  
The word ‘event’ deserves a little expanding. A good example of an event of the 
Whiteheadian kind we are describing is a democratic vote, such as the one that occurred 
in the Brexit referendum. The character of an event is that it has bookend—for example 
the first polling booth opening and the last vote being counted— through which we say 
that there is a definite ‘before’ and an ‘after,’ in which the event took place. The event 
has a certain duration that designates it as an event. If we scrutinize the event, we can 
say that, in the Brexit referendum event, the U.K. voted to leave. Of course, this a highly 
compressed version of the referendum as event, since there is an inexhaustible amount 
of further detail we can discover if we examine it more closely: differing votes by regions 
or by age or time or party allegiance, for example. All of this, including our assignments 
of bookends, is part of what we give as ‘explanation’ of the event. An actual event 
simply is. Language is a tool we use to explain the event as a unique thing that is.  
To return to art as a decision procedure, it presumably is a smaller-scale event than 
a national referendum, but it still has the character of having bookends, through which 
we say that it happened. It also has an inexhaustible quality, through which, as we study 
it more, we learn there is more to discover. We can describe decision procedures in art 
as events. In these events there is a choreographing of agencies, a valuing of art, and an 
establishing of relations to other decision procedures as well as to other non-art 
entities. Such relations may be to cans and baskets, which, in the absence of a decision 
procedure, are not units of art. Our assertion within this thesis and for the purposes of 
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our research is that all instances of art are accompanied by decision procedures. The 
decision procedure is the unit in our ‘coordinate analysis.’ It is how we coordinate the 
notion of art and subdivide it in more definite terms. This is not a claim that a decision 
procedure is all that is ‘real’ about art; i.e., that if we somehow summed up all decision 
procedures, we would have a total account of art. It is an abstraction only, an analysis 
providing a selective attention to certain structural features, or what Auxier and 
Herstein call a ‘quantum of explanation’ (Auxier and Herstein 2017, 69). 
As an event, a decision procedure in art is a kind of materialization. The role of 
conscious, purposeful human decision making in a decision procedure may be vague. 
The passage of force registered in pigmented matter may be a decisive decision 
procedure in a painting, even if the painter at that moment had not anticipated that this 
particular mark would be the one which announced the completion of the painting as 
such. In other words, a decision procedure may be one in which spontaneous, 
sometimes surprising, or possibly non-useful peripheral activity is a factor. It may be 
only be after the fact that we recognize the event as a decision procedure for art. 
Such decision procedures may relate to each other and to other more distant 
decision procedures. When I first encountered Chicken in a Basket, I thought nothing 
more of it. Later, in my studio, I was working with a digital drawing tool that limits my 
line lengths to 1.5 meters; after I finished my scribbling, a visitor saw one of my 
drawings and asked why I was drawing chickens. I titled the drawing a meter and a half 
of rubber chicken. The decision procedure here included a digital activity and a 
participation with a visitor that, on inspection, has some real, if unclear, relation to 
Noland’s work.  
A decision procedure, then, is a unit of analysis that I have chosen in the present 
inquiry in order to provide a scaffolding for thinking about relations that arise within art. 
I am asserting that within such decisive occasions there is some kind of some kind of 
forming and choreographing, some kind of engagement of agencies, and some kind of 
activating of art as a value. These are part of a ‘genetic analysis’ of a decision procedure, 
that is, a breakdown of a decision procedure as a unity into its parts for the purposes of 
our inquiry. The description to this point is still far too generic to be recognizable as any 
kind of art. I have left open what kinds of engagements and materials are enlisted in a 
decision procedure; how they are embodied; to what degree they are algorithmic; 
spontaneous, or conscious; and how the artistic valuing is evaluated and determined. 
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Within the thesis, I will further refine and extend my notion of a decision procedure in 
each chapter, focusing especially on notions that I will argue are relevant to peripheral 
digital activity. Such manner of analysis is relevant for this project because it doesn’t 
predetermine how a particular decision procedure involves digital, material, or human 
engagement and how this engagement then choreographs a relation to the activating 
and valuing of art. In other words, it sidesteps a subject-object paradigm in which a 
knowing human ‘subject’ interacts with an ‘object’ by constructing a unit of analysis that 
spans different manners of activities and engagements, including what I am calling 
peripheral digital activity.   
In our discussion, we have not established a fixed temporal or spatial frame. A 
decision procedure as an event in art is some definite span. It is some real, extensive 
occurrence. Consistent with our interest in peripheral digital activity, we allow that a 
decision procedure may refer to a broader span of spatiotemporal activity than is 
typically followed in theories of immanent interactivity.  
The implication is that, in my analysis, I need to pay special attention to particular 
concrete decision procedures at hand, to understand how they choreograph relations of 
valuing art and engaging agencies. Such an examination may necessitate further 
mentalistic, materialistic, algorithmic, and artistic specification, according to the 
particular decision procedure being studied and the purpose of the investigation. The 
mode of analysis followed here is therefore partial, incomplete, and purpose specific.  
The various kinds of mental, material, or digital activity invite distinct inquiries with 
their own associated methods, ontologies, and lineages. For ease of analysis, I will 
pursue discussion of different aspects of a decision procedure separately, on their own 
terms, and allow that a decision procedure choreographs and fuses these together. This 
arrangement facilitates our inquiry by providing a clearer structure for carrying forward 
the investigation, which I discuss in the thesis outline below.  
Thesis Outline 
In the previous section, I introduced a ‘coordinate’ and ‘genetic’ analysis of art as a 
‘decision procedure.’ This analysis provides a scaffolding intended to introduce terms 
that I will further develop, in order to carry forward the investigation. 
Each chapter dives into a topic and, at the end, returns to the notion of a decision 
procedure, modifying and elaborating the scheme on the basis of findings. Each chapter 
 20 
is therefore an independent phase that is also cumulative part in the ‘satisfaction’ of the 
research question. Below is a roadmap:  
Chapter 2, Whitehead-centred Research, acknowledges the diversity of Whitehead 
research and discusses how this project sits in relation to other work. I explain why the 
project is Whitehead-centric and retains close attention to the metaphysics Alfred 
Whitehead sets forth. I discuss issues in methodologies. The chapter concludes by 
suggesting that a ‘decision procedure’ is an analogy for what Whitehead calls an actual 
entity.  
Chapter 3, Actual Entities, is devoted to providing a brief outline of Whitehead’s 
metaphysics to clarify what actual entities are and how they fit within his scheme. I 
conclude this chapter by identifying the actual entity as the ‘mattering’ of decision 
procedures. While the chapter is primarily summative, the end of this chapter discusses 
Whitehead’s philosophy in terms of notions of a ‘maculate conception,’ stressing the 
role of the periphery in each actual entity’s process.  
Chapter 4, Digital Entities, turns to discuss the digital in greater depth. I show why 
Whitehead is of special relevance in studies of the digital. Through a reading of James 
Bradley, I argue that Whitehead’s actual entities can be thought of in terms of ‘general 
function,’ which I contrast with notions of digital function. The claim is that Whitehead’s 
metaphysics already generalizes to digital entities: Digital function takes place through 
general function. However, digital function is a narrow idealisation of general function, 
which can result in a ‘bifurcation’ of the digital. The chapter concludes that in order to 
properly locate the mattering of digital function in artistic decision procedures, it must 
be reconnected to concrete and context-specific circumstances.  
Chapter 5, Tino’s Handshake, turns to contemporary art and examines the constructed 
situations of contemporary artist Tino Sehgal. The chapter begins by describing Sehgal’s 
practice. I argue that Sehgal’s acquisition process requires that we examine his work 
more systemically and not only in terms of the individual artistic encounters. I examine 
readings of participatory art and conceptual art applicable to Sehgal’s practice. Tracing 
systems art in conceptualism, I discuss connections between systems art and 
Whitehead’s systematic philosophy. The chapter then returns to the notion of ‘decision 
procedures,’ comparing Sol LeWitt’s and Adrian Piper’s conceptualism and decision 
procedures with the kinds of unfolding participatory activity in Sehgal’s constructed 
situations. I propose that Sehgal’s decision procedures are monist and seek to model 
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‘general function.’ The chapter concludes with a return to the discussion of peripheral 
digital activity. I argue that constructed situations offer an example of one strategy for 
critically investigating and reconfiguring the effects of peripheral digital activity. 
Coda: Anonymous Painting Looks at the large-scale paintings of Laura Owens. I consider 
Owens’s use of the phrase ‘anonymous gesture’ as another possible example of a 
monist decision procedure in contemporary art. Here, I adopt a Whiteheadian framing 
more loosely, so as to point towards future directions for the research. 
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2. Whitehead-centred Research 
In Chapter 1, I identified Whitehead’s philosophy of organism as a guiding theoretical 
framework for the thesis. In this chapter, I situate my research in relation to the field of 
Whitehead scholarship and discuss methodologies. At the end of the chapter, I return to 
the notion of ‘decision procedures’ as art that I introduced in Chapter 1 and propose the 
decision procedure as a metaphysical analogy. 
Whitehead’s metaphysics addresses nature at its most general level, in terms of 
microcosmic ‘actual entities’ and not in terms of appropriate strategies or forms of 
practice in contemporary art. As Lewis Ford notes, ‘Whitehead is concerned with 
metaphysically necessary principles of the widest scope, and has little to say about the 
contingencies of humankind and the human situation. Ethics (and political philosophy) 
cannot get started without some assumptions about these contingencies’ (L. S. Ford 
1998).  
Whitehead offers some discussion of art in his philosophy, but there is little in the 
way of contingencies that could illuminate a thesis on contemporary art. Whitehead has 
been more frequently discussed in theology and science and remains relatively unknown 
within discourses of contemporary art. For this thesis, therefore, it is important to 
further overview the field of contemporary Whitehead research.  
The Whitehead Revival 
Since the 1990s, there have been renewed efforts to connect Whitehead’s metaphysics 
to contemporary social and political life (Morris 1991, 3). This is part of what Mark 
Hansen diagnoses as a ‘veritable renaissance of Whitehead scholarship’ (Hansen 2015, 
88), and Auxier and Herstein call ‘the contemporary revival’ of Whitehead (Auxier and 
Herstein 2017, 14).  
The recent responses to Whitehead’s philosophy of organism have been remarkably 
diverse. To give a few examples of the breadth of Whiteheadian research, in preparatory 
reading for this project some of the recent publications I encountered touched on topics 
as varied as: quantum mechanics (Epperson 2012), relativity theory (Desmet and Weber 
2010), theories of mind (Weekes 2012), media theory and digital art (Hansen 2015; 
Barker 2012), sociology (Halewood 2014), gender and queer studies (Faber, Halewood, 
and Lin 2012), computational architecture (Parisi 2013), science studies (Stengers 2011), 
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and speculative realism (Shaviro 2014; Bryant, Srnicek, and Harman 2011). There is a 
wealth of commentary and research in the process studies community and the Center 
for Process Studies at Claremont, co-directed by Roland Faber, as well as within the field 
of theology, much in connection to Charles Hartshorne’s influential process theology.     
In my view, recent scholarship on the philosophy of organism can broadly be divided 
in two. Many projects draw on Whitehead and combine his notions, at times obliquely, 
with other influences and disciplines to support and inspire movement in new 
directions. Examples include the scholars Bruno Latour, Donna Haraway, Mark Hansen, 
Brian Massumi, and Judith Butler—thinkers who admit a Whiteheadian influence, and 
add a range of other theoretical positions so as to pursue novel modes of thought.  
Other projects seek to understand the coherence, implications, and spirit of the 
framework established by Whitehead, an approach I label Whitehead-centred (or 
‘Whiteheadist’). Here we find numerous subgroups. Scholars such as Jorge Luis Nobo 
(1986) and Judith Jones (1998) aim to critique, modify, and develop Whitehead’s 
metaphysical categories, including the category of the ultimate, the eight categories of 
existence, the twenty-seven categories of explanation, and the nine categorial 
obligations of Process and Reality. Others seek to elucidate Whitehead’s project more 
broadly at a higher level, staying true to the spirit of the philosophy of organism; in this 
group one exemplar is Isabelle Stengers’s Thinking with Whitehead (Stengers 2011), a 
book that is a valuable resource for humanities researchers looking for an entrance into 
Whitehead’s project. Stengers follows the line of scholarship that argues Whitehead’s 
thought is not a rigorous whole but represents a complex, sliding, piecemeal 
development (L. S. Ford 1985; Lucas 1989; Stengers 2011). Others seek new 
interpretations of Whitehead. One important recent example for this thesis is by Auxier 
and Herstein (2017). They reject the ‘compositional analysis’ approach of Stengers and 
Ford, and stress the importance of mathematical methods and modelling for 
understanding Whitehead. Others provide important comparative and contextual 
analyses and interpretations of Whitehead’s philosophy, including Steven Shaviro 
(Shaviro 2014, 2012) and David Ray Griffin (Griffin 2007). Finally, there are many other 
efforts to carry Whitehead’s reformist notions of subjectivity towards other discourses 
and disciplines, for instance, Michael Halewood’s mapping of Whitehead into sociology 
(Halewood 2013) and Melanie Sehgal’s research on Whitehead connected to new 
materialist feminist thought (Sehgal 2014). 
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This thesis follows a Whitehead-centred route, seeking to harness Whitehead’s 
approach more directly in a study of peripheral digital activity in contemporary art. Such 
an application of Whitehead’s metaphysics presents its own hurdles. I do not attempt to 
further distil or synthesize Whitehead’s philosophical doctrine with other contemporary 
theoretical positions such as those by Latour, Deleuze or Butler. It is not that I believe 
such combinations are wrongheaded—on the contrary, they are crucial to the project of 
updating Whitehead’s thinking for the present. However, multiple theoretical braids 
create interpretive demands and, with them, the risks of talking at cross purposes. As 
Whitehead notes, ‘Most of the muddles of philosophy are, I think, due to using a 
language which is developed from one point of view to express a doctrine based upon 
entirely alien concepts’ (ESP 117). Given the terrain this thesis already covers, I focus my 
efforts primarily on developing an interpretation of Whitehead that is useful within the 
purposes of this project, bringing together notions of art and the digital.  
Media Theory and Metacomputation 
There is relevant related Whitehead research, in terms of media theory and 
computation, and also in the humanities. I outline some of this research below. 
Both Mark Hansen and Tim Barker (Hansen 2015; Barker 2012) examine 
Whitehead’s views while drawing on their backgrounds in media theory. Media theory 
has long held an interest in dynamic processes, a topic Whitehead has much to say 
about. Media theorist Marshall McLuhan was known to have been influenced by 
Whitehead (Coupland 2010, 45, 59). Media theory therefore offers one productive route 
for bringing together discussions of Whitehead, art, and the digital. 
I do not directly address media theory in this thesis. One factor in this decision is 
that adopting a media-theoretic perspective risks eliminating from consideration 
conceptualist, social, and participatory practices of art which do not automatically 
assume that art has a theory of media. A second point of concern is the multiple 
overloading of notions of mediation and media. For instance, Barker observes that the 
term ‘mediation’ is used in one way in the tradition of media studies, drawing on the 
legacies of Hegel, Marx, and Engels. He then proposes to reconfigure this tradition, 
introducing his own use of the term ‘mediation’ as a name for generative process 
(Barker 2012, 10–12). A third source of usages come from Whitehead himself. 
Whitehead uses the term ‘mediation’ to refer to how one entity arbitrates or modulates 
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others (PR 49, 141) as well as to characterise the degrees of separation between entities 
(PR 226). Elsewhere, Whitehead writes that ‘the world can be conceived as a medium 
for the transmission of influences’ (PR 286). This notion of the ‘world as medium’ 
corresponds to the doctrine that activity is generational, with one generation of actual 
entities feeding forward data to the next, so that activity can be analogized as a 
transmission of data in a medium. Untangling these multiple overlapping usages is a 
significant project and risks distracting from our focus on Whitehead. Given these 
concerns, I have chosen to defer an investigation of media theory to later work. 
Another pathway for combining Whitehead, art, and the digital is charted in Luciana 
Parisi’s new materialist discussion of computational architecture (Parisi 2013). A major 
goal in Parisi’s work is to argue that computational algorithms, as found in parametric 
architecture, represent a new category of non-anthropic ‘thought’ that is not predicated 
upon a neurological mind having those thoughts (Parisi 2013, 235). That is, for Parisi, the 
algorithm is a distinct and novel species. The objective, then, is to formulate a language 
to characterise this kind of computational thinking-being as a new yet alien mode of 
thought, to capture what it is like to be such an algorithm. Here Parisi moves beyond the 
conventional ways of describing algorithms as stepwise procedural operations. She 
introduces terms such as ‘infinite infinities’, ‘incomputabilities,’ ‘computational 
interferences,’ ‘randomness,’ ‘infinite quantities of data,’ and ‘incompressible data.’ 
Parisi’s argument draws on a close reading of Whitehead recast using computational 
terminology. For example, where Whitehead proposes that the world is not reducible to 
logical axioms, Parisi’s version of this is: ‘Against the metacomputational view of a 
universe contained in simpler axioms, I will argue that incomputable limits are truly 
intrinsic to computation’ (2013, 20). Or again, where Whitehead claims there is no pre-
fixed ordering of becoming, Parisi’s framing is: ‘Ontological complexity or chaotic 
incompleteness does not emerge from order, but is rather the unconditional condition 
… of procedural calculations’ (2013,  20). Said in another way, the purpose of Parisi’s 
project is to leverage Whiteheadian concepts to intervene in metacomputation, not 
metaphysics. Her mixing of computer terminology with Whitehead’s neologisms can 
sometimes lead to double vision as we decode whether a given proposition stands as a 
metaphysical claim, a metacomputational claim, or both. Among those challenged by 
Parisi’s account will be computer scientists, who will not recognize her definition of 
algorithms as ‘data structures that are internally conditioned by infinities as 
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incomputable entities’ (2013, 83). Stated modestly, Parisi’s goal is to make explicit an 
under-diagnosed issue of error within the theory of algorithms. Her more extraordinary 
claim is that computational algorithms themselves constitute original modes of 
speculative thought (2013, 9).  
I admire Parisi’s project, but I have chosen not to follow Parasi for this thesis. I share 
with Parisi many of the same starting points and convictions. At the same time, her 
primary concern appears to be to establish computation as a novel and important kind 
of agency on its own, albeit with more mysterious (infinite, incomputable) 
underpinnings than is proposed by cognitivists and emergentists (2013, 170). This leads 
Parisi to highlight computational technologies as separate from us. They ‘do not exist in 
direct relation to human thinking,’ have ‘a certain degree of autonomy’ (2013, preface), 
and may ‘have acquired a new, ontological status that is unrelated to the preexistence 
of biophysical bodies’ (2013, 1). Her motivation in stressing this separation is, I believe, 
to put pressure on the notion of computation. She wishes to challenge the view of 
computing as a fixed sequencing of operations, in order to argue that algorithms ‘cannot 
be contained by a [conventional] metacomputational ontology’ (2013, 7). This explains 
why Parisi investigates computational complexity and advanced technical applications 
such as parametric geometries in architecture, rather than examining the architectural 
sites themselves. I affirm the thrust of Parisi’s critique. As for Parisi, my interest in 
peripheral digital activity is precisely how digital activity escapes our conscious thinking 
patterns. At the same time, in this project my focus is on the digital as we encounter it 
together. In my view, even the simplest networked devices, ubiquitously deployed, can 
be more consequential than computationally exotic algorithms. The Paris attackers in 
2015 used SMS messaging on cheap disposable devices, to devastating effect. They 
required no encryption, hardly any data, and only the most straightforward messaging 
algorithms. Such digital exploits call for new kinds of peripheral digital awareness.  
Humanities and the Social Sciences 
Turning away from media theory and metacomputation, the question remains which 
approaches we use to bridge between Whitehead and contemporary art. What I 
consider next casts a broader net, looking at some of the ways Whitehead has been 
taken up in higher-level terms within other areas in the humanities.  
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Here we quickly encounter scepticism as to whether metaphysics can play a role at 
all. Rehearsing long-standing anti-metaphysical attitudes (see, for example, Rorty and 
O’Shea 1995), Christian Thorne in a recent essay challenges new materialists on whether 
a philosophical ontology of primordial nature is able to contribute to debates on human 
affairs and politics. At the core of Thorne’s argument is the issue of metaphysical 
levelling:  
Let’s say you believe that the entire world is made out of fire … water itself is a 
mingling of fire air with burning air. The cosmos is ablaze. … How are you going to derive 
a political program from this insight, and in what sense could that program be a politics 
of fire? How, that is, are you going to get from your ontology to your political proposals? 
For if fire is not just a political good, but is in fact the very stuff of existence, the world’s 
primal and universal substance, then it need be neither produced nor safeguarded. No 
merely human arrangement—no parliament, no international treaty, no tax policy—
could dislodge it from its primacy. It will no longer make sense to describe yourself as a 
partisan of fire, since you cannot be said to defend something that was never in danger, 
and you cannot be said to promote something that is everywhere already present. Your 
ontology, in other words, has already precluded the possibility that fire is a choice or that 
it is available only in certain political frameworks. This is the fate of all political 
ontologies: The philosophy of all-being ends up cancelling the politics to which it is only 
superficially attached. (Thorne 2013) 
Whitehead only partially addresses Thorne’s criticism. I want to briefly expand on 
this here, since it offers insights into how we might take up Whitehead’s project. 
Thorne lists three ways that metaphysics might avoid a totalising emptying of 
politics. His first proposal, that metaphysics may allow for some hierarchy, is the route I 
believe Whitehead follows. Whitehead’s philosophy of organism analyses our cosmic 
epoch in terms of actual entities. Actual entities do not exist as universally 
undifferentiated sameness: The actual entities inside a black hole differ from those in a 
stone. According to Whitehead, actual entities are multifarious and peculiar, ‘they differ 
among themselves: God is an actual entity, and so is the most trivial puff of existence in 
far-off empty space’ (PR 18).  
This difference is not merely a selection of different combinations of properties. 
Whitehead argues that existence presents categories that ‘proceed from “contrasts,” to 
“contrasts of contrasts,” and on indefinitely to higher grades of contrasts’ (PR 22). Here, 
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what is important to stress is that, for Whitehead, actual entities operate through 
different kinds of contrast irreducible to simpler analysis. He argues that actual entities 
are more than a collective disjunction of component elements. What does this mean? In 
Whitehead’s speculative scheme, each actual entity is a particular unique individual with 
its own self-determining aim. It may be analysable in simpler terms, but it cannot be 
reduced to neat categories or classes: ‘This doctrine has the same ground as the 
objection to the class-theory of particular substances. The doctrine is a commonplace of 
art’ (PR 229).  
As an example, a ray of light may be analysable in terms of its red, green, and blue 
components. But this does not mean that if we construct a hue from a mixture of red, 
green, and blue, the result is the same thing as the original spectral ray, even if it 
appears similar to our eye, as a prism quickly demonstrates.  
Similarly, actual entities cannot be built mechanically from component parts. 
Whitehead takes this a step further. In the spirit of the British emergentists, he argues 
that actual entities construct novel and irreducible grades of contrast that feed forward 
to the next generation, leading to an ‘emergent evolution’ of contrasts (PR 229). In other 
words, actual entities in the world are self-modifying and evolving, constructing new and 
varying types of ontological order.  
Emergentism draws on observations in physics that, as the structural complexity of a 
system increases, new physical properties arise that were not predictable from or 
reducible to those previously exhibited, either by their simple constituents or by their 
sum. This is the idea of ‘the real emergence of qualitative novelties, arising from the 
increasing structural complexity of phenomena’ (Brioschi 2013, 83). In Whitehead’s 
metaphysics, actual entities can have greater or lesser intensities of patterned contrast 
(the topic of intensity and contrast is explored in Jones 1998, 41), which can feed 
forward generationally. If intensity of contrast is unevenly distributed, politics returns to 
metaphysics, since, as Thorne colourfully puts it, ‘if you possess ontological rankings of 
this kind, you should be able to set some political priorities on their basis, finding ways 
to reward the objects (and people? and groups?) that carry their fiery qualities close to 
the surface, corona-like, and, equally, to punish those objects and people who burn but 
slowly and in secret. You might even decide that it is your vocation to help the world’s 
minimally fiery things—trout ponds, shale—become more like its maximally fiery 
things—volcanoes, oil-drum barbecue pits’  (Thorne 2013).  
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However, even a brief examination of Whitehead’s theory of emergence hits 
potholes. Whitehead offers no full treatment of emergence; he does not clearly 
articulate his views in connection with other emergent cosmologies such as those by 
Morgan, Alexander or Bergson; he does not propose emergence as a mechanism to 
explain the arising of mentality and consciousness. George R. Lucas closely studies the 
place of evolution and emergence in Whitehead’s philosophy (Lucas 1989, 50–65) and 
concludes that ‘Whitehead is not an emergent evolutionist, nor is he an evolutionary 
cosmologist in the more general sense. No clearly deﬁnable doctrine of evolution is in 
evidence in his philosophy. His statements about evolution and the emergent 
evolutionists are vague, and occasionally even contradictory. He does not appear overly 
concerned with giving further interpretation to the idea of evolution, and evidently he 
had not clearly thought through his own position on evolution in anything approaching a 
systematic sense’ (1989, 68). Emergentism is one mechanism within Whitehead’s 
metaphysical toolkit but not one that can be used to adequately solve Thorne’s 
problem. Whitehead provides no full answer to Thorne’s issue, namely a systematic 
pathway that navigates from low-level metaphysical actual entities to his broader 
political, social, and cultural proposals. 
On the other hand, Whitehead does frequently discuss broader issues. Whitehead 
moves from theorizations of metaphysical categories to wide forays into art, culture, 
history, and politics without drawing bright lines between disciplines. We find this 
especially in works such as Modes of Thought and Adventures of Ideas, though 
discussions of the implications of his philosophy of organism for human life occur 
throughout Whitehead’s writings. For example, in a discussion of his theory of symbolic 
reference, Whitehead inserts the phrase ‘it is the task of reason to understand and 
purge the symbols on which humanity depends’ (SYM 7). Or, in Modes of Thought, he 
writes, ‘History is the record of the expressions of feeling peculiar to humanity’ (MT 37). 
These sidelong remarks reflect Whitehead’s refusal to reduce his philosophy to 
metaphysical technicalities (Halewood 2013, 122). Whitehead’s aim is not merely to 
conceive of a rigorous description of the smallest puffs of existence. His project in 
parallel, and inseparably, shifts from the construction of abstractions to descriptions of 
the consequences of these abstractions for us. Whitehead both builds and ‘plays’ his 
abstractions in his head and seeks to communicate this to us within his philosophy. Such 
an iterative approach to conceiving and testing is integral to his work. We see this at the 
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start of Process and Reality. Whitehead first defines ‘speculative philosophy’ as ‘the 
endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of 
which every element of our experience can be interpreted’ (PR 3). Whitehead 
immediately adds: 
Philosophers can never hope finally to formulate these metaphysical first principles. 
Weakness of insight and deficiencies of language stand in the way inexorably … Our 
datum is the actual world, including ourselves; … The true method of discovery is like the 
flight of an aeroplane. It starts from the ground of particular observation; it makes a 
flight in the thin air of imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed 
observation rendered acute by rational interpretation. (PR 4–5) 
Here we see Whitehead’s response to Thorne’s issue of metaphysical levelling. 
Whitehead asserts that, while metaphysical theories are incomplete and partial, it 
remains possible to interrogate these abstractions and engage in analogical question 
asking at a high level, through iterations of thinking and testing from the ‘ground of 
particular observation.’ Indeed, such iterative refinement is how renewed interpretation 
is formed. In Whitehead’s philosophy, instead of presenting only a metaphysical model, 
his objective is to make available both aspects of his conception, his metaphysical 
inquiry into first principles and his flights of imaginative generalization. Such a position 
may not give us a fully worked-out political ontology, but it points in directions we may 
travel. It is what Stengers describes as an ‘etho-ecology’: an approach that connects the 
ethos, or way, of a living being with its oikos, the whole to which it belongs, including the 
‘many links, niches, and collectivities produced by the ethos that mutually imply one 
another, and on which each depends in one way or another’ (Stengers 2011, 164). If we 
commit to such an etho-ecology in an inquiry into peripheral digital activity and art, the 
next question that arises is how we might we adapt this ethos methodologically. 
A Whitehead Methodology? 
One factor uniting Whitehead scholars and artists, including Isabelle Stengers, Steven 
Shaviro, Michael Halewood, Brian Massumi, Steve Goodman, Luciana Parisi, Erin 
Manning, Mark Hansen, Mike Michael, Melanie Sehgal, Martin Savransky, and others is 
the desire to extend Whitehead’s flights of imaginative generalization. The aim is, to use 
Stengers’s phrase, to take up ‘the baton of Whitehead’s text’ (Stengers 2011, 25). 
Stengers continues: 
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What matters to me is to inhabit the movement that Whitehead proposes for 
thought, and, without stopping this movement, to experience and put to the test the way 
in which it is or is not able to receive questions that Whitehead did not ask because they 
are not those of his time. In other words, my choice is not to interpret but to try to 
transmit, that is, also, as every lover of Whitehead knows, to take up again in my way, 
tying it in to my questions, that which has no other truth than the set of resumptions to 
which it will give rise. (Stengers 2011, 25)  
Stengers here offers the beginnings of a sketch of a Whiteheadian methodology. For 
the remainder of this section, I discuss issues of methodology, as it pertains to our 
present research question on art and the digital.  
Within practice-based art research, the issue of methodology is a knotted one. 
Scholarly texts (e.g. Elkins 2009; Sullivan 2010; Gray and Malins 2004) offer 
contextualizing overviews and look at some of the historical factors that have given rise 
to practice-based art PhD’s. They also indicate possible categories to assist artist-
researchers. One common reference is Christopher Frayling’s three types of art research 
that might grow: research into art and design, research through art and design, and 
research for art and design (Frayling 1993). Yet while such references provide guidelines, 
the diversity of projects in practice-based art research mandates addressing 
methodology on a case-by-case basis.  
For Whitehead-centred research projects, the topic of methodology is knottier still. 
Whitehead argues that the movement between empirical actualities and intellectual 
generality is frequently hindered and narrowed by the normative procedures of method. 
As Whitehead cautions in The Function of Reason, ‘The more clearly we grasp the 
intellectual analysis of a way [of] regulating procedure … the more decidedly we reject 
the inclusion of evidence which refuses to be immediately harmonized with the method 
before us. Some of the major disasters of mankind have been produced by the 
narrowness of men with a good methodology’ (FR 20).  
Whitehead critiques not only how practices produce knowledge but also how we 
validate knowledge in a given field. To give an example of research conducted for this 
project, one can ask what research knowledge is held in the production of drawing that 
is executed using a digital drawing tool that constrains line output to one inch per hour? 
Or in a drawing made by a researcher in collaboration with their domestic partner to 
reproduce a digital image by drawing it one pixel at a time by hand? If we start from pre-
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existing categories of knowledge and disciplines, the answers to these questions tend to 
reinforce a theory/practice split, in which practice is held to be separable from 
publishable research outcomes (Manning 2016, 1). Yet it was through doing these 
drawings, starting from the midst of a concrete ‘interaction’ I believed I already 
understood, that I encountered unquantifiable experiences that changed the course of 
my inquiry. I started to consider the digital not as a purposeful ‘interactive technology’ 
and instead in terms of peripheral activity, something that shaped the manner of my 
experience in ways I found ineffable. How should such ineffable experience be 
constituted in terms of knower and known in a field of knowledge and justified through 
an appeal to methodology?  
Erin Manning takes up precisely this question in her critique of method in The Minor 
Gesture (Manning 2016, 1–39). Manning’s aim is to encourage researchers to listen to 
excluded voices, the voices ‘of knowledges not yet parsed for the academic 
establishment’ (2016, 5–6) that are lurking within experiences. These voices do not yet 
fall neatly into relations of the knower-known or the subject-object, since those 
relations are themselves immanent to the composition of a particular occasion’s coming 
to be. Manning stresses what she calls the ‘more-than’ status of doing, the way that 
doing exceeds prior bounds: 
When something does, new relational fields are forming, and with them, new modes 
of existence. A new mode of existence brings with it modalities of knowledge. These 
modalities of knowledge are not yet circumscribed—they are transversal to the modes of 
operation active in the relational field. They are still in-act. This is the force of radical 
empiricism: it gives us a technique to work with the in-act at the heart of experience. 
(Manning 2016, 5) 
There is a possible spiral within Manning’s critique. She points out the pitfalls of 
method, and the importance of doing. She then describes radical empiricism (a label 
that spans ‘art-based research,’ ‘research-creation,’ and Whitehead’s metaphysics) as a 
technique aimed at avoiding those pitfalls. But her critique of method and emphasis on 
doing is itself amenable to being packaged as a methodology. I believe this is no 
accidental circularity. It corresponds to a view of methodology that is dynamic and 
historical. According to Whitehead, methodology ‘starts as a dodge facilitating the 
accomplishment of some nascent urge of life’ (FR 14). It is a gambit to survive, which 
then becomes an accomplishment of living well. Over time, however, the satisfaction of 
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repetition fades, until the methodology becomes mere life, and the spirit of adventure 
compels life towards new methodologies (FR 14–15). While Manning states that she is 
‘against’ method, it is perhaps more accurate to say she is against the imposition of 
method from without. She calls for a renewal of a dynamic methodology that is 
immanent to each project: ‘[This] means taking the work’s affirmation, its urge of 
appetition, at face value, asking what thought-feeling does in this instance, and how it 
does it’ (Manning 2016, 14). To repeat Stengers, it is ‘to take up again in my way, tying it 
in to my questions, that which has no other truth than the set of resumptions to which it 
will give rise’ (Stengers 2011, 25, emphasis added).  
This self-disclosing aspect of methodology may be why, when Halewood and Michael 
address the issue of Whitehead-centric methodology in the field of sociology, they do so 
‘tentatively’ (Halewood and Michael 2008, 31). They offer preliminary guidelines 
(Halewood and Michael 2008, 44; Halewood 2013, 5), commenting that the guidelines 
do not ‘raise these to principles or injunctions: our tactics are best regarded as 
emergent in their instantiation within the actual occasions of research practice’ (2008, 
53). It is incumbent on each project to self-identify its methods and guidelines.  
Working with Analogies  
It is time to step back from our survey of secondary literature and consider the 
methodological strategies proposed for this study. In this section, distilling from 
Halewood, Michael, Manning, and Auxier and Herstein, I point to some of the guidelines 
followed in this research: 
Side-by-side ontologies. This thesis aims to marshal far-flung discourses, including 
those of digital technologies and contemporary art, within a Whiteheadian perspective. 
A danger of Whitehead’s metaphysics, with its emphasis on the smallest occasions of 
existence, is that it risks sidestepping the ‘art’ elements. Whitehead rejects or provides 
alternative conceptualizations for many of the staple ‘habits of thought’ (PR xiii), 
including the subject-predicate form of expression and permanent substances. In doing 
so, Whitehead upends basic language idioms. To introduce Whitehead in a discourse on 
art necessitates re-envisagement, transformation and reinvention of terms2. Whitehead 
provides clues that serve as starting points. But the scale of a Whiteheadian reformation 
is extreme, and researchers must decide how and when to turn to such a metaphysics, 
                                                        
2  Michael Halewood makes a similar point in relation to the 'social' (Halewood 2013, 3–5). 
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based on the benefits it may bring to specific problem areas. Pragmatically, this suggests 
adopting a Whiteheadian ontology side by side with substance-ontological perspectives, 
and acknowledging that such hybrid contraptions are historically situated. In what 
follows, I explicitly make room within the body of the thesis for the inclusion of other 
(non-Whiteheadian) voices and world-views, without attempting to read everything 
through a Whitehead-centred lens. Discussions from multiple paradigms are allowed to 
jostle, following their own manners, adding what they can.  
Iterative refinement. Technical terms in Whitehead’s text, e.g., the word 
‘prehension,’ do not have a single standing. Each term’s use is shaped by the unfolding 
analysis, sometimes even within a paragraph, in order to clarify a point, always in 
reference to the initial coordinating whole established at the start of each book (Auxier 
and Herstein 2017, 112–41 and passim). Whitehead’s analysis of technical terms varies 
from topic to topic and paragraph to paragraph and according to the purpose of the 
investigation. This is similar to the way that Latour stresses that his actor network theory 
‘prefers to travel slowly, on small roads, on foot’ (Latour 2005, 22), or that Halewood 
describes his project as ‘tracing’ a culture of thought. In this thesis, I work by refining 
and retracing and modifying. Each chapter returns to the he topic of a decision 
procedure, with due reconsideration, attending to the research question that initiated 
the inquiry.  
Analogies. Whitehead’s is not an elementalist; i.e., he is not proposing that we can 
define the low-level entities of the universe, and then, through some systematic 
mechanism of composition, arrive at explanations at a higher level. Counter to 
scientistic reductionism, Whitehead applies his methods of analysis at different levels, 
constructing different schemes that fit together analogically. The idea is that ‘the whole’ 
may be analysed as analogous levels with different degrees of generality, exposing 
different characteristics. Auxier and Herstein explain: 
[T]he whole takes on a different character at various levels of generality. For 
example, the ‘whole’ as articulated by the theory of perception is called ‘nature,’ and its 
parts are perceptions, their objects, and the forms of relation between these. Taken 
together, the (symbolically) coordinate result of these parts is called ‘science,’ when it is 
derived according to certain kinds of genetic specification (mainly measurement), while 
that same whole is called something like ‘beauty’ when derived according to certain 
intensities of organization, best exemplified in art. The point is that the levels of 
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generality in other of Whitehead’s inquiries, apart from Process and Reality, are similar 
but not identical with those in Process and Reality. (Auxier and Herstein 2017, 38) 3 
Here, I believe, we find another response to Thorne’s critique of metaphysical 
levelling and how we can begin to move towards politics from metaphysics: by choosing 
concrete projects, setting purposes and scopes, choosing appropriate analogies, and 
following research iteratively.  
In our case, given art as a primary axis of our research question, in Chapter 1, I 
identified art as the ‘whole’ of our coordinate analysis. There is no reason to always use 
Whitehead’s technical terms, such as ‘actual entities’ or ‘prehensions’ or ‘concrescence.’ 
This is not a metaphysical treatise but one concerned with art and the digital. At the 
same time, we want to propose analogies that are plausible in Whiteheadian terms. 
Care is needed in in how we construct such analogies.  
In this thesis, I align a ‘decision procedure,’ an event within art, with what 
Whitehead calls a ‘society of actual occasions’ (PR 205). I discuss actual entities and 
actual occasions in more detail in the next chapter. Here I want to note that when I 
describe a decision procedure as engaging with agencies valuing art in a form of self-
choreographing, these closely echo Whitehead’s construction of actual entities. He 
describes actual entities as ‘feeling’ other actual entities, accreting value, and self-
forming in phases of concrescence. I am proposing an analogy that encapsulates details 
of Whitehead’s metaphysics and uses higher-level terms rather than employing phrases 
such as ‘historical routes of intermediate objectifications,’ as I would need to do as a 
metaphysician.  
Whitehead appears to validate such an approach when discussing art. I provide a 
more extended quote below for context: 
When you understand all about the sun and all about the atmosphere and all about 
the rotation of the earth, you may still miss the radiance of the sunset. There is no 
substitute for the direct perception of the concrete achievement of a thing in its 
actuality. We want concrete fact with high light thrown on what is relevant to is 
preciousness. 
                                                        
3 Auxier and Herstein cover the topic of analogies more mathematically and at greater depth. For them, a 
central claim is that in Whitehead’s metaphysics, the quanta of explanation ‘have reality only as analogies, 
and not simplistic identities’ (Auxier and Herstein 2017, 81). Victor Lowe, in his biography of Whitehead, 
makes a similar point. Whitehead does not specify the time span of actual occasions. Instead, says Lowe, 
Whitehead’s cosmology is a general way of thinking, so that ‘anything in human experience may be treated 
as an actual occasion so far as it approximates to the design of an actual occasion set out in the philosophy 
of organism’ (Lowe 1990, 232, 268) 
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What I mean is art and aesthetic education. It is, however, art in such a general sense 
of the term that I hardly like to call it by that name. Art is a special example. What I 
mean is art and aesthetic education … Thus ‘art’ in the general sense that I require is any 
selection by which the concrete facts are so arranged as to elicit attention to particular 
values which are realized by them. For example, the mere disposing of the human body 
and the eyesight so as to get a good view of the sunset is a simple form of artistic 
selection. The habit of art is the habit of enjoying vivid values.  
But in this sense, art concerns more than sunsets. A factory, with its machinery, its 
community of operatives, its social service to the general population, its dependence 
upon organizing and designing genius, its potentialities as a source of wealth to the 
holders of its stock is an organism exhibiting a variety of vivid values. What we want to 
train is the habit of apprehending such an organism in its completeness. (SMW 199, 
underlining added) 
In this passage, Whitehead is not proposing an object-based definition of art, but 
suggesting that art is a kind of activity of functioning and valuing, of selecting and 
attending in order to apprehend organisms as varied as sunsets or factories.4 The claim, 
following Auxier and Herstein, is that Whitehead is here working through analogy. In 
Science and the Modern World, where this passage occurs, the coordinate ‘whole’ is ‘the 
progress of civilization’ (SMW 1). Whitehead’s ‘selecting,’ ‘eliciting attention to values,’ 
and ‘arranging’ are part of his genetic analysis of art in this context, for this purpose. His 
analogy has similarities to my own proposal of a decision procedure in engaging, 
activating of values, and choreographing. Whitehead is asking us to imagine, at the 
basement of it all, a teeming processual horde of ‘actual entities,’ while working, 
analogically, at a much higher level.  
Although the terms of the current project are different, I am proposing something 
similar here in my notion of a ‘decision procedure’ of art as an analogy for a 
Whiteheadian society of actual entities. I have described a decision procedure in art as a 
choreographing, an engaging of agencies, a valuing of art, all set within a relational flux 
of activity. In this case, we must explain in more detail what is entailed by relations and 
choreographing, and what kinds of entities we are setting in motion. In other words, we 
                                                        
4 As a point of historical context, Whitehead published this in 1925, two years after László Moholy-Nagy 
joined the Bauhaus Weimar and ordered Construction in Enamel 2 and 3 made at a local enamel factory, 
allegedly by telephone. The Bauhaus was an art school modelled on the organisation of a factory. For an 
interesting discussion of the Bauhaus and Moholy-Nagy’s interest in art’s relations to organisms and 
systems theory, see Terranova 2016. 
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must spend some time looking beneath the hood to understand how Whitehead 
proposes that processual ‘societies’ of actual entities work. In the next chapter, I first 
briefly outline some of the key features of Whitehead’s metaphysics and, at the end of 
the chapter, return to our discussion of decision procedures in art. 
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3. Actual Entities 
At the end of Chapter 2, I suggested that the ‘decision procedures’ of art within this 
study are held to be analogous to Whitehead’s processual entities. At the heart of 
Whitehead’s philosophy are ‘actual entities.’ For the purposes of the present study, and 
given that Whitehead’s ontology is unfamiliar within contemporary art, this chapter 
introduces actual entities and describes some key features of Whitehead’s metaphysics 
in broad strokes. Whitehead uses unfamiliar notions, so we here lay down some of the 
rudiments of his terminology, including terms such as ‘concrescence’ and ‘eternal 
objects.’ At the end of the chapter, I return to decision procedures, and discuss them in 
terms of the mereology of whole-part relations in Whitehead’s metaphysics. 
The Bifurcation of Nature 
Before discussing the details of Whitehead’s system, it is important to introduce one of 
the central problems that Whitehead seeks to address in his metaphysics, so as to 
understand why Whitehead proposes a radical reformation of philosophical first 
principles.  
Whitehead identifies an intractability between subject and object in Western 
philosophy. He argues that, since Galileo, Descartes, and Locke, the postulated divide 
between res cogitans and res extensa and the distinction between primary and 
secondary qualities has caused troubles. This is because it creates a tendency in Western 
philosophy to view extensive matter as inert, static, and bereft of sensible qualities. This 
leads to what Whitehead describes as a bifurcation of nature, that is: 
… the bifurcation of nature into two systems of reality, which, in so far as they are 
real, are real in different senses. One reality would be the entities such as electrons 
which are the study of speculative physics. This would be the reality which is there for 
knowledge; although in this theory it is never known. For what is known is the other sort 
of reality, which is the byplay of the mind. Thus there are two natures, one is the 
conjecture, the other is the dream. (CN 29) 
A bifurcation occurs in any theory that would ‘bifurcate nature into two divisions, 
namely into the nature apprehended in awareness and the nature which is the cause of 
awareness’ (CN 29). Stengers states it this way: ‘Nature “bifurcates” as soon as, in one 
way or another, the mind is called to the rescue, qua responsible for “psychic additions,” 
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to explain the difference between what we are aware of and what is supposed to belong 
to nature’ (Stengers 2011, 38).  
Through such a bifurcation in science, we find ‘conjectures’ of molecules and 
electrons. Human experiences are described in terms of objectively felt qualities such as 
the warmth of a beach, the blueness of a sky, or the rustling of leaves, but these are a 
dreamlike fluttering of one’s mind. In a bifurcated world view, the conjecture and the 
dream are incommensurable.  
For Whitehead, the bifurcation of nature perpetuates a number of fallacies. He 
describes several ‘myths’ in Process and Reality (PR xiii and passim), including:  
• ‘vacuous actuality’: the belief that matter is lifeless and devoid of subjective 
immediacy (PR 29)  
• the ‘sensationalist doctrine’ of perception, which holds that all knowledge of the 
external world arises from the mediation of private sensations (PR 142)  
• the ‘subject-predicate’ form of proposition, through which statements such as 
‘The whale is big’ are explained away as self-evident metaphysical first principles 
(PR 13) 
•  ‘primary substances’: the classical notion of permanent substances, in which 
individual substances are not present in each other and can relate to other 
substances only externally 
• ‘misplaced concreteness,’ that is, overconfidence in explanations of concrete 
circumstances, neglecting the degree of abstraction involved (PR 7) 
Whitehead argues that as long as philosophy perpetuates a bifurcation of nature and 
retains these myths, it will be incapable of addressing the ‘solidarity of the universe,’ 
and will ‘render this problem incapable of solution’ (PR 57).  Whitehead’s metaphysics is 
the culmination of a lifelong effort to overcome the bifurcation of nature. He seeks to 
reunite two world views: to see the warmth and redness of a sunset and the theories of 
its molecules, electrons, and photons in solidarity, as different ways of grasping at 
relations that are already present in nature. Both types of explanation are ‘essential 
factors in the composition of “really real” things whose interconnections and individual 
characters constitute the universe’ (MT 150). The sometimes bizarre contortions that 
Whitehead finds necessary within his metaphysics are indicative of how pervasive the 
issue of the bifurcation of nature is and how difficult it is to overcome the bifurcation of 
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nature non-reductively, without forcing all explanations to a lowest common 
denominator. 
The recent revival of interest in Whitehead is, I believe, a sign that a growing number 
of scholars recognize that the bifurcation of nature remains a pressing contemporary 
issue across multiple fields of study. As Erin Manning observes, ‘To posit two systems—
one “within the mind” and one “without the mind”—is a methodological posture still 
very much alive in the critical apparatus of the disciplinary model’ (Manning 2016, 3). As 
more researchers seek ways to think across disciplines, holistically and ecologically, 
Whitehead’s scheme has gained relevance.  
More specifically, in terms of this thesis, I return to the discussion of bifurcations in 
the next chapter, when I consider how theories of software lead to a bifurcation of the 
digital. For the remainder of this chapter, I want to sketch in broad strokes some of the 
key features of Whitehead’s scheme, so as to explain why I believe Whitehead is a useful 
thinker of ‘peripheral’ activity.  
Setting a Scope  
This thesis is an application of Whitehead’s ideas, not a philosophical contribution or 
metaphysical treatise. The intended audience includes those who are not Whitehead 
experts. I therefore take certain liberties. I will not, for example, discuss the historical 
climate Whitehead was addressing. or his interlocution with the philosophers he 
references, including Aristotle, Bacon, Bergson, Berkeley, Descartes, Hume, James, Kant, 
Leibniz, Locke, Hume, and Spinoza—thinkers Whitehead famously consigned to a ‘series 
of footnotes to Plato’ (PR 66). Such a discussion is central to understanding Whitehead’s 
project but goes beyond what I can cover here. Similarly, the treatment that follows is a 
higher-level descriptive characterisation of some of the key features of his scheme, 
using a near-obligatory high-level topic-based survey format. The topical format is 
flawed as a means of discussing Whitehead’s philosophy, since it fails to address the 
synoptic coherence of his project. Whitehead wishes to produce a metaphysics of 
solidarity, to place all in the same boat ‘to sink or swim together’ (CN 148). If philosophy 
were like a game of Mikado,5 Whitehead aims to create a Mikado configuration in which 
every stick touches many other sticks, with no stick standing alone. However, his is far 
                                                        
5 Also called pick-up sticks, a game in which brightly coloured sticks are thrown on the table, and the 
objective is to remove sticks without disturbing other sticks in the pile.  
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from a static configuration. Whitehead modifies, edits, and refines his meanings within 
his analysis, and even within a single sentence. He pursued different problems in 
different books. The same technical term may have different interpretations depending 
on this shifting configuration. Reflecting the difficulty of interpretation that results, 
within the secondary literature there are a multitude of different readings of his 
philosophy. Presenting such a project by dividing it into topic areas with brief 
discussions vastly oversimplifies this challenging aspect of Whitehead’s philosophy. I 
have chosen a topical format focusing on aspects of his philosophy out of necessary 
expediency for the purposes of this project, in order to impart the rudiments of 
Whitehead’s system without turning this text into a thesis on Whitehead. To that end, I 
draw on a variety of secondary sources as interpretive aids6 and cover only selective 
topics, paying heed to the needs and scope of the present research question.  
Actual Entities and Lifecycles  
Whitehead holds that concrete existence can be analysed in terms of a fluxing process 
consisting of myriad entities. Whitehead uses the term ‘actual entity’ to refer to one of 
these entities of existence. ‘Actual entities … are the final real things of which the world 
is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real. … The 
final facts are, all alike, actual entities’ (PR 18). Anything that exists is made up of teams 
of actual entities. Actual entities are the concrete, indivisible units the universe is made 
from, the ‘atoms’ in Whitehead’s system, though it is important to remember that 
actual entities are not tiny particles we can discover, e.g., using the instruments of 
science. Whitehead is referring us to microcosmic things, not microscopic ones; i.e., 
these are the kind of entities necessary to describe how the world is constructed in a 
processual metaphysics. What physicists call an electron is for Whitehead a whole 
shower of actual entities. Whitehead’s interest is in the smallest concrete things of the 
actual world: actual entities are an abstraction he develops to help explain the world’s 
concrete units. Whitehead follows a Leibnizian monadic style of thought: There is only 
one type of primitive actual entity. All the things we encounter in experience, from 
                                                        
6 In my reading, I am most influenced by a triad of Whitehead scholarship:  Judith Jones (1998) captures the 
internal, poetic, and genetic aspects of the concrescence of actual entities; Auxier and Herstein’s (2017) new 
interpretation of Whitehead persuasively describes the models, methods and principles underlying his 
philosophy; and Stengers (2011) conveys the spirit and arc of Whitehead’s thought beyond itself.  
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boiled sweets to sunsets to symphony orchestras, are teeming conglomerations of 
actual entities. A complex organism such as a human is a welter of ‘societies’ of ‘living 
occasions’ born from actual entities (Whitehead uses the term ‘actual occasion’ when 
thinking about actual entities from without, in morphological relation to other actual 
entities). As Melanie Sehgal puts it, actual entities are therefore an abstraction that 
offers ‘a hypothetical starting point for our heterogeneous fields of experience and 
knowledge, including everyday experience as well as the counter-intuitive findings of 
quantum physics’ (Sehgal 2014).  
Metaphysical theories either assume persistence and then must explain flux, or they 
assume flux and then explain how things can persist. Whitehead follows the latter 
approach. Actual entities are in flux. Whitehead calls his approach a philosophy of 
organism. As a hylozoist, he describes actual entities using metaphors of biological life. A 
vast stream of actual entities are born each moment. Each actual entity has a lifecycle, 
in which there two distinct periods: The first period is a spontaneous burst of dynamic 
activity called concrescence; this is followed by a second and everlasting period of stasis. 
Both extremes are necessary in order to account for the varying ways things endure.  
If all things are made up of actual entities, this implies there must be a means for 
each actual entity to form itself differently, to account for the different kinds of things 
we encounter in the world—a fleck of consciousness is different from an electron. There 
must be a way for actual entities to form different individual facts in the world. 
Whitehead addresses this through the first, dynamic part of an entity’s lifecycle, the 
actual entity’s ‘concrescence.’ 
Whereas atoms in physics have electrons, neutrons and protons, each of 
Whitehead’s actual entities are processual units, so each goes through various stages of 
process. The name ‘concrescence’ is the term Whitehead uses for the phases of process 
that each actual entity has when it is actively forming itself. Just as worker bees work 
and then die, actual entities concresce and then perish. Each actual entity conducts its 
concrescence independently of other contemporaneous actual entities, outside of what 
we experience as the passage of time. Concrescence refers to the phase when an entity 
receives the world and formulates its response to the world. The response may be as 
trivial as a repetition of a previous pattern or as complex as a puff of conscious decisive 
thought. Each actual entity’s concrescence is the formulation of its definite response, its 
‘this is me in my here and now.’  
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Concrescence lasts for a flicker and then completes when the actual entity reaches 
‘satisfaction’ and terminates, or ‘perishes.’ It then ‘transitions’ to the next stage of its 
existence, where it emerges as a ‘fact’ of the past, at a concrete time and place. It is a 
‘definite, determinate, settled fact, stubborn and with unavoidable consequences’ (PR 
219). After terminating and transitioning, the actual entity then becomes a fact that 
other concrescing actual entities receive as part of their past. They formulate their living 
‘now’ in response to the past. In other words, each actual entity’s concrescence takes 
place independently and, after concrescence completes, the actual entity then effects 
other actual entities: ‘The “effects” of an actual entity are its interventions in 
concrescent processes other than its own’ (PR 220). In this way, after terminating, the 
actual entity is a novelty in what Whitehead calls the ‘creative advance’ of the universe 
(PR 28). Said another way, concrescence is the ‘becoming’ of an actual entity, whereas 
after it perishes and transitions, it is a ‘being’ that impacts the becoming of other actual 
entities. 
In this scheme, what we typically call an object, such as a plate, is a pulsing collection 
of generations of actual entities. It looks permanent to us because entities are 
successional; from one moment to the next, when an entity perishes, a new entity 
spawns to succeed it in a repeating pattern. Rocks or electrons or starlight may appear 
to endure unchanged for long periods of time, but for Whitehead they are successive 
waves of generations of entities—just as Derek Jarman’s Blue (1993) looks like an 
enduring constant colour but is made up of many instances of blue. 
It is in its perishing and transitioning that each actual entity becomes lodged in space 
and time. In Part IV of Process and Reality, Whitehead describes how successive 
generations of contemporaneous collectivities (or nexūs) of entities are divided into 
physical units of space and time. He presents a unique mereotopological ‘epochal’ 
theory of time that generalizes both relativistic and quantum effects.  
For Whitehead, every actual entity ‘decides’ what it is. This is an odd use of the 
word. It does not mean that actual entities are making human-style judgements. It 
means that an actual entity’s concrescence yields a definite determinate result, one that 
is consequential or ‘decisive’ for other subsequent actual entities. Each actual entity 
concrescences independently, but any consequences of the result it arrives at in its 
satisfaction are realized when the entity perishes and becomes a ‘settled fact,’ and new 
actual entities are instantiated to take up where the previous generation left off. This is 
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important for Whitehead’s handling of causality. If actual entity A makes a decision, and 
B is in a subsequent generation, it may behave either conformally or non-conformally in 
response to A’s decision. In the former case, A and B together exhibit efficient cause. In 
the latter case, B exhibits final cause. Each actual entity ‘arises as an effect facing its past 
and ends as a cause facing its future. In between there lies the teleology of the Universe’ 
(AI 194). Whitehead argues that while actual entities are overwhelmingly conformal, i.e., 
efficient cause prevails, there must exist the potential for free behaviour, for the entity 
to be its own final cause. This potential for spontaneity is necessary to account for the 
great wealth of different kinds of ‘living occasions’ that exist in the world, including 
humans but also other animals and simpler life forms. 
While teleological cause appears an odd requirement to insist on for physical things, 
it is important in how Whitehead addresses the impulses and desires of biological life. 
Here Whitehead makes his ‘actual entities’ perform double duty. In order to avoid a 
bifurcation between biological creatures, in possession of a mental life, and non-
biological things, Whitehead retains his monistic approach and uses the same abstract 
actual entities for both. Actual entities have the equipment necessary for ‘higher grade’ 
forms of life, including human consciousness. Whitehead achieves this by extending the 
description of spontaneous concrescence to incorporate sufficient receptive and 
reactionary mechanisms to provide for aesthetics, thought, judgement, emotion, 
intuition, and intellection, achieved through a rich relational model (which I describe in 
the next section). 
One of the major confusions in the philosophy of organism is that, since the same 
actual entity serves this double duty, Whitehead uses multiple and synonymous names 
for his metaphysical notions. Depending on the context and the role he wishes to 
emphasize, Whitehead draws on terms from ontic, mentalist, biologic, mathematical, 
subjectivist, and physicalist vocabularies, sometimes in ways that run counter to 
conventional usages. In discussions of morphology, actual entities are called ‘actual 
occasions.’ In its live period, an actual entity is called a ‘subject’ or a ‘living immediacy’ in 
its ‘becoming,’ having its ‘experience’ for ‘itself.’ An actual entity has a ‘subjective aim’ 
and a ‘subjective form’ that shape the kinds of subjective experience the actual entity 
may have. Whitehead repeatedly reminds us that his ‘subjects’ are concrescing actual 
entities: ‘Apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare 
nothingness’ (PR 167). When a subject concludes its pulsing concrescence and reaches 
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satisfaction, it perishes and enters into the world beyond. As Whitehead says, it is no 
longer its own subject but becomes a ‘superject’ effecting the lives of other subjects. It 
has reached its ‘objective immortality.’ Like passing a baton, a subject experiences a 
brief moment of becoming before transitioning into a superject objectified in the 
experiences of others:  
An actual entity is to be conceived both as a subject presiding over its own 
immediacy of becoming, and a superject which is the atomic creature [after reaching 
satisfaction and perishing] exercising its function of objective immortality. It has become 
a ‘being’; and it belongs to the nature of every ‘being’ that it is a potential for every 
‘becoming.’ (PR 45) 
Whitehead seeks a single set of abstractions that can generalize to both physical and 
biological life forms. However, his subject-object terminology has a distinctly different 
readout from normal usage. Each entity is first subject, then reverses roles and is 
objectified by other subjects. A stone exists as a nexus of subjects (actual entities) each 
having a private living experience of a ‘now.’ But when we touch the stone as an object, 
what we feel is the stone as its ‘superject,’ i.e., as a nexus of actual entities that have 
perished and already are one generation in the past.  
A remark by Marcel Duchamp is here quite helpful: 
 [It is] the interaction of the onlooker, which makes the painting. Without that, the 
painting would disappear in an attic. There would be no actual existence of a work of art. 
It’s always based on the two poles, the onlooker and the maker, and the spark that 
comes from that bipolar action gives birth to something—like electricity. Don’t say that 
the artist is a great thinker because he produces it. The artist produces nothing until the 
onlooker has said, “You have produced something marvellous.” The onlooker has the last 
word on it. (quoted in Tomkins 2013, 31). 
This very much has the flavour of the approach Whitehead adopts with actual 
entities—subsequent generations of actual entities are ‘onlookers’ to previous 
generations, and it is their subsequent activity that gives birth to new novelties. The 
question next is: What is the nature of the ‘bi-polar spark’ that connects an entity and its 
onlooker? 
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Prehensions 
If there is one type of actual entity and a plurality of instances of actual entities of that 
type, this implies a theory of how actual entities can relate, i.e., how what Duchamp 
called a ‘bi-polar action’ can exist. As with his careful accounting of extent and causality, 
Whitehead commits to a robust theory of relation. 
Whitehead rejects the notion that the relations between actual entities are entirely 
external to those entities, with the implication that each actual entity receives merely a 
‘representation’ of the universe that is outside of it. He writes that ‘it is a cumulation of 
the universe and not a stage-play about it’ (PR 237). Each actual entity grasps other and 
prior entities within its own experience, through a relation Whitehead calls a 
prehension. A prehension is a piece of actuality, a ‘concrete fact of relatedness’ (PR 22) 
through which one entity is included in the experience of another, so that past occasions 
of experience share in the constitution of new occasions.  
Prehensions are the smallest units of analysis in Whitehead’s scheme. Prehensions 
are how Whitehead accounts for all types of relatedness, including memory, perception, 
space, time, causality, intentionality, symbolic reference, subject-object relations, and 
God-world relations. A prehension never exists on its own. Instead, prehensions occur 
together as subordinate elements within an actual entity; more precisely, an actual 
entity is constituted by its prehensions of other entities. Said in another way, 
prehensions are ‘internal relations’ of the actual entity. At the same time, for the 
prehended entity, the prehension is an ‘external relation.’ In other words, a prehension 
can be thought of as an asymmetric relation, where one relata is internal and other is 
external. Auxier and Herstein help to flesh out this description: 
[W]e may differentiate the notions of internal and external relatedness by how they 
reveal/form (the language here is tricky) the nature of identity. For external forms of 
relatedness, a ‘thing’s’ identity is the first, analytically given fact; for internal forms of 
relatedness ‘identity’ is the final, synthetically achieved result. Part/whole relationships 
are the image of internal relatedness because there is no actual part until the whole is 
given. Yet by the same token, the whole is itself presupposed, but vague … until the parts 
are definite. The identities of part and of whole are thus synthetically correlative to one 
another and not initially given, independent facts. (Auxier and Herstein 2017, 62-62) 
What is useful about this description is the way it helps portrays internal relations as 
thing that are constructed. I picture this as being a little similar to how, as a silver gelatin 
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print develops, it starts out blurry and indistinct, but, over time, contrast increases and it 
becomes sharper until each grain is fully resolved and the picture is complete. This is 
oversimplifying in the sense that prehensions form a complex multidimensional welter 
of relations, but it captures the movement from vague to definite as actual entities 
synthesize their internal relations.  
Whitehead describes mechanisms through which the prehensions that arise in an 
actual entity are selected, ordered, and weighed to produce the terminal datum for the 
actual entity. Here, Whitehead describes two different kinds of prehensions: positive 
and negative. Positive prehensions are additive; they are the way an actual entity 
includes other entities in its functioning. Negative prehensions are used to exclude or 
eliminate a part of another entity from consideration. Through constellations of additive 
and eliminative prehensions, an actual entity grasps another actual entity ‘under an 
abstraction’ (PR 231). Negative prehensions play an important role in ‘objectification.’ 
Objectification is a combination of positive and negative prehensions, so as to ‘relegate 
into irrelevance, or into a subordinate relevance, the full constitution of the objectified 
entity’ (PR 62). It is how one entity can prehend just a part of another entity, in its own 
way. This becomes critical in Whitehead’s account of mentality. 
As with actual entities, prehensions are made to perform double duty, to take a role 
in physicalist and mentalist life. Once again, Whitehead mixes psychologisms with 
technical language. An extreme example is his use of the word ‘feeling’ to mean a 
‘positive prehension.’ The terms ‘feel’ and ‘prehend’ are used largely interchangeably by 
Whitehead. A prehension includes not only what is felt but additional information about 
the feeling—it is not just a single word, ‘marvelous,’ it retains a ‘vector character’ that 
includes factors such as where the feeling came from, what the underlying datum is, and 
how the data is felt by the entity. ‘A feeling bears on itself the scars of its birth’ (PR 226).  
Whitehead describes prehensions as sharing many characteristics with actual entities 
(PR 19). That is, a prehension is not simply a logical connector; it is an act that is itself a 
part of existence. 
Whitehead extensively discusses how prehensions are formed during an entity’s life, 
as it perishes, and in its ‘transition’ to the next generation of actual entities. The 
discussion includes a set of ‘categorial obligations’ and ‘phases’ during the actual 
entities’ lifetime. There is also a non-metrical ‘mereotopological’ explanation of how 
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prehensions generate the constraints between actual entities that result in the division 
of the extensive continuum into actual time and space. 
The phases of concrescence described by Whitehead indicate that concrescence is a 
dynamic layered process. To return to our metaphor of a silver gelatin print, 
concrescence is more akin to multiple layers that are composited together. Positive 
prehensions serve to add to the composition, and negative prehensions serving to mask 
out parts of the composition, to arrive at the final unified result.  
Mentality 
In the philosophy of organism, Whitehead’s aim is to avoid a Cartesian divide between 
mind and body. However, Whitehead is not anti-dualist tout court. Whitehead doesn’t 
erase the distinctions between mental and physical. Doing so would stymie an account 
of consciousness. What he rejects is Descartes’s variant of human separatist dualism, in 
which mental and physical are really distinct, so that the (human) mind and body are 
only and wholly intelligible apart from each other as isolate realms.7 Whitehead seeks to 
bring these two spheres of activity together. He therefore states that all actual entities 
have two poles, a ‘physical pole’ and a ‘mental pole.’  
When Whitehead says all actual entities have a mental pole, he is not suggesting 
anthropomorphic panpsychism, with atoms having tiny people inside, each with folk 
human subjectivities. It is not as if stones are having dreams about conceptual art. 
Although all actual entities are furnished with both physical and mental poles, each 
actual entity is its own peculiar particularity and for many entities the ‘mental’ pole may 
have a negligible role. Through equipping all entities with mentality, the philosophy of 
organism insists that the terms ‘experience’ and ‘decision’ must be recalibrated and 
broadened in order to locate conscious human thought and judgement as rarely 
occurring intensities within a vast spectrum of other kinds of decisive experiences.   
Whitehead’s premise is that, if mentality is to happen at all, the grounds for 
mentality should be present in the most fundamental units of analysis. The same 
fundamental units must also be explanatory of extent and temporality. Whitehead’s 
solution is to say each actual entity constructs both mental and physical characteristics 
                                                        
7 Anderson Weekes’s The Mind–Body Problem and Whitehead’s Non-Reductive Monism (2012) provides a 
useful discussion of Whitehead’s metaphysics in relation to philosophies of mind and mind-body dualism. 
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of the world. An actual entity develops conformal (physical) prehensions in its initial 
phases of concrescence, and spontaneous (conceptual) prehensions in later phases of 
concrescence. Much the same way that weft and warp together make a piece of fabric, 
both poles of an entity are necessary. As Crownfield puts it, ‘It is not rationalism versus 
empiricism, but rationalism and empiricism, distinct but inseparable.’ (Crownfield 1977, 
382).  
The physical pole is initially conformal to the actual ‘physical’ data felt from the past. 
However, this physical data contains a diversity of possibilities, some compatible, some 
incompatible. The mental pole experiences these potential relevant alternatives and 
‘decides’ on a novel and, in some cases, non-conformal configuration. In the philosophy 
of organism, such decisive activity occurs in all entities, from a stone to a fleck of human 
consciousness. 
To give an example, an electron, as an actual occasion, experiences physical feelings 
of other actual entities (e.g. of the entity providing its charge, of the entity providing it a 
social existence in an atom, etc). These precede its mental feelings (of potential energy 
levels it may jump to). The occasion concludes with the entity’s decision: jump! The 
entity then perishes, and through perishing it satisfies what in the ledgers of physics will 
be recorded as a transition from one quantum shell to another. Only in the next cycle of 
actual entities will the corresponding electronic entity, as superject, be felt differently.  
An actual entity participating in human consciousness carries out a much more 
elaborate and intensive series of phases of conceptual concrescence, but the difference 
is one of degree and intensity, not of type. The different categories and phases of 
concrescence, described in detail in Process and Reality, are a plea to see human 
consciousness and judgement as rare components of experience, coextensive with other 
kinds of experience. Whitehead writes that ‘consciousness presupposes experience, and 
not experience consciousness’ (PR 53). He adds: 
Consciousness flickers; and even at its brightest, there is a small focal region of clear 
illumination, and a large penumbral region of experience which tells of intense 
experience in dim apprehension. The simplicity of clear consciousness is no measure of 
the complexity of complete experience. Also this character of our experience suggests 
that consciousness is the crown of experience, only occasionally attained, not its 
necessary base (PR 267).  
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For Whitehead, the ancient philosophical preoccupation with human consciousness 
ignores that conscious experience is frequently eclipsed by ‘aesthetic delight’ (PR 184). 
We turn to the theme of aesthetics in the next section. 
Aesthetics 
One way to understand Whitehead’s discussion of mental and physical poles is through 
the role he gives to aesthetic feeling. In this section, I briefly outline Whitehead’s 
approach to aesthetics.  
We start to see this introduced in the following passage, in which Whitehead claims 
to pursue a philosophy that inserts ‘feeling’ in the place where Kant places reason8: 
The philosophy of organism aspires to construct a critique of pure feeling, in the 
philosophical position in which Kant put his Critique of Pure Reason. This should also 
supersede the remaining Critiques required in the Kantian philosophy. Thus in the 
organic philosophy Kant's ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ becomes a distorted fragment of 
what should have been his main topic. The datum includes its own interconnections, and 
the first stage of the process of feeling is the reception into the responsive conformity of 
feeling whereby the datum, which is mere potentiality, becomes the individualized basis 
for a complex unity of realization. (PR 113) 
Recalling our previous discussion of actual entities and prehensions, we can begin to 
make some sense of Whitehead’s statement above. Whitehead proposes to ground his 
philosophy on an analysis of prehensions (‘feelings’) rather than human reason. He 
signals that Kant’s doctrine in the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’—in which Kant proposes 
that space and time are synthesized by the subject—is a ‘main topic,’ since, for 
Whitehead, time and space do not exist as pre-givens but are formed through acts of 
constructive functioning. Whitehead then reiterates some of the core features of his 
metaphysics: actual entities include their own interconnections—their internally related 
prehensions. Experience is a process that moves from responsive conformity, to the 
realization of potentials for individuation included within conformity, to the satisfaction 
of the actual entity as a complex unity. 
An upshot of such an arrangement is that aesthetics is not installed only as a high-
grade or human achievement. Instead, for Whitehead, ‘aesthetics’ arises at the base of 
                                                        
8 Whitehead’s claim that his philosophy is an ‘inversion’ of Kant (PR 88) or that he inserts feeling in the place 
of Kant’s reason is hard to evaluate. What precisely Whitehead means by this and whether his assertion 
reflects a fair interpretation of Kant is a matter of some debate (see Lucas 1989, 77–92). 
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scheme, in the initial physical ‘feeling’ phases of concrescence, prior to all other 
experience of an actual entity as a subject. That is, aesthetics is something all actual 
entities experience, from starlight to periwinkles to humans. In each actual entity’s 
concrescence, Whitehead writes, ‘the first phase is the phase of pure reception of the 
actual world in its guise of objective datum for aesthetic synthesis … The second stage is 
governed by the private ideal, gradually shaped in the process itself; whereby the many 
feelings, derivatively felt as alien, are transformed into a unity of aesthetic appreciation 
immediately felt as private’ (PR 212). 
Aesthetics here refers not to aesthetic judgement but instead to a kind of low-level 
early stage of concrescent ‘synthesis’ and ‘appreciation’ through which the ‘alien’ 
feelings of other actual entities are transformed and appropriated to become that actual 
entity’s immediate sense of the world. 
Aesthetics within this scheme is a quotidian occurrence within all things, but this 
does not imply that it is mundane. Aesthetics is the evaluation of the ‘antecedent 
settled world’ (PR 65) as the grounding on which higher grades of experience are 
possible at all. ‘The metaphysical doctrine, here expounded, finds the foundations of the 
world in aesthetic experience … All order is therefore aesthetic order’ (RM 105).  
Key to understanding Whitehead’s proposals of aesthetic harmony and order are his 
notions of actuality and potentiality.9 Similarly to his division of actual entities into two 
poles, a physical pole and a mental pole, Whitehead describes the cosmos as divided 
between actuality and potentiality. For any concrescing actual entity, the actual world 
consists of the atomised settled ‘facts’ of the past, i.e., superjective objectifications of 
other actual entities. In these past actual entities are embedded a diversity of potential 
worlds that may exist in the future. The carriers of this potential diversity are what 
Whitehead calls ‘eternal objects.’ Eternal objects are what all actual entities of the past, 
present, and future have in common. In other words, eternal objects are the ‘universals,’ 
‘possibilities,’ or ‘potencies’ in Whitehead’s scheme. However, eternal objects ‘tell no 
tales’ (PR 256) by themselves. An eternal object is a ‘pure potential,’ a capacity that can 
be actualised in an infinity of different modes. It is only when an eternal object becomes 
embedded through ‘ingression’ into an actual entity that it ‘participates’ in the actual 
entity, taking on one determinate mode of ingression. Ingression locks down or makes 
                                                        
9 Steven Shaviro usefully charts correspondences between Whitehead’s distinction of actual and potential 
and Deleuze’s notions of real and virtual (Shaviro 2012, 36). Shaviro also extensively discusses Whitehead’s 
aesthetics, especially in comparison with Kantian aesthetics (Shaviro 2012, passim). 
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an eternal object stand in a single determinate mode. How eternal objects ingress into 
an actual entity is what gives the actual entity its particular character. An eternal object 
has the status of a pure potential any in the future and of a definite determinate one in 
its ingression in an actual entity in the past. 
To give an example, if we think of binary, we may think of ‘0’ and ‘1,’ or perhaps zero 
or one, or a switch that is either up or down, or a circuit that is charged or discharged. 
Something connects all these different occasions and allows us to say that in each case 
we are discussing an arrangement that has the conditions necessary for binary on or off 
(or yes and no, true and false, black or white…). It is this aloof yet recognizable 
definiteness that is the quality of what Whitehead calls an ‘eternal object.’  In each case, 
we are dealing with the same constellation of eternal objects, manifested in different 
modes. 
Whitehead’s eternal objects have shades of Platonic forms.10 However, Whitehead 
does not propose that eternal objects exist in their own ideal realm. According to his 
ontological principle, ‘there is nothing which floats into the world from nowhere’ (PR 
244). Everything that is real is part of some actual entity. This means that eternal objects 
too must exist as part of an actual entity. Whitehead here performs some remarkably 
deft bookkeeping, erecting an actual entity, God, in whose mind exist the eternal 
objects. If eternal objects are prehended by God, and God is an actual entity, this retains 
consistency and preserves the ontological principle without breaking Whitehead’s 
monism. An advantage of this scheme is that Whitehead then has an actual entity on 
which to pin wider issues in his cosmology. Whitehead’s God is the first ‘primordial’ 
actual entity, prehended by all other entities, and forever concrescent—an entity whose 
concrescence is ‘the beginning and the end’ of our present cosmic epoch (PR 344). 
Whitehead’s God, in other words, is a philosophically and technically necessary actual 
entity, not the God of religion, although this point has been contested. Some process 
scholars seek to expunge Whitehead’s ‘God’ entirely, without fully considering how this 
entity is important for Whitehead’s account of possibility. Others, such as Charles 
Hartshorne and members of the ‘Claremont School’ have stressed the theological traits 
of Whitehead’s God.11  
                                                        
10 One difference between eternal objects and Platonic forms is that eternal objects are relational entities: 
They have complex prehensions of other eternal objects, hence my evocation of a ‘constellation’ of eternal 
objects here. This term is introduced by Auxier and Herstein (2017, 146).  
11 See the discussion by Auxier and Herstein, who seek to recover a more secular and philosophical 
interpretation of Whitehead’s God (2017, 240-296).  
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Whitehead defines an eternal object as ‘an entity whose conceptual recognition 
does not involve a necessary reference to any definite actual entities of the temporal 
world’ (PR 220, emphasis added). Here we can start to see the importance of eternal 
objects in Whitehead’s mental/physical distinction. Physical prehensions operate at the 
level of what is actual, i.e., the settled actual entities of the past. Conceptual 
prehensions operate at the level of eternal objects discovered in the actual entities of 
the past. The shift from physical to mental activity therefore corresponds to a shift from 
actual entities to the eternal objects ingressed in those entities, and their potential for 
entertaining alternative modes of ingression in the current actual entity. The physical 
world provides a grounding actuality which selects and orders the possibilities that can 
be entertained in the mental pole of the actual entity, in its ‘creative’ production of a 
novel configuration. The potential world is the world of anticipation, of possible future 
worlds. For Whitehead, aesthetics is central to the discovery of potential novelty in the 
future.  
Whitehead makes this arrangement more explicit by dividing the mental pole into 
two phases, ‘aesthetic supplement’ and ‘intellectual supplement’:  
In the aesthetic supplement there is an emotional appreciation of the contrasts and 
rhythms inherent in the unification of the objective content in the concrescence of one 
actual occasion. (PR 213) 
Put in less technical terms, aesthetic supplement is the phase of an actual entity’s 
existence where mental operations begin. There is an ‘influx’ of conceptual prehensions, 
whose purpose is to reveal relevant ordered patterns of ‘contrasts’ and ‘rhythms’ in the 
objectified actual entities of the settled world, combinations that may achieve 
inhibitions or intensifications of prehension. This is the phase that Whitehead calls ‘blind 
feeling’ (PR 213). It is blind in that this phase is concerned with open-ended discovery of 
potential ‘indetermination’ latent within the actual world.  
In the ‘intellectual’ supplement, the indetermination of aesthetic supplement 
becomes integrated and resolved, as the actual entity selects one mode or another to 
become a single, decisive, determinate unity. How an actual entity does this depends on 
the actual entity’s ‘subjective form,’ which shapes the kinds of phases of physical and 
mental prehension the actual entity uses.   
We need to be careful when saying that the aesthetic phase is where mental activity 
begins and this is followed by an intellectual phase. Whitehead rejects ‘a priori’ or ‘a 
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posteriori’ sequencing of concrescent activity, arguing that concrescent phases take 
place in a nonlinear fashion in which physical and conceptual prehensions in sub-phases 
of concrescence ‘interfere with each other by intensification or inhibition’ (PR 213). 
Aesthetic and intellectual supplementation together traverse from the field of might-
be’s to arrive at the terminal outcome. As Auxier and Herstein note, the narrative 
structure of the discussion of concrescence in Process and Reality ‘requires that it be 
read more in the way of Finnegans Wake—especially since the holistic character of the 
theory of prehensions means that the “end of the story” brings us back to the 
“beginning of the story” and is already presupposed in it’ (Auxier and Herstein 2017, 60). 
Thus, while Whitehead argues that each actual entity ‘receives’ the world and then 
‘responds’ to the world, at the same time he argues that an actual entity has a 
‘subjective aim’ from the outset, which is modified over the course of concrescence. 
There is no easy way to untangle this. There are helpful ways we can understand 
Whitehead’s proposal. In the next section I explore this by developing a notion of 
‘maculate’ conception. 
Maculate Conception 
In this section, I propose to discuss Whitehead’s approach to aesthetics and mental 
concrescence using the terms ‘maculate’ and ‘immaculate.’ These are not terms 
Whitehead uses; I introduce them here to begin to frame a way to understand 
concrescence at a higher level. I also use these notions to start to steer our overview of 
Whitehead back towards thinking about peripheral digital activity, as will become 
clearer by the end of the section. 
For Whitehead, nothing comes into the world from nowhere: There is no 
‘immaculate conception’ of actual entities. Another way of saying this is that each actual 
entity is ‘maculate,’ or entangled with the physical facts of the world. The ‘mental’ 
phase of experience starts from a collection of past actualities that massively condition 
the possibilities for any given occasion—this is the first and maculate part: the world is 
stubbornly conformist. However, it isn’t right to say it is only maculate. Mental 
conception involves giving birth to a piece of novelty in the world. It must have the 
potential to transcend existing concrete actuality. A mental experience may be truly 
novel, i.e., it is potentially immaculate. However, the experience we have of an actual 
entity’s conception is given to us after the actual entity has perished, as a new fact in 
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the world, as superject. This means we experience conceptual novelty transported to us 
after the act, and in physical form. What is given to us in conception is the satisfaction of 
its having occurred. In other words, the mental activity of an actual entity is experienced 
aesthetically by other entities, maculately again. The mental phases of concrescence 
have a phantomlike aspect. By the time we know it has happened, we are already 
dealing with it as a past actuality that now includes a phantomlike thing that occurred a 
moment ago and changed whatever plans we had for dinner. The consequences of the 
novelty of experience are felt, after the fact, as the entity perishes, and maculately 
again. 
In this way, at each moment, mental activity and physical activity weave into each 
other, as with the analogy of warp and weft. For Whitehead, there is no neat antinomy 
of an ‘aesthetic dimension,’ no clean separation of thinking from the world that is 
thought, no separable ideal realm. 
This becomes more apparent if we shift from the analogy of maculate/immaculate 
(spot/spotless) to the related term ‘macula.’ The macula is the spot in the eye through 
which we achieve high-resolution colour vision. Through the varying distribution of 
cones in the central fovea, falling off to the periphery, the macula facilitates the 
organization of visual sensation. High-acuity vision is a function of both the central and 
the peripheral regions of the macula together. The macula is not two isolated things, an 
in-focus acuity and an out-of-focus periphery, separate and apart from each other. 
Rather, the retina as a whole produces the contrast through which the complex field of 
entities is separated into varieties of focused and unfocused. Through the macula, the 
focused acuity and the out-of-focus periphery mutually produce each other. The macula 
is a composite element that functions to segregate entities according to certain 
parameters.  
This comes closer to capturing the relation between the endless potential of the 
mental pole and the aesthetic conditioning of the physical pole. It is not that origination 
belongs to one and material realization to the other; both together create the novelty of 
experience in which an acuity is detected and a response is taken.  
However, we have missed a crucial aspect. The macula isn’t simply a part of the 
retina. When Whitehead mentions the eye, he is quick to bring into discussion the head, 
hands, body, even the place one stands to get a good view, the sources of photons 
providing illumination, and the entities whose role it is to deflect those photons. The 
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macula of the eye is a complex ‘corpuscular society,’ itself composed of a number of 
subordinate societies cooperating with other body parts and organs. For Whitehead, a 
‘society’ is any collection of actual entities that share a defining characteristic in a way 
that is self-sustaining (PR 137). Corpuscular societies are part of the context 
presupposed in the organization of a macula to detect an acuity. The macula depends on 
these other societies for its function. It is an ‘active’ system, achieving its operation only 
by collaborating with the muscles of the eye and the body to shift the point of focus 
dynamically, to elicit relevant high-acuity attention to different items. We cannot 
divorce the macula from its embodiment. We should not ignore other characteristics of 
eyes as embodied organs: eye-strain, alcohol-induced visions, moments of blurry vision, 
tears, the pain induced by a bright source of light, the phenomenon of blindsight—all at 
least sometimes modify operations of the macula. Each impact how the eye transmits 
and supplements what is felt by the antecedent part. While the macula of the eye is 
dominated by its role in vision, nonetheless, we know that we see with the eye (PR 81, 
118). The optic nerve, the neurons of the cortex and other parts of the brain each 
transform and supplement. It is a mode of withness that ensures each part of the body 
leaves its mark, however vague that may be in the final conscious experience: 
The various actual entities, which compose the body, are so coordinated that the 
experiences of any part of the body are transmitted to one or more central occasions to 
be inherited with enhancements accruing upon the way, or finally added by reason of the 
final integration. The enduring personality is the historic route of living occasions which 
are severally dominant in the body at successive instants. The human body is thus 
achieving on a scale of concentrated efficiency a type of social organization, which with 
every gradation of efficiency constitutes the orderliness whereby a cosmic epoch shelters 
in itself intensity of satisfaction. (PR 119) 
Cognitive scientists investigate the macula, researching ways to develop 
computational models of vision based on logarithmic sensor arrays.12 While such 
cognitivist theories have merit, they treat the macula abstractly as a mechanism of 
computational efficiency. This ignores the withness of the body, the way the macula is a 
part of an historically situated activity, so that high-acuity vision is one aspect of an 
                                                        
12 Foveal or ‘log-polar’ representations of mammalian vision have been studied extensively in computational 
vision and robotics since the late 1970’s. For a survey of research, see Traver and Bernardino 2010. The 
research notes the optimization and efficiency trade-offs made possible by ‘log-polar’ representations. 
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advanced achievement of a ‘social’ organisation that is embodied and environmentally 
enmeshed.   
Whitehead’s theorization of actual entities and their organisation into larger ‘social’ 
organisms repeatedly emphasizes the ecological importance of the surrounding context 
in the achievement of any one actual entity. Whitehead is, above all, a thinker who 
stresses the importance of peripheral activity in any individual’s activity. For example, 
consider how Whitehead positions consciousness in Process and Reality: 
Each actual occasion contributes to the circumstances of its origin additional 
formative elements deepening its own peculiar individuality. Consciousness is only the 
last and greatest of such elements by which the selective character of the individual 
obscures the external totality from which it originates and which it embodies. An actual 
individual, of such higher grade, has truck with the totality of things by reason of its 
sheer actuality; but it has attained its individual depth of being by a selective emphasis 
limited to its own purposes. The task of philosophy is to recover the totality obscured by 
the selection. (PR 15) 
Consciousness, here, is a high achievement, but it is simultaneously an achievement 
won by masking the peripheral ‘circumstances’ (literally that which encircles and stands 
around) through which selective emphasis and purpose are made possible. Whitehead 
wishes to undo the ‘excess of subjectivity’ (PR 15) so as to recover these obscured 
circumstances.   
This is neatly summarised by Judith Jones, in her book Intensity: An Essay in 
Whiteheadian Ontology. The book starts, ‘Whitehead’s metaphysics could be described 
as an account of how the “greater world without” an entity “steals in” upon it.’  (Jones 
1998, 3). Jones’s larger project examines Whitehead’s metaphysics especially in regard 
to the higher phases of intellectual activity associated with human experience. Her aim 
is to understand the agentive relations of Whitehead’s metaphysics in more nuanced 
ways, unpacking how and to what extent one agency contributes to the becoming and 
valuing of another.  She insists that ‘the “accidents” or “tricks” of an actuality’s 
insinuation in another remains a real and passional element in the satisfaction of that 
other entity’ (Jones 1998, 3). Her use of the word ‘passional’ recalls for us Whitehead’s 
technical use of the word ‘feeling’ for prehension. But it is also laying the groundwork 
for her to argue, emphatically and poetically, that ‘we have no language in which to 
express a concept of individuation that is not a way of specifying a discrete being … that 
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is incapable of location in other such individuals.’ (ibid., 209). Her work, then, seeks 
ways of expressing a sense of an individual whose existence is conditioned by a mutual 
togetherness with other individuals. 
Jones’s mention of the issue of individuation and the divide between one individual 
and other individuals returns us full circle to the discussion of the bifurcation of nature 
with which we began this chapter. The motivation for Whitehead’s argument that we 
must ‘recover’ the circumstances surrounding individual activity is precisely his drive to 
overcome the bifurcation of nature. In other words, actual entities, prehensions, 
concrescence, mental and physical poles, potentiality, and actuality are the 
metaphysical mechanisms Whitehead proposes in order to properly relate the one and 
the many without presupposing an impassable barriers.  
In this thesis, in Chapters 1 and 2, I began outlining a ‘decision procedure’ as an 
event within art. I proposed that this notion was an analogy for thinking about the 
outcome of what Whitehead calls a ‘society of actual occasions’ (PR 205). In our 
discussion of actual entities within this chapter, we have started to understand in a little 
more detail the kind of ‘mattering’ that takes place within a decision procedure. What I 
called the choreographing of a decision procedure is understood here as the result of 
myriad actual entities that are becoming together, conformally and non-conformally. I 
have pointed out why this arrangement emphasizes the importance of peripheral 
activity in the becoming of any one actual entity and linked this to Whitehead’s critique 
of the bifurcation of nature. 
I here want to repeat Jones’s assertion that ‘we have no language in which to 
express a concept of individuation that is not a way of specifying a discrete being.’ 
(1998, 209, emphasis added). Jones’s use of the word ‘discrete’ points to where we 
must turn next. Software systems model the world precisely in terms of discrete binary 
logics of either 0 or 1. Recall that our research question considers art that takes place in 
some relation to the digital, in order to locate appropriate strategies and practices in 
contemporary art to critically investigate and reconfigure the effects of peripheral digital 
activity. We must therefore consider how such discrete operations might be imbricated 
within a decision procedure of art. In short, we must pursue a Whitehead-centred 
theory of the digital. This is the topic of the next chapter. 
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4. Digital Entities 
I began by asking what are appropriate strategies in contemporary art to critically 
investigate and reconfigure the peripheral digital activity. This question led to an 
investigation of Whitehead and his philosophy of organism as a theoretical framework 
(Chapter 1). I proposed that art can be thought of as a kind of decision procedure, which 
I situated as an analogy for what Whitehead calls an actual entity (Chapter 2). I then 
discussed the ‘mattering’ of the decision procedure in terms of processual actual entities 
(Chapter 3).  
In this chapter, I turn to the digital. The question for us now is: How do we 
understand the digital in relation to Whitehead’s notions of the spawning activity of 
actual entities? What kind of mattering takes place with the digital? In this chapter, I 
describe a notion of general function and a notion of digital function and explain how, in 
a decision procedure of art, the digital arises as a situated ordering and patterning of 
general function. Then, in the next chapter, we turn to contemporary art to locate this 
notion of situated ordering as a way of developing decision procedures which may 
promote or critique peripheral digital awareness. 
Whitehead and the Digital 
I believe Whitehead is relevant in discussions of digital technologies for two primary 
reasons: (i) his work on Principia Mathematica and related mathematical research and 
(ii) the functional processual paradigm of his philosophy of organism. I introduce these 
two topics below. 
Whitehead collaborated with Bertrand Russell on Volumes I–III of Principia 
Mathematica (PM) for ten years. It was a painstaking effort, requiring pages of dense 
logic written using a notation Whitehead had co-invented with Russell that is now 
obsolete. 
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Excerpt showing the logic notation used by Alfred Whitehead and 
Bertrand Russell in Principia Mathematica, Volume I, 1910. 
 
The scope of PM was immense. Russell and Whitehead sought to realize the goal of 
logicism: to show that all the formal languages of mathematics could be united in 
expressions within a single notational formalism, logic. They failed in this goal.13 
Nevertheless, they succeeded in launching the field of logical formalism by grafting 
ancient Greek logic, formerly a branch of Classics, onto modern mathematics.  
In PM, Russell and Whitehead develop type theory, with a hierarchy of functional 
and non-functional types. Type theory remains a theoretical cornerstone in today’s 
programming languages. In a very direct way, Whitehead and Russell, through their 
work on PM, became foundational figures in computer science. Whitehead’s 
mathematical research and his mereotopology continues to contribute to computer 
                                                        
13 Kurt Gödel famously submitted a formal proof, in 1931, that logic systems such as those used in PM can 
either be consistent or complete but not complete and consistent. Whitehead acknowledges Gödel’s proof in 
1938, writing, ‘Today, even Logic itself is struggling with the discovery embodied in a formal proof, that every 
finite set of premises must indicate notions which are excluded from its direct purview’ (MT 2). He adds that 
philosophy ‘should never start from systematization,’ an idea he credits to William James, who ‘discovered 
intuitively the great truth with which modern logic is now wrestling’ (MT 3). In my view, Whitehead intuited the 
shortcomings of logical formalisms early on.  
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science research (for one survey, see Henry 1993) and, more recently, to robotic and 
computer vision research (Auxier and Herstein 2017, 51–52). 
By the start of World War I, Whitehead was working on Volume IV of Principia 
Mathematica on geometry. Whereas Russell had been the instigator and the most active 
contributor to earlier volumes, Volume IV was to be Whitehead’s own (Lowe 1990, 12–
13). However, he abandoned this effort. His drafts have been lost or destroyed. His 
theory of geometry would emerge much later and in a less formal presentation, in his 
elaboration of the coordinate division of the extensive continuum in Part IV of Process 
and Reality.  
A factor in Whitehead’s decision to abandon PM was the upheaval taking place in 
theoretical physics at the time. As Whitehead says, ‘By the turn of the century, nothing, 
absolutely nothing was left that had not been challenged, if not shaken. This I consider 
to have been one of the supreme facts of my experience’ (quoted in Crownfield 1977, 
376). Through a series of empirical experiments from 1890 onwards, classical models of 
physics were proven wrong. Einstein published his special theory of relativity (STR) in 
1905, and the Bohr model of the atom was published in 1913. Whitehead’s earliest 
mathematical contributions concerned Maxwell’s theories of electricity and magnetism, 
and he contributed to both the reception and mathematical criticism of Einstein’s 
relativity.14 After World War I, Whitehead devoted himself to the development of the 
philosophy of organism, elucidating what the new branches of mathematical logic and 
physics implied philosophically.  
In this philosophy, Whitehead anticipates many of today’s software procedural 
technologies and idioms. It is here that we find a second connection to the digital. In 
order to make this case, in what follows I focus on an interpretation of Whitehead’s 
philosophy that draws on the notion of the function. Most discussions of Whitehead’s 
philosophy of organism use his own neologisms and terms, including concrescence, 
prehension, ingression, and eternal objects. In the next section, I aim to highlight 
Whitehead’s closeness to theories of function. I first motivate this approach through a 
discussion of programming culture and then outline function theory in relation to 
Whitehead’s project. In the concluding section of the chapter, I discuss digital function 
and general function in terms of what I call the bifurcation of the digital. 
                                                        
 14  Whitehead wrote a critique of Einstein’s non-Euclidean geometry and proposed an alternative non-
metrical mathematics (Whitehead 1922). Ronald Desmet traces Whitehead’s involvement in relativity theory 
(Desmet and Weber 2010). 
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Functional and Object-Oriented Programming 
Within today’s programming culture, there is a distinction between ‘object-oriented’ 
programming languages (OOP) and functional programming languages (FP). 
 In the 1990s, object-oriented programming languages such as Java became the 
dominant way of building large software projects. Such languages promote the idea that 
software entities should be modelled as classes of ‘objects,’ with properties that are 
modified in response to messages. For instance, a meeting object might have properties 
such as time, date, location, and attendees. It could respond to messages such as cancel 
or reschedule.  
In the past decade, there has been a marked increase in the use of another 
programming paradigm called functional programming.15 Functional programming is an 
approach to programming language design first explored in early AI languages such as 
Lisp in the 1950s and today championed by languages such as Haskel, Scala, and Clojure. 
In functional languages, programming sequences are organized less in terms of objects 
responding to events and more as compositional chains of functional units. Note that 
differences between programming languages are primarily pragmatic, since, according 
to a widely accepted conjecture known as the Church-Turing thesis (Church 1936), all 
programming languages are theoretically capable of solving the same computational 
problems. Task-based functional approaches have become important because they offer 
practical advantages in software systems that are distributed across multiple computers 
updated on a continuous basis—a scenario encountered in large internet companies and 
in finance. Today, teams developing large systems often adopt hybrid ‘mixed paradigm’ 
approaches combining functional programming strategies with object-oriented 
programming strategies, as found, for example in Facebook’s React framework (Hunt et 
al. 2016). Functional programming in such software occurs as an idiom or an outlook, a 
way of approaching the problem space.  
In functional systems that I am familiar with through my work as a software 
consultant in finance, the software is organised as myriad diverse, short-lived parallel 
                                                        
15 Functional programming languages were once considered niche and academic. Today they are 
increasingly being used in commercial development, as discussed in N. Ford 2014 and Warburton 2016. 
This is evidenced in studies of language rankings, e.g. by RedMonk and PYPL, as well in listings on job-
search websites such as Indeed.com, Dice, and Monster.  
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tasks that continually feed forward data to the next round. Such systems execute tasks 
on massive ‘compute clouds’ containing thousands or tens of thousands of processors. 
Each task computes its results independently and, on completion, publishes data to a 
large shared storage structure, before terminating, or ‘dying.’ Since storage has become 
relatively cheap, storage structures are increasingly append-only. Data changes are 
appended to the end of tables with a timestamp, so that prior data is never lost or 
erased. In such systems, a ‘message’ does not modify an ‘object.’ Instead of permanent 
objects with a mutable state, the model consists of transient functions that exist for a 
short while, yielding data that continually accumulates. The data for a given timepoint is 
generated through a composition of multiple contemporaneous transient tasks 
computing in parallel. While some tasks are straightforward, others can take many 
hours to complete. Tasks may also be subject to modifications and corrections (e.g., to 
test a new market idea, or if a programmer notices an error, or when a user enters an 
amendment). Throughout the day, previous calculations may become out of date, 
requiring ‘recalculating,’ redoing prior computations and appending additional rows to 
the store to integrate the changed data. To perform recalculating consistently, data is 
modelled ‘bi-temporally,’ that is, instead of simply storing quantities of a value, the data 
is stored in a longhand form, such as ‘the quantity of A for 11/05 8:15, as known at 
11/05 9:15 on agent B.’ To manage this process efficiently, rich ‘dependency graphs’ are 
maintained, keeping track of which entities feed into other entities to minimise wasted 
computation. 
 Functional programmers who have worked on such systems will read Whitehead’s 
Process and Reality and experience moments of uncanny recognition and déjà vu. 
Functional data-flow idioms, developed largely independently of Whitehead’s 
philosophy, have numerous overlaps with the abstractions Whitehead developed in the 
1920s, which I introduced in the previous chapter. Software models in which rounds of 
transient tasks compute contemporaneously, separately, and by accumulating data in a 
shared store echo features of Whitehead’s description of concrescent process; function 
arguments seem to have bearing on what Whitehead calls ingression; Whitehead’s 
notion of ‘propositions’ as hybrid entities brings to mind what in functional 
programming is termed ‘partial application’; append-only stores have parallels with 
Whitehead’s notions of objectification as a continual accumulation of facts; bi-
temporalism is something Whitehead addresses more generally in terms of 
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perspectivism; the software ‘promise’ pattern is structurally similar to what Whitehead 
calls a ‘lure’; dependency graphs share similarities with what Whitehead describes as a 
‘penumbral welter’ of prehensions. These are patterns of similarity only and not 
conceptual identifications. But the sheer number of such patterns of similarity is 
noteworthy.  The inventor of the Clojure functional programming language, Rich Hickey, 
affirms this observation:  
I am not a proponent of the philosophy or metaphysics of Whitehead and could 
hardly claim to understand it all. I was putting together a keynote for the JVM language 
summit and striving to find [programming] language-independent core ideas in the 
Clojure work. I was reminded of some Whitehead I had studied in college, so opened up a 
few of his books. Sure enough, he was all over some of the themes of my talk—time, 
process, immutability, etc. He is quite quotable, so I made him the ‘hero’ of the talk. But 
Whitehead was not an inspiration for Clojure—any connections were a serendipitous 
discovery after the fact. That said, the number of connections was startling. (Hickey and 
Fogus 2011) 
Whitehead’s anticipation of functional software patterns used in today’s temporally 
driven systems is remarkable but not coincidental.16 Whitehead’s collaboration with 
Russell was influenced by Gottlob Frege's pioneering work on functions, together with 
Giuseppe Peano’s logical axioms and notation. These elements later became a common 
thread in Alonzo Church’s development of lambda calculus in the 1930s, a precursor of 
today’s functional languages (Cardone and Hindley 2006). Whitehead’s philosophy was 
born in part from a study of the function, and function theory has remained central in 
computer science.  
What is a function? Consider the function (x, y) ® 2x2 + y. As a mathematical entity, 
such a function takes a collection of inputs (in this case x and y) and has a body  
(‘2x2 + y’). The function body determines how those inputs are combined in order to 
obtain the function’s output. A mathematical constraint for well-behaved functions is 
that a given pattern of inputs always produces the same result, leading to a conception 
of a function as a many-to-one mapping. This can be represented as an infinite set. The 
function above, for example, can be represented as a set of tuples <x, y, z> where x and 
                                                        
16 Auxier and Herstein also make this observation, arguing that a key connection between Whitehead and 
computer science is a shared emphasis on empirical modelling, found, for example, in areas such as 
computer vision: ‘Computer science has trumped even our best philosophical intentions, and arrived at a 
radically empirical formulation of space and cognition ahead of almost everyone, other than Whitehead 
himself ’ (2017, 94).   
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y encode values from the domain of inputs and z the codomain of corresponding 
outputs, generating the set { <1,1,3>, <1,2,4>, <2,1,9>, <2,2,10> … } etc. 
This terminology of inputs, outputs, production, and mapping is a processual and 
set-theoretic way of understanding functions. Such theorisations were not in place when 
Frege, Russell, and others began elaborating mathematical function theory. They 
adopted different terms. We see this in two important papers, Frege’s Function and 
Concept (Frege 1997 [1891]) and Russell’s On Denoting (Russell 1905). In his paper, 
Frege proposes that for a function like 2x + x2, there is an ‘argument’ part (in this case, 
the sign x) together with an ‘expression’ part (2x + x2). A function exists where there are 
one or more places where an argument occurs in an expression, serving as a gap, an 
empty placeholder meant to be filled up with a value. From this view, ‘+’ itself is a 
function with two placeholders, of the form (a) + (b). Functions are nested inside other 
functions, leading to a function language. Frege argues that, whereas a numeric value is 
an object that is ‘saturated,’ or complete in itself, functions are ontologically 
incomplete, or ‘unsaturated,’ since they require supplementation to arrive at a value for 
the function. Object and function are in this way fundamentally distinct. Frege further 
distinguishes between what he calls the Bedeutung and Sinn of a function, which 
Russell, in On Denoting, translates as the ‘meaning’ of a function and its ‘denotation.’ 
For example, the phrase ‘the present queen of England’ both has a meaning (the female 
royal person presently sovereign of England) and denotes an individual, Elizabeth. On 
the other hand, ‘The present king of France is bald’ is meaningful but does not denote a 
value, since there is no king of France.  
Frege’s and Russell’s repeated appeals to examples from human language, rather 
than terse mathematics, are significant. Both held that functions are not simply 
mathematical entities but philosophical primitives. Frege defines a ‘concept’ as a unary 
function that maps its argument to either the True or the False. Such a concept-function 
determines which values ‘fall under’ the concept and which do not. Frege further 
proposes that a language statement can be broken down into its concepts, converted 
into functional form. In a similar vein, when Russell critiques Frege’s distinction between 
denotation and meaning, his aim is not simply to produce a more logically complete 
mathematical theory of propositional functions but to open up a theory of knowledge 
which explains how one thing can denote another, how ‘we know the properties of a 
thing without having acquaintance with the thing itself, and without, consequently, 
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knowing any single proposition of which the thing itself is a constituent’ (Russell 1905, 
493). For Russell and Frege, functions are fundamental features within an analytical 
paradigm of the philosophy of language and cognition.   
General Function 
As with Russell and Frege, for Whitehead too the function is crucially important. 
However, Whitehead takes a starkly different approach to the function in his philosophy 
of organism.  
The mind involved in the materialist theory dissolves into a function of  
organism. (SMW 194) 
In Whitehead’s philosophy of organism, function in general is the ‘ultimate’ entity. 
His notion of the process of becoming of actual entities, which he calls concrescence, 
involves a many-to-one constructivist mapping activity. Said another way, what 
Whitehead calls an actual entity can be conceived of as a function. The actual entity’s 
becoming is the constructive act of function application, whose satisfaction is the ‘result’ 
of the function. However, the function in this case is not a purely logical one. Whitehead 
instead substitutes a speculatively generalized notion of a function, or what I will call a 
‘general function.’ 17 A general function departs from the idea of a logical function as a 
rigorously contained discrete entity. Whitehead achieves this by generalizing the 
meaning, domain, and codomain of the function. The function meaning is no longer 
described through terse mathematical notation in which there are explicit gaps or slots 
but necessitates a richer natural-language exposition. In place of a rigidly specified set of 
inputs, Whitehead proposes a general function that receives all prior activity as its input. 
Such a multiplicity of input is not representable as a mathematical set, since it is an ever-
expanding complex. The general function is what is called in mathematics a ‘functional,’ 
a function whose inputs are themselves functions. As well as a multiplicity of input, in 
Whitehead’s general function, many-to-one mapping activity is not fully constrained by 
an externally specifiable set of rules defining a correlation between input and output. 
Although rule-based, according to Whitehead, each particular mapping activity is to a 
degree causa sui, self-explanatory and self-determining. This means any externally 
provided set of tuples of input to output is insufficient to characterize a particular 
                                                        
17 See also Auxier and Herstein’s discussion of logical function and operation (2017, 165). They draw a 
distinction between logical function, as an aspect of concrescence, and operation, which is aligned with what 
Whitehead calls ‘transition.’  
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instance of mapping activity. A general function cannot be ‘explained away’ by logical 
theorems, since general function activity at least sometimes yields novel combinations 
where factors become incorporated that were hitherto not addressed. This leads away 
from set-based definitions of function towards an algebraic, and speculative 
‘imaginative generalization’ (PR 5) of function, whose aim is to describe mapping activity 
metaphysically at the widest scope. 
I am drawing here on a reading of Whitehead by James Bradley entitled The 
Speculative Generalization of the Function: A Key to Whitehead (Bradley 2002). Bradley 
asserts that a ‘hitherto unrecognized significance of Alfred North Whitehead resides in 
the fact that he fuses together a speculative philosophy of activity and logical analysis by 
drastically reinterpreting the nature of the mathematical function and redefining the 
self-explanatory in terms of the applicability or descriptive adequacy of his functional 
analysis to the nature of things’ (Bradley 2002). 
Bradley bases his reading on Whitehead’s own discussion of his algebraic method 
and real variables in Whitehead’s final publication of essays  (ESP 97–113, 127–131; also 
Mays 2014, 94). He substitutes Whitehead’s neologisms with mathematical terms such 
as ‘function,’ ‘domain,’ and ‘codomain,’ aligning the concept of general function with 
that of activity as constructive mapping:  
[Whitehead’s] claim is that the generalized concept of mapping, as the mapping of 
order, is distinguishable from any specific order, for it is the process whereby order is 
generated. Mapping is not any set of ordered pairs [input to output], but the concept of 
the ordination of order, of the ordering of pairs into sets. It is not any specific relation or 
rule, but the concept of the configuration of any specific relation or rule. It is not any 
specific difference or form, but the concept of the differentiation of difference, the 
formation of forms. In consequence, as the very term suggests, the concept of mapping 
in general is the concept of an activity. (Bradley 2002, 4)  
In short, Whitehead is seeking to understand the grounds in which logical function 
can take place, without proposing that those grounds are reducible to logical function. 
Whitehead is conducting ‘a meta-functional analysis of the nature and conditions of any 
function at all’ (Bradley 2002, 2). 
In my view, Bradley correctly asserts the importance of the link between the 
development of Whitehead’s mathematics and his metaphysics. However, Bradley’s 
paper is far from a complete treatment. A major contribution of Auxier and Herstein’s 
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interpretation of Whitehead is that they elaborate the algebraic features of his work 
more thoroughly. Not only do they explore the mathematical underpinnings of 
Whitehead’s philosophy across a spectrum of his metaphysics, they explain, in much 
greater depth, how Whitehead fuses a speculative philosophy of the ‘whole’ with a 
logical analysis of individual parts. 
In my view, what is significant about the concept of general function discussed here 
is that, by framing Whitehead’s actual entities using the analogy of general function, we 
can more clearly see how the logical function of digital technologies fits within his 
philosophical scheme. I expand on this further in the next section. 
Digital Function and General Function 
We have discussed two notions of function: a formal notion of function, found in 
mathematics, and Whitehead’s metaphysically generalized conception of general 
function.  
Digital technologies are programmed in software using formal logical notations that 
are restricted to the domain of mathematical problems that are ‘computable’ (Turing 
1936). These logical specifications of ‘digital function’ are abstract specifications. When 
these specifications of digital function are loaded onto a digital device, the ‘mattering’ of 
digital technologies is activated. In this respect, as Whitehead might have put it, the 
software logical formalisms of digital function are ‘construed in terms of habit of 
thought which find their justification in the theory of a fixed environment’ (SMW 112). 
That is, digital function presupposes a well-defined ordering and sequencing of 
operations of discrete algorithmic software entities (the binary values, variables, 
conditionals, sequences, and other structures of software) whose mechanics are 
understood to be fixed in advance. Digital function is a mathematical projection of a 
discrete model onto a situation that is not itself discrete and discontinuous. In digital 
circuitry, as Auxier and Herstein point out, ‘we know that some energy moves between 
and through an incomplete circuit, but we discount that energy because it’s “nothing” 
compared to what happens when a circuit is complete. In fact, if the circuit were not at 
least potentially completable, there would be no point in describing it at all.’ (2017, 45, 
emphasis mine). In other words, logical digital function is an idealised discretization of a 
more complex empirical situation, one that is put to work for certain purposes. We can 
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frame this by paraphrasing Whitehead, taking one of his comments on consciousness 
but recasting it to digital function: 
[Digital function is the latest] of such elements by which the selective character of the 
individual obscures the external totality from which it originates and which it embodies. 
An actual individual, of such … grade, has truck with the totality of things by reason of its 
sheer actuality; but it has attained its individual depth of being by a selective emphasis 
limited to its own purposes. The task of philosophy is to recover the totality obscured by 
the selection. (PR 15) 
The point of this comparison is to recall, when discussing digital systems, that when 
we hear of binary logic and algorithms, these are convenient and incomplete tales we 
tell to emphasize the consequential ‘sheer actuality’ of the digital. However, this 
represents only a narrow and selective aspect, one that affirms the purposes of the 
digital while obscuring its penumbral totality.  
The claim is that digital function is realized through general function, and it is at the 
level of general function that we begin to see more of the conditions that are obscured 
in notions of digital function. This is to say that digital function and general function are 
two different abstractions for understanding the same circumstances, one at a high level 
of programming sequences and algorithms, the other at a low level of processual 
mapping activity of swarms of ‘actual entities.’ To use Whitehead’s algrebraic terms, 
digital function is defined in terms of pure extension, whereas general function includes 
a combination of extension and intension—intension being any property or mode of 
composition which is not among those considered in pure logic (ESP 316). Whereas 
digital function is viewed from the perspective of discrete, self-contained entities, digital 
systems actually operate through general function that is historically situated and 
conditioned by the outcome of inherited general function activity. This includes 
contingent intensities of differentiations, contrasts, negations, and exclusions from 
other agencies that are not reducible to logical assertions. At the level of general 
function, there is no necessary fixed order to which all things conform. The relations 
that general functions enter into are not closed, so that, as Bradley puts it, the ‘multiple 
and intrinsically complex routes of inheritance of any occasion of mapping … constitute 
its genealogical conditions’ (Bradley 2002, 8).  
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In positing digital function as something that takes place through general function 
(i.e., through the processual activity of actual entities), my assertion is that human 
activity and digital activity are different modes, orders, and intensities of activity within 
the same metaphysical ontology. In this view, human-embodied activity and digital 
activity are interconnected through a dense ‘penumbral welter’ of connections that is 
not reducible to an analysis of button clicks or finger swipes within a theory of 
interaction. Indeed, the very paradigm of interaction is called into question.18 
This reading of digital function and general function, through Whitehead and 
Bradley, is essentially similar to Parisi’s analysis of metacomputation. However, instead 
of proposing a new theory of metacomputation, I have transposed the argument to the 
terms of Whitehead’s metaphysics, with the claim that Whitehead’s metaphysics (as 
general function) already generalizes digital function. This is not a critique of Parisi’s 
analysis but an effort to provide an alternative (and less ambitious) companion reading. 
What interests me about this metaphysical (though not yet metacomputational) 
interpretation of digital function is that it places digital systems in the same frame as 
other organisms in Whitehead’s scheme. It is when we consider digital function from the 
perspective of general function that we are more clearly confronted with the issue of 
the bifurcation of the digital. 
The Bifurcation of the Digital 
The apparently discrete and self-contained mathematics of digital function lends 
support to characterizations of the digital as its own world, a ‘virtual,’ ‘immaterial,’ or 
‘dematerialized’ ‘cyberspace,’ cut off from nature. Such characterizations evoke the 
fantasy of a new bifurcation of nature, one premised on an alternative digital ‘real.’ In 
David Berry’s words, within such a bifurcation, ‘computationality, or some related 
ontological form, becomes the site of primary qualities or “facts,” the site of objectivity, 
and is foundational, ahistorical, unchanging, and a replacement for nature in modernity 
…’ (Berry 2014, 119). A bifurcation of the digital aligns with two prognoses: dynstopian 
and utopian. The dystopian prediction is that humans will become lost in a digital realm, 
like the Matrix, with no way to navigate back to authentic experience for itself. The 
                                                        
18 In Whitehead’s description, contemporaneous processual entities are independent, they feel past 
actualities through internal relations, anticipate future potentialities and react. There is no direct interaction 
between two permanent substances as such. Karen Barad also notes that the concept of ‘interaction’ 
presupposes two or more fixed existents. Instead of this model, she proposes the term ‘intra-action,’ which in 
some ways is closer to Whitehead’s model. For more, see Barad 2007, 139. 
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utopian view is that the digital realm can merge with the cultural, leading to new forms 
of activity beyond the limits of a ‘natural’ human body. In either scenario, our actual 
embodiments are rendered redundant within an expanding digital horizon.  
Nathalie Casemajor, examining such characterizations of the digital in a survey of 
digital materialism, asks, ‘How did the trope of immateriality colonize our imagination to 
the point where we came to believe computing exists beyond the material world?’ 
(Casemajor 2015). Casemajor identifies a growing body of scholarship since the 1980s 
that problematizes the notion of a bifurcated digital realm, insisting that digital 
technologies must be analysed together with their historical and material conditions.  
Reading scholars including Jane Bennett (2010), Donna Haraway (2007), Karen Barad 
(2007), Mark Hansen (2015), and others aligned with what Casemajor calls ‘new 
materialisms,’ we began to sense what might be described as a ‘buzzing digitalism.’ This 
is an approach to the digital that rejects its bifurcation from other activities and argues 
that digital processes and networks are thoroughly entangled with human sociotechnical 
processes. 
Although Whitehead was writing before the arrival of digital computers, he 
anticipates such logic-derived bifurcations, describing them as the outcome of 
‘erroneous’ misconceptions and defective insights rooted in language and literature (MT 
66). As an example, he points to words and sentences bounded by full stops as 
suggesting the possibility of entities that are self-contained and disconnected from their 
environment, promoting ‘the understanding of the interconnection of things, each 
understandable, apart from reference to anything else’ (MT 66). Whitehead then 
mentions mathematical types and simple numbers, which have the appearance of being 
perfectly exact, timeless, and ahistorical truths. However: 
The notion of a sphere of human knowledge characterized by unalloyed truth is the 
pet delusion of dogmatists, whether they be theologians, scientists, or humanistic 
scholars. Again, perfection is a notion which haunts human imagination. But its naïve 
attachment to the realm of forms is entirely without justification. How about the form of 
mud, and the forms of evil, and other forms of imperfection? (MT 68–69)   
Whitehead argues that the notion of numbers existing in a perfect vacuum is idiotic 
(MT 69). Instead he suggests that we ‘consider the perspectives of the universe for the 
number three, and for the colour blue, and for any one definite occasion of realized fact’ 
(MT 66). The point is that, much as we might be tempted to think that numbers exist 
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beyond history, any abstract notion gains its relevance from the concrete entities it 
relates to, and not the other way around, since without such relations an abstraction is 
meaningless. 
 The suggestion here is that Whitehead’s critique of the bifurcation of nature can be 
extended to discussions of the bifurcation of the digital. This in turn means that the 
techniques he employs to overcome such bifurcations are applicable in discussions of 
digital function. In the next section, I discuss this issue in broad terms by examining 
Whitehead’s mereology, his approach to whole and part relations. This serves as a 
preparation for taking up the issue in more specific terms through a discussion of 
contemporary art in the next chapter. 
Mereology  
Whitehead’s philosophy can be viewed as a repudiation of the mistaken idealism of 
discrete logic. In Whitehead’s view, while logic is an important and relevant instrument, 
the ‘exactness’ of logic is a fake (ESP 96). In place of fake exactness, as idealised in 
logical digital function, Whitehead’s philosophy aims to leverage mathematics as a study 
of patterns of relation more generally. One of the ways he does this is to work 
informally through whole-part relations, or what technically can be described as 
intuitionistic ‘mereology.’ 
The argument here is that, to properly locate digital peripheral activity as a general 
relational activity, instead of as a bifurcated discrete function, we should think of logic in 
mereological terms. In the rest of this section, I further unpack this idea. 
Auxier and Herstein’s new interpretation of Whitehead stresses the importance 
Whitehead places on his mereology, working between the two extremes of analysis, a 
coordinate ‘whole’ at the greatest level of generality, and a ‘quantum’ unit of 
explanation at a most concrete level of description. In Process and Reality, Whitehead 
defines the ‘whole’ as the current cosmic epoch. At the other extreme, the prehension is 
the smallest and most concrete entity of analysis (Auxier and Herstein 2017, 37). The 
image of whole-part relations is also present in Whitehead’s concept of prehension as 
an internal relation (ibid., 63). It is a mainstay of Whitehead’s meretopological analysis 
of the division of the extensive continuum into time and space. It is invoked in 
Whitehead’s philosophical categories, such as his category of the ultimate (PR 21), in 
which he asserts that to produce any ‘one’ individual necessarily presupposes that there 
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exists a ‘many’ from which this one can be constituted, just as the notion of a ‘many’ 
presupposes a disjunctive plurality of ‘ones’ that could each potentially be an individual. 
Whole-part relations are an important feature of Whitehead’s ‘coordinate’ and ‘genetic’ 
analysis, briefly mentioned in Chapter 1. There are many other examples in Whitehead’s 
writing where he refuses to parse out conceptual units piecemeal, insisting on the 
‘interfusion’ of the whole as a combination of multiple factors. Consider, for example, 
how Whitehead responds when asked by Dewey to choose between the ‘genetic-
functional’ description of concrescence in Part III of Process and Reality (which we 
earlier linked to Finnegan’s Wake) and the more axiomatic mathematical interpretation 
of the extensive continuum in Part IV: 
John Dewey asks me to decide between the 'genetic-functional' interpretation of first 
principles and the 'mathematical-formal' interpretation. There is no one from whom one 
more dislikes to differ, than from Dewey … But I must decline to make this decision. The 
beauty of philosophy is its many facets. Our present problem is the fusion of the two 
interpretations. The historic process of the world, which requires the genetic-functional 
interpretation, also requires for its understanding some insight into those ultimate 
principles of existence which express the necessary connections within the flux. (ESP 179) 
To grapple with the ‘fusing’ of multiple interpretations as a mereology, take the 
following two assertions:  
The world is not logical.  
The world is not illogical.  
We can proffer evidence towards either assertion. The world is not logical, since 
logic provides no explanation of fairies or rubber chickens in baskets or flying spaghetti 
monsters or nonsense rhymes or poetry or many of the multifarious other things that 
exist. On the other hand, the world is not illogical, since, if it were, the very statement 
would be incoherent. Whitehead’s mereology calls for us to recognize that these two 
stanzas do not yield an opposition or sylogism. To put them in opposition is already to 
presuppose the validity of one stanza against the other, a logical trap. Instead, 
Whitehead asserts that the whole, such as it is, is able to support the emergence of both 
logical and illogical experiences: Both must be partial units of analysis within a more 
complex whole, which is irreducible to either.  
We find this style of reasoning deployed when Whitehead argues that logic and 
aesthetics are more similar than is usually supposed (MT 60–63). Recall that, for 
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Whitehead the physical pole is where aesthetic synthesis takes place, and the mental 
pole is where reasoning and consciousness arise. Whitehead writes: 
I suggest to you that the analogy between aesthetics and logic is one of the 
undeveloped topics of philosophy. In the first place, they are both concerned with the 
enjoyment of a composition, as derived from the interconnections of its factors. There is 
one whole, arising from the interplay of many details. The importance arises from the 
vivid grasp of the interdependence of the one and the many. If either side of this 
antithesis sinks into the background, there is trivialization of experience, logical and 
aesthetic. The distinction between logic and aesthetics consists in the degree of 
abstraction involved. Logic concentrates attention upon high abstraction, and aesthetics 
keeps as close to the concrete as the necessities of finite understanding permit. Thus 
logic and aesthetics are at the two extremes of the dilemma of the finite mentality in its 
partial penetration of the infinite. (MT 61) 
Whitehead here asserts that, whereas aesthetics begins from a whole and proceeds 
to the appreciation of the many details, logic begins from construing individual details 
whose combination leads to a synthesized whole. Both involve creating a unity through 
an interplay of the interconnection of many factors. The difference between logic and 
aesthetics is not of one in opposition to the other. It is rather the intermixing of degrees 
and manners of selection and attenuation, in which both logic and aesthetics have a 
role. This is an example of an application of Whitehead’s mereology to identify a whole 
arising from an interfusion of many interconnected details. He argues that if either side 
is too dominant—if there is too much emphasis on the whole or to the part—there is a 
‘trivialization’ of experience, in aesthetical or logical experiences. 
Auxier and Herstein identify the importance of mereology as a mode of thought 
underlying Whitehead’s approach. Yet their own interpretation is sometimes perhaps 
not mereological enough. For example, they suggest that some Whitehead scholars are 
‘working with ideas they believe to be Whitehead’s, but are not Whitehead’s … Putting 
Whitehead’s name to those ideas can be misleading.’ (Auxier and Herstein 2017, 20, 
emphasis theirs). I agree that there is a great deal of misinterpretation. It is also the case 
that Whitehead has more in mind for his project than the correct arrangement and 
attribution of ideas. Consider a remark of Whitehead’s on why he uses the term ‘feeling’ 
to mean a positive prehension. He observes that epistemological theories tend to use 
technical terms which are ‘far from the concrete facts of experience,’ whereas ‘the word 
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“feeling” has the advantage of preserving this double significance of subjective form and 
the apprehension of an object. It avoids the disjecta membra provided by abstraction’ 
(AI 233, emphasis in original).  Whitehead is here reminding us that he seeks to avoid 
narrow-band specialist thinking that leads to a disjecta membra. We should recall 
Whitehead’s statement that philosophy is a ‘welding of imagination and common sense’ 
(PR 17). A valid interpretation of Whitehead’s remark on his use of emotive words is that 
he aims not only to operate at the level of ideas but also to intervene at the level of 
language. He views philosophy as something which uses language as a tool that 
‘redesigns language’ (PR 11). Just as numbers do not exist in a vacuum, Whitehead is 
aware that he is not writing in a vacuum. His hope is not merely to adequately describe 
ideas about a cosmos, it is also the hope that philosophy will shape common language 
and transmute language. His coining of the term ‘creativity’ is one such example of a 
word that escaped the confines of his philosophy into wider usage (see Halewood 2013, 
35–38). Auxier and Herstein prioritize Whitehead’s ‘mathematical mind,’ so as to arrive 
at their conclusion that Whitehead is, above all, a radical empiricist (2017, 82). Others, 
including Stengers and Jones, attend more to the poetic and linguistic features of 
Whitehead’s project and arrive at a more activist stance that champions the spirit of 
speculative adventure (Stengers 2011, 14–15).  
I have picked these interpretations not to level one against the other but to argue 
that Whitehead doesn’t simply employ mereological thinking as an instrument; he 
recognizes that thought is part of the wider whole. It coexists with language, aesthetics, 
politics, ethics, and norms. Redesigning and reforming language within philosophy 
impacts this penumbral totality.  
To illustrate this, recall Whitehead’s statement that ‘most of the muddles of 
philosophy are, I think, due to using a language which is developed from one point of 
view to express a doctrine based upon entirely alien concepts’ (ESP 117). One way of 
reading the word ‘muddle’ is negatively, as an ethnographic caution regarding the 
hazards of cross-contamination between sites of study. But it can also be read positively, 
as an acceptance that philosophy yields muddles because it must draw on inherited 
language to express new or alien ideas. Hartshorne gives us an anecdote of Whitehead 
introducing Bertrand Russell at a lecture: ‘Bertie says that I am muddle-headed. But I 
think that he is simple minded’ (Hartshorne 1990, 311). Hartshorne continues, ‘There 
are those who would be clear (and even neat and witty) at almost any cost, including 
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that of vastly oversimplifying things. There are those who above all would be adequate 
to the richness and many-sidedness of reality, even if they cannot always be neat and 
clear in their account of it’ (ibid., 311).  
It is this second line of interpretation that Judith Jones commits to, and takes 
further, in a section of her book on Whitehead titled ‘The Metaphysics of Muddle.’ Jones 
writes, ‘Muddledness is the experience of competing forms of value in a situation in 
which it appears to be impossible to realize all competitors; it is an experiential 
rendering of what may theoretically be conceived [of] as moral conflict’ (Jones 1998, 
179). ‘Muddle,’ here, is a poetic way of expressing the kinds of conflicts and contrasts 
that arise in the intermixing of logic and aesthetics. Jones describes these conflicts as 
moral because such discord requires that we make value-balancing decisions. Our 
models ‘keep breaking’ (ibid., 179) and this leads to genuine and inescapable disruption.  
Jones points us towards a view of digital function not as an ideal and fake exactness, 
but as a ‘muddled’ (and so political) experience of general function, in which logic and 
aesthetics are imperfectly balanced. Here again we are reminded of Thorne’s issue of 
metaphysical levelling that I discussed in Chapter 2. It is not sufficient to propose an 
abstract metaphysical system. We must interrogate the proposed abstractions by 
engaging in analogical question asking at a high level, while iterating and testing from 
the ‘ground of particular observation.’ 
What I propose now is that art provides one opportunity for examining and testing 
alternative valuations. In the next chapter I suggest that art practice may constitute new 
kinds of decision procedures that locate the digital not as an ideal and falsely exact logic 
but as a fully relational peripheral activity. This provides a testing ground for the ‘value-
balancing’ acts that Jones mentions. However, such value-balancing acts cannot take 
place in the abstract or on the basis of a general theory. Recalling that general function 
is conditioned historically and genealogically, our inquiry must take place Sitz im Leben, 
or, to use Massumi’s term, in the middling (Massumi 2013, 1). In the next chapter, we 
turn to the art practice of Tino Sehgal in order to examine his constructed situations. At 
the conclusion of the chapter, I will argue that Sehgal’s constructed procedures 
investigate models of permutation and systems of logic, establishing a critical relation to 
peripheral digital activity.  
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5. Tino’s Handshake 
This chapter turns to contemporary art and examines the constructed situations of 
contemporary artist Tino Sehgal. The chapter begins by describing Sehgal’s practice. I 
argue that Sehgal’s acquisition process requires that we examine his work more 
systemically, and not only in terms of the individual artistic encounters. I examine 
readings of participatory art and conceptual art applicable to Sehgal’s practice. Tracing 
systems art in conceptualism, I discuss connections between systems art and 
Whitehead’s systematic philosophy. The chapter then returns to the notion of ‘decision 
procedures,’ comparing Sol LeWitt’s and Adrian Piper’s conceptualism and decision 
procedures with the kinds of unfolding, participatory activity in Sehgal’s constructed 
situations. I propose that Sehgal’s decision procedures are monist and model ‘general 
function.’ The chapter concludes with a return to the discussion of peripheral digital 
activity. Here I argue that constructed situations offer an example of one strategy for 
critically investigating and reconfiguring the effects of peripheral digital activity. 
Artologies 
How might art critically investigate the phenomenon of peripheral digital activity? 
Before attempting to answer this, one must ask, What does it mean to situate art as a 
critical investigation? If we have presupposed that the investigation centres on the 
digital, doesn’t this subordinate art to an instrumental or illustrative role, neutering its 
critical potency as a mode of engaged activity? Isn’t this risk is exacerbated if we cast art 
as research, limiting art to practice-based research? What ontology and epistemology 
are being proposed for art as research? What hermeneutic criteria are relevant?   
Let us accept the analytic conceit of art as a ‘whole’ and art in its particular 
occurrences. The issue then becomes one of identifying the proposals, justifications, and 
specifications available for navigating between the general notion of art and its 
particulars. It is in these navigations that art obtains its ontology, epistemology, and 
hermeneutics, as well as definitions of art, artwork, artist, and art world. The issue being 
raised has parallels with the issue of research methodology discussed in Chapter 2, this 
time is recast in connection with art. I refer to the unsettled tension at the heart of this 
issue as the problem of artology—i.e., what formation of art/artist/art world is being 
subscribed to, if at all? 
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Here it is helpful to take as an example Grant Kester’s proposal for art in The One 
and the Many (Kester 2011). Kester suggests that, within recent participatory practices, 
there is a paradigm shift from ‘textual’ to ‘dialogical’ art. Kester asserts that dialogical 
art practices ‘complicate conventional notions of aesthetic autonomy. These practices 
mark a (cyclical) renegotiation of aesthetic autonomy via the permeability that exists 
between art production and other, adjacent, forms of cultural production and activism’ 
(Kester 2011, 9). Kester does not suggest that textual and dialogical art are hard-and-fast 
categories. They are tendencies, or ‘predispositions,’ varying from artist to artist and in 
each artwork. He also does not propose that one type of art supersedes the other. Both 
types of art are different articulations of art more generally, which Kester defines as ‘the 
ability of aesthetic experience to transform our perceptions of difference and to open 
space for forms of knowledge that challenge cognitive, social, or political conventions’ 
(2011, 11). 
Kester defines ‘textual’ art in terms of a partitioned model of production, in which 
the artist authors a work that is then interpreted by viewers and critics. Kester 
associates this model of production with hegemonic, normative, and canonical 
conventions or traditions in the anglophone art world. He suggests this model of art 
emphasises shock-based tactics of reception, transgressive a-rational somatic 
experience, an appeal to the ‘avant-garde,’ and continental and postcolonial theory 
(2011, 54). In contrast, suggests Kester, ‘dialogical’ practices are conversational, with 
porous divisions between making and interpreting. This implies that dialogical models of 
art have different ontological, hermeneutic, and evaluative criteria in their proposals for 
aesthetics and ethics. One implication of dialogical art, for example, is that art historians 
and critics must employ analysis techniques more typically used in social sciences, such 
as field research and interviews (2011, 10). Kester describes dialogical art as an 
‘intellectual baroque,’ since it is a category that is not defined through extrinsic criteria 
but one in which, in each project, the creative or critical procedure ‘takes on a life of its 
own’ (2011, 13). 
One way of reading Kester’s discussion of textual and dialogical art is as an 
identification of multiple art worlds, with different ways of organizing the movement 
from art as a generality to its particularities. As we found with Manning and in our 
discussion of methodologies in Chapter 2, Kester identifies a dominant critical tradition 
and proposes an alternative nascent model which is based upon a procedure that takes 
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on a ‘life of its own.’ He describes these two organizations of art as predispositions, or as 
modes. There is a textual and a dialogical manner of art.  
Regardless of whether there is a paradigm shift in art, Kester’s careful analysis 
demonstrates that there are multiple possible movements from general notions of art to 
particular instances. These multiple movements can also take place simultaneously. For 
example, in the art practice of the Dialogue art collective Kester examines, there are at 
least three ways art is configured by the Dialogue collective in their installations: for 
Adivasi tribal villagers at the ‘interstices of modernity and tradition’ (2011, 78); for the 
Mumbai contemporary artist Navjot Altaf, who has ‘a level of access to national and 
international art circuits’ (Kester 2011, 94); and for Kester himself, as a faculty member 
of a visual arts department in California engaged in field research. 
The suggestion is that art may enlist multiple artologies, according to individual 
conditions and purposes of reception and activation of the art at each moment. A 
corollary of this multiplicity is the implication that any single artology captures only a 
partial account of art. Furthermore, if different kinds of relations to art take place 
simultaneously, the various artologies are not static but interfere with each other, as 
receptions and engagements with art transmute each other over time.  
This raises a secondary issue: How do we identify artologies in their relations to 
other kinds of non-art phenomena?  
Consider the proposal of art advanced by Nicolas Bourriaud in his book Relational 
Aesthetics. Bourriaud starts his book by outlining an artology. He identifies that ‘artistic 
activity is a game, whose forms, patterns and functions develop and evolve according to 
periods and social context; it is not an immutable essence’ (Bourriaud 1998, 11). He 
continues, ‘Art was intended to prepare and announce a future world: today it is 
modelling possible universes’ (1998, 13). Whereas in Chapter 2 we saw Whitehead 
discussing art’s selection and enjoyment of values in general, Bourriaud stresses art as 
specific kinds of processual activity that introduce relations, games, and models of 
possible universes. In his analysis, he links the emergence of this artology to digital 
technologies. He argues that the artists he examines emphasize artistic activity, rather 
than conventions of object making, partly in response to the increasing use of digital 
modes of production and sociality.  
Bourriaud here invokes what he names the Law of Relocation, asserting that fruitful 
thinking arises when we consider the possibilities of technology obliquely, rather than 
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by illustrating those possibilities directly as technique. ‘Art only exercises its critical duty 
with regard to technology from the moment when it shifts its challenges. So the main 
effects of the computer revolution are visible today among artists who do not use 
computers’ (1998, 67). Bourriaud claims that artists in the 1990s who showed an 
increased attentiveness to social togetherness were ‘ushered in’ (1998, 72) by digital 
communications and image-production technologies, even if those artists did not 
explicitly use those technologies in their practices. Such artists, according to Bourriaud, 
sought to inhabit the relations established through computer technologies differently, 
so that, ‘these days, it is no longer a question of depicting from without the conditions 
of production, but of introducing the gestural, and deciphering the social relations 
bought on by them’ (1998, 68). The Law of Relocation suggests that there is no 
preordained art/non-art divide, and indeed, within certain artologies, oblique strategies 
may be more fruitful than direct strategies.  
From the discussion above, it is apparent that appropriate strategies and practices in 
contemporary art to critically investigate and reconfigure the effects of peripheral digital 
activity cannot be disclosed in any determinate manner. But if no determinate answer is 
available, we can inquire into possible strategies. In this chapter, I do this through a 
sustained analysis of one artist, rather than through a synoptic survey. I examine the 
contemporary artist Tino Sehgal. At the end of the chapter, working through notions of 
conceptualism, I will argue that Sehgal is an artist whose non-object stance results in a 
decision procedure that is monist. It intertwines with the digital, and avoids a bifurcation 
of the digital.  
In selecting Sehgal, it is not my intention to isolate his art as an exemplar of a 
movement or theory or to elevate Sehgal’s art above others. The goal is to further 
elaborate the notion of a decision procedure that I have been developing over the 
course of this thesis.  
Sehgal may seem like an unlikely artist to focus on within a discussion of the digital. 
Sehgal has been characterised as an anti-object artist. He is known to refuse to carry a 
mobile phone. He stresses person-to-person contact in his artworks. He has attempted 
to ban people from using digital devices in his installations.  
At the same time, Sehgal’s art installations require hiring, training, and organizing 
hundreds of part-time paid workers to perform scripted sequences and permutations 
that run continuously throughout the duration of the exhibition. Such an arrangement 
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of delegated labour presupposes today’s efficient labour practices, through which pools 
of workers are organized and coordinated using networked communications 
infrastructures that streamline the administration of payroll and scheduling. While 
Sehgal does not produce objects, he assumes the availability of communication 
technologies in his practice. In my view, Sehgal’s practice operates the way that it does 
because of enabling factors of the internet. At the same time, his practice serves to 
interrogate models of rules and permutations, as a kind of living software. This is what 
draws me to consider Sehgal’s practice in relation to notions of digital activity. Such a 
reading resonates with descriptions of ‘post-internet’ art, in the sense of the term as 
used by Marisa Olson since around 2008 and taken up by many others. Olson draws 
attention to artists, like herself, whose practice presupposes the internet in some way, 
even if the artworks produced are not recognizably internet artworks. For Olson, the 
post-internet ‘encapsulates and transports network conditions and their critical 
awareness as such, even so far as to transcend the internet’ (Olson 2011, 60). A worry I 
have with the term is that there is so much leeway in what might count as post-internet 
art that the term loses its critical purchase (see Droitcour 2014 for a discussion of this 
issue). One area of future research is to further examine peripheral digital activity in its 
relation to other post-internet art. In what follows, I primarily focus on Sehgal’s 
constructed situations. 
Tino Sehgal 
In a visit to the Guggenheim, my first guide, who was a child, announced to me, ‘This is a 
piece by Tino Sehgal.’ After brief introductions, the guide popped the question ‘What is 
progress?’ I knew the question was coming. I couldn’t avoid the impression that I was at 
a busy restaurant with overworked wait staff who received moderate tips, and I had just 
been told the name of the chef and what was on the menu. ‘Warm food’ came my reply. 
I was ushered up Frank Lloyd Wright’s spiralling ziggurat ramp. My guide tactfully 
handed me over to a second, older guide. By the end of my sojourn at the top of the 
ramp, I had had four different conversations with guides of increasing age. Food 
remained a connecting thematic. I had ‘solved’ Sehgal’s menu problem by inventing my 
menu à la carte, and when the final interpreter informed me, ‘The piece is called This 
Progress,’ my dialogue was over and I was suddenly hungry. I left for the bright 
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outdoors, contemplating This Progress, by British-German artist Tino Sehgal, presented 
at the Guggenheim in New York in 2010.  
At Sehgal's This Variation in Huguenot House at Documenta XIII, Kassel, Germany in 
2012, I entered a pitch-black, muggy room. Slowly my eyes adjusted and I was able to 
make out shadowy bodies slinking around. There was a troupe in full swing—more than 
a dozen figures swaying, moving, and sitting. I found a wall to lean against and stayed 
for two cycles of the performance, more than half an hour. ‘Ah ha, ah ha, du dum, du 
dum…’ At some moments, the interpreters worked as a chorus, but there were also one-
on-one interactions between interpreters and visitors. Beatboxing, chanting, singing, 
slow movement, dancing, clapping, rhythmic humming, short sentences, whispers, 
crescendo, fading, louder, quieter, a pulsating swirl. When I left, the dank smell of This 
Variation seemed to linger with me for an hour. 
Sehgal contests the notion that art requires making tangible material objects. He 
hires ‘interpreters’ to stage what he calls ‘constructed situations.’ These constructed 
situations follow scripted moments and choreographed movements that Sehgal conveys 
to interpreters during rehearsals. The interpreters enact these scripts in shifts 
throughout the duration of the exhibition. Sehgal occasionally uses museum guards as 
interpreters, calling attention to their institutional role. For This Is So Contemporary, 
shown at the Venice Biennale in 2005, a group of guards chants, ‘Ooooh. This is so 
contemporary!’ Sehgal also hires dancers or singers or enlists members of the public, 
according to the needs of the piece. His earlier works tended to be more balletic. After 
around 2006, he started making more interactive demands on viewers and requiring 
more improvisation on the part of the interpreters. More recent works have moved 
away from walking-and-talking to an omnibus of varied types of sequences, as with This 
Variation, described above. 
Sehgal distances his practice from the conventions of performance, removing the 
props and architectural devices (such as stages or theatrical lighting) that might divide 
audience from artwork in a sphere of absorption. He emphasizes that his works are to 
be experienced body to-body as first-person encounters. For Sehgal, the works are 
intended to be understood as visual conceptual art, though he is less concerned with 
whether his work is an autonomous artwork—what he calls the ‘if’ question—than with 
the ‘how’ questions: ‘How I am relating to you now?’ (Serpentine Galleries 2016, 08:15).  
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An unauthorized photo taken of Tino Sehgal’s The Kiss at 
Guggenheim Museum (2010), taken on an iPhone shows and 
printed in the New York Times (Cotter 2010). 
Tino Sehgal forbids formal written documentation of his works. For This Variation, 
the Documenta guidebook mentions Sehgal on the contents page, but the page about 
Sehgal is omitted. Sehgal attempts to prevent photography and video of the works. 
When the New York Times printed an iPhone photo of The Kiss in 2010, Sehgal described 
this as ‘ungentlemanly, very crass’ (Collins 2012). Claire Bishop describes this 
denouncement of documentation as the desire to couple production with deproduction, 
as if Sehgal aspired to simultaneously be making and not making something (Bishop 
2005). 
Sehgal’s works mandate a variety of institutional demands. They typically must be 
presented for six weeks or more and run continuously during the institution’s full 
opening hours. The exhibition environment may also need to be prepared and emptied 
of signage, maps, benches, booths or other objects, with planters changed and windows 
covered or uncovered. At the Guggenheim, for example, Sehgal instructed that the tarp 
covering of the ‘oculus’ above Wright’s ramp be remove, to allow natural light into the 
space.  
Sehgal’s works also require numerous preparatory steps. Asad Raza helped produce 
both This Progress at the Guggenheim and These Associations in the Tate Modern’s 
Turbine Hall in 2012 (Morgan and Raza 2012). He describes Sehgal as the author or 
conceptualizer of the works, whereas his own tasks were more those of producer and 
collaborator, although these roles overlap. For the Guggenheim and the Tate pieces, it 
took a year to find and train interpreters, including holding multiple meetings, 
organizing intensive group sessions, and finding time for individual one-on-one reviews 
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of each interpreter. Raza mentions that they selected interpreters with a certain kind of 
sensitivity, people with a ‘zone of measured and profound’ or certain ‘addressal’ 
qualities. For the Tate’s Turbine Hall piece, the sequences and elements were also 
changed during the running, and some interpreters left or new interpreters were hired. 
The result was a daily collective decision-making, a ‘culture’ of reproduction for the 
piece that involved several hundred interpreters, with between sixty and one hundred 
interpreters in the Turbine Hall at a time. It is a relentless slog to keep Sehgal’s pieces 
running. 
Sehgal has discussed his work in terms of bringing back ‘aristocratic sensibility,’ 
‘refinement,’ ‘court etiquette,’ or ‘ritual’ (Serpentine Galleries 2016, 13:30). Hans Ulrich 
Obrist, borrowing a term from the artists Gilbert & George, has designated Sehgal’s 
works as living sculpture. As a performance staged for the more than one million visitors 
at the Turbine Hall, Sehgal’s works could also be described as living monuments.  
Such framings invite us to scrutinize his art by zooming in, as an art ethnographer, to 
focus on unique individual encounters between interpreters and visitors to explore how 
the pieces ‘work.’ Certainly, a comprehensive account of Sehgal’s practice must include 
analyses of these short-lived phosphorescent moments. But there is also a zoomed-out 
perspective examining the programmatic factors at work in the institutional staging of 
the art as event. In this framing, we encounter Tino’s handshake. 
Tino’s Handshake 
Sehgal carefully scripts how his works are acquired by institutions and collectors. In 
contemporary art, social conventions normally separate discussions of business details 
from the art itself.19 In Sehgal’s case, the mention of his business handshake is an ever-
present refrain in discussions of his practice.  
Lesley Johnstone, a curator for an exhibition of Sehgal’s work at the Musée d’art 
contemporain de Montréal, writes: 
In keeping with Sehgal’s strict opposition to manufacturing objects, the process of 
acquiring one of his works consists in a purely oral transaction involving the artist or one 
of his representatives, the director, curators and registrar of the museum, and a lawyer. 
The conditions of acquisition and installation are recited and committed to memory by 
                                                        
19 Art’s purchase scripts, its ‘front-room’ and ‘back-room’ operations, and the social conventions of 
separating discussions of business and art are examined from a sociological perspective in Olav Velthuis’s 
Talking Prices (Velthuis 2005). 
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all present, the price is discussed and when both parties are in agreement, there is a 
handshake. No paper documentation accompanies the acquisition. Conditions of 
presentation include the remuneration of all players and a strict refusal of video or 
photographic documentation, printed press releases, catalogues, labels or didactic 
panels. (Johnstone 2013) 
Sehgal’s scripted handshake deal is said to be ‘in keeping’ with his choices as an 
artist; it is ‘a great metaphor’ for the collecting and exchange of art. Handshake deals fit 
with Sehgal’s interest in courtly etiquette and ritual. In early feudal rituals, the 
ceremony of a mixing of hands signalled a religious fusion of two persons, the lord and 
vassal.20 Today the handshake itself is legally redundant. Oral contracts are just that— 
they require the agreement of terms, intention, and consideration, given orally (Gillies 
2004). Sehgal’s handshake is therefore a choreographed ritual, not a legal obligation. It 
is performed as part of his business operations even though oral contracts are not 
typically accepted by large institutions. Jessica Morgan has described Sehgal as a highly 
unsuccessful artist because of the challenges of acquiring his works. Yasmil Raymond 
reports that when the Walker Art Center acquired a Sehgal work, it was a protracted 
process and ‘the only time someone on the acquisitions committee voted against an 
acquisition. There was a small insurrection’ (Collins 2012). Klaus Biesenbach, then chief 
curator of the Museum of Modern Art’s Department of Media, described the process: 
‘There was an orally communicated contract. As a curator you have to remember it—I 
was very happy I wasn’t alone because I was afraid I was going to forget everything—
and you have to follow the instructions. We had 12 people around the table, including a 
lawyer, a notary, gallerists, curators and members of the conservation and registration 
departments. The meeting went on for hours’ (quoted in Degen 2009).  
Why make the acquisition process so hard? Why insist on choreographing it to the 
point where the handshake, a formality, becomes foregrounded? One answer is that this 
choreographing of the business boardroom attempts to blur the conventions that 
separate the artistic encounter from the business operations of art, treating the practice 
as a whole as an exercise in brand management.21 Sehgal affirms this view, arguing that 
                                                        
20 Handshakes as rituals may have started with early feudal ceremonies of vassalage, in which the vassal 
offered oaths of fealty and ‘mixed hands’ (immixtio manuum) with the lord. Nitzan and Bichler describe how 
this feudal ritual became embedded in the ‘social contract’ of capitalism (2009, 283–87). 
21 This follows a notion from Velthuis, who writes that Jeff Koons, Takashi Murakami, Richard Prince, 
Maurizio Cattelan, and Damien Hirst are ‘brand managers whose main occupation is the production and 
diffusion of commercial propaganda’ (Velthuis and Lind 2012, 33). 
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it is meaningless to try to separate art and commodity form. From this perspective, the 
visitors, buyers, interpreters, and critics are all are complicit in manifesting and 
communicating Sehgal’s practice. Bishop has called Sehgal’s practice ‘delegated 
performance’ (Bishop 2012, 224), noting that it is not only the interpreters that Sehgal 
delegates to. As she points out in one review, ‘The present article, far from being the 
weakest link in Sehgal’s conceptual fortress, may indeed be immanent to the work: a 
production that stands for and encircles the objective of his practice’ (Bishop 2005).  
Sehgal’s acquisition process calls attention to the proximity of business operations 
and art operations. We are invited to consider the contractual immixtio manuum as a 
constructed situation: These Purchases. Within such an artology, the relevant factors 
that define the work include not only the individual encounter with the artwork, but also 
the surrounding business operations. We are being invited to consider both the ‘front 
room’ art encounter and the ‘back room’ together, not as one in support of the 
production of the other but rather as equally immanent to his practice as art. Sehgal’s 
art is both inseparably experiential and programmatic, fusing the operations of two 
paradigms at once. One paradigm centres on the individual encounter a visitor has with 
the artwork in its exhibition setting, where Sehgal’s pieces take up the role of art as 
participatory experience within circulations of performances, objects, gestures, and 
propositions in phenomenal discussions of art. Another paradigm proposes art as 
constituted through certain arrangements of rules and activities, which include the 
institutional rules of circulation, business operations, and wider communication 
systems. I read Tino’s handshake as propelling the view that both are important aspects 
within the proposed artology. If a constructed situation is purchased but not staged, it 
remains a work of art that can be resold.22 But if it is staged, then the myriad details 
(houseplants, lighting, selection and training of interpreters) are also aspects of the 
work.  
Organizing two hundred contracted workers to continually staff an event that runs 
for six months requires substantive concrete machinations and dense informational 
exchanges. And when Sehgal orders different houseplants for the Guggenheim, this is 
reminiscent of the way that, to install a Dan Flavin exhibition, museums will re-create 
wall heights and electrical wiring to exacting specifications: Empty architectural space is 
                                                        
22 This echoes Lawrence Weiner’s Statement of Intent (1968) which claimed that the idea of a work ‘may be 
fabricated’ but ‘need not to be built’. The ontology of the work was held to be its potential material realisation 
(Skrebowski 2009, 162). 
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never laissez-faire but has a material price tag. Then there are the many documents, 
emails, and non-ephemeral counterparts necessary to stage a large-scale event. Such 
factors are an aspect of Sehgal’s art as an operation, as a way of art. It is only when we 
examine the two paradigms of his artistic practice together that we can observe the 
paper trail of objects and materials necessary to his ‘objectless’ art experiences. 
 
 
 
A paper flyer for the Guggenheim exhibition of Sehgal’s 
undocumented ‘objectless’ practice, $7.25/hr. Photograph posted 
on Twitter by Lindsay Pollock, http://twitpic.com/j2y0d. 
 
In order to give this claim salience, it is first necessary to examine existing readings 
relevant to Sehgal’s practice. For the remainder of this chapter, I take up Sehgal’s 
practice in its relation to discussions of relational, social and participatory art, and 
conceptual art. In this discussion, I relay some substance-philosophical positions taken 
up by Sehgal’s practice and conclude the chapter with a discussion of systems theory 
and algorithms. 
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Participatory Art  
Sehgal describes his artworks as ‘interactive.’ The works are conducted within exhibition 
spaces, and they try to set in motion human-to-human activity. In this respect, his work 
appears to fit the model of relational art proposed by Bourriaud twenty years ago. One 
approach to Sehgal’s constructed situations is therefore to consider them through the 
history of relational aesthetics and participatory art. 
Bourriaud defines relational art as art that adheres to an ‘aesthetic theory consisting 
in judging artworks on the basis of the inter-human relations which they represent, 
produce or prompt’ (1998, 112). Bourriaud’s book of essays on relational aesthetics is an 
important reference point, though many other writers since, including Bishop (2012) 
and Kester (2011) have considerably widened the terms of the conversation, linking 
relational art to a broader territory of debates stemming from attempts in art in the 
1960s and 1970s to transcend objecthood—including Michael Fried’s 1967 essay Art and 
Objecthood (1998); Lucy Lippard’s Dematerialization of the Art Object from 1966 to 1972 
(1997); the various movements of conceptual art; neoconceptualism; performance and 
body art; installation art; experimental dance; and artists such as Yvonne Rainer, Dan 
Graham, Yves Klein, Gordon Matta Clark, Fluxus, and Allan Kaprow. 
Bishop’s well-known essay Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics gives this incisive 
commentary: ‘If relational art produces human relations, then the next logical question 
to ask is what types of relations are being produced, for whom, and why?’ (2004, 65). 
Bishop points out that imaginative models of interaction are nothing new, hardly 
utopian, and short on critical evaluative criteria. Bourriaud’s notions of the value of 
sociability and conviviality in art are no guarantees of democratizing change. In Artificial 
Hells—Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship (2012), Bishop traces the 
evolution of participatory art and theatre from early-20th-century Italy and Russia to the 
present day. She argues that participatory art should not be reduced to collectivism and 
good intentions or positivist measures of impact. She draws on the aesthetic philosophy 
of Jacques Rancière to argue that art critique must allow for notions of distance, 
autonomy, or unreadability to be included as criteria used to evaluate art’s capacity for 
social change.  
Kester starts with many of the same questions that Bishop raises regarding relational 
aesthetics but arrives at different conclusions (see Heartney 2012). He too critiques 
Bourriaud’s relational aesthetics for equating sociability with democracy. In Kester’s 
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book The One and the Many (2011), he uses the term ‘dialogical practice’ to describe art 
that is collaborative, politically engaged, and combines community activism with artistic 
production. Kester promotes artists who produce participatory work on international 
sites in conjunction with local populations. For instance, he describes the art collective 
Dialogue in Kopaweda, India, which designed and built public water pumps in several 
Adivasi tribal villages. According to Kester (2011, 65), the reparative collaboration 
produced by Dialogue emphasizes durational exchanges between site and audience, 
problematizes the authorial status of the artist, and contests aesthetic autonomy. Kester 
contrasts this with relational aesthetics in the work of artists Santiago Sierra and Francis 
Alÿs. He argues that these artists do not seek to remodel collective exchange or produce 
lasting relationships with the sites they inhabit. Rather, they reinscribe the ‘shock’ 
pioneered by the historical avant-garde. In doing so, relational aesthetics is committed 
to the hegemonic influence of continental critical theory developed in the wake of the 
events of May ’68, since it privileges spontaneous encounters over active engagement 
with the systems of global capital. For Kester, such practices have ‘foreclosed the 
possibility that social interaction or political engagement itself might transform 
subjectivity or produce its own forms of insight’ (2011, 59). 
Three writers—Bourriaud, Bishop and Kester—provide three different voices, each 
part critic, part historian, part ethnographer, each offering alternate perspectives on 
participatory art. Each presents alternate mythologies of compulsion, violence, 
persuasion, agency, and aspiration. Without offering a full characterisation of these 
accounts, what is pertinent here is the way that each capture different partial aspects of 
Sehgal’s practice. 
Bourriaud’s model of relational art, for instance, highlights the importance of 
museums as sites that provide an opportunity for unexpected meetings and dialogs—a 
position Sehgal shares. However, Bourriaud’s notion of relational art is materialist and 
utopic. He argues that artists should use the ready materials of the day to promote 
conviviality, to offer visitors a moment of escape from utilitarian life. A quintessential 
example of Bourriaud’s relational aesthetics is Rirkrit Tiravanija’s 1992 exhibition 
entitled Untitled (Free) at 303 Gallery in New York, in which the artist converted the 
gallery into a kitchen serving free Thai curry. Contra to a ‘free lunch’ utopia, Sehgal 
affirms his art’s commodity status. His instruction-driven scripts and flashmob 
choreography have a utilitarian and pragmatic character.  
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Bishop (2012, 232) stresses the economic and durational circumstances of Sehgal’s 
works, which she describes as delegated performance situated within affluent Western 
art institutions. She also identifies the differing registers in Sehgal’s pieces, including 
what she calls ‘gallery time,’ the all-day-long, always-running mode of performance as 
an army of industrialised shift workers are paid and accrue costs, and the individual brief 
flashes of ‘interaction time’ between visitors and interpreters, in which value is placed 
on liveness. For Bishop, Sehgal is one artist of many in a much larger historical narrative 
for which she simultaneously asserts that art evades normative criteria. While I find 
Sehgal’s slow choreography at times arresting, it is hard to see Sehgal as much of a 
proponent of Bishop’s notions of unreadability, in which art resists co-option. 
Kester’s more practical conception of dialogical art seems closer to Sehgal’s 
concerns. Kester is open to art that includes utilitarian ends, if it foregrounds the 
importance of participatory dialogues. For Sehgal, the ultimate success of a work is the 
way it accompanies a visitor and mingles with their own thoughts, a point on which 
Kester and Sehgal might agree. Dialogical art seems to fit Sehgal’s Socratic tendency, his 
‘If I can set someone in motion …’ proposition, which appeals to the individual’s small 
but relevant agency. However, Sehgal rejects explicit political activism as well as long-
term engagements with communities outside the institutional franchises of art, both 
central requirements of Kester’s notion of dialogical art. 
These three theorizations bring into focus three different aspects of Sehgal’s 
practice, in each case highlighting what amounts to a partial fit. What I propose to do 
next is turn to Sehgal’s own identification with conceptual art in order to consider 
another avenue within his practice, which I relay in terms of a notion of ‘cleaner’ 
conceptualism.  
Cleaner Conceptualism  
Sehgal’s anti-object practice involves a single consistent manner of presentation in all 
his works. This runs counter to the participatory art discussed by Bourriaud, Kester, and 
Bishop, who recognize a diversity of different kinds of artistic practice and resist 
anything that hints at ‘purity’ in the sense that Clement Greenberg assigned to modern 
art, i.e., as a critical art in which the task is ‘to eliminate from the effects of each art any 
and every effect that might conceivably be borrowed from or by the medium of any 
other art’ (Greenberg 1995, 111–12 [1963]). Is Sehgal’s zealous anti-object stance some 
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kind of return to a purist pursuit for art? How does this relate to conceptualism and its 
repudiated rejection of Greenbergian medium-specificity? To respond to this, in this 
section we examine the legacy of conceptual art in relation to Sehgal’s practice.  
Sehgal self-describes his practice in reference to conceptual art: 
I’m trying to be cleaner than performance art. Although I’m actually not so interested 
in performance art; it’s not even really a reference for me. I’m especially trying to be 
cleaner than conceptual art in the sense that if we want to dematerialise the object, let’s 
really dematerialise it. I’m still producing objects not in the material sense of the word 
but in the product sense of the word. … What conceptual art was doing was 
dematerialising the art object into language, which they thought meant writing 
something on paper. They are from the tradition of painting and sculpture somehow, so 
what do they do, they write on paper. (Obrist and Sehgal 2003) 
The question I want to take up in this section is how we interpret ‘cleaner’ 
conceptualism. In what follows, I will argue that Sehgal’s statement aligns with a 
‘systems’ attitude towards conceptual art.  
The legacies of conceptual art from the late 1960s and early 1970s are varied and 
contested. As John Chilver (2005, 47–49) observes of artists in the period from 1965 to 
1975, during which conceptualism is said to be active, Sol LeWitt, Vito Acconci, Robert 
Morris, Lawrence Weiner, and Robert Smithson rejected the term ‘conceptualism’. They 
all pursued practices that were committed to the particularities of making stuff and 
responding to material situations. Conceptualism is an underspecified historicization of 
practices that were multiple, complex, dynamic, and not reducible to straightforward 
definitions. There was never a single kind of conceptual art, and the artists now labelled 
as conceptualists formed an unruly, factional community.23 The polemics surrounding 
the term ‘conceptual art’ at times overwhelm what was a complex tapestry of activity, 
even as the lasting effects of conceptual art are still influential in art today, as evidenced 
by Sehgal’s statement. 
A recent thesis by Luke Skrebowski (2009) examines the role of ‘systems art’ in 
conceptual art. Skrebowski taxonomically inserts systems art between minimalism and 
conceptual art. He does so with deliberate awkwardness, since he does not propose to 
construct a movement-based or category-based history of systems art. Instead, he 
presents systems art as a set of artistic problems, strategies, or responses within 
                                                        
23 This is a point well charted by Peter Osborne. See Osborne 2013. 
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complex shifting forces of art. He reads the work of the critic Jack Burnham from 1968 
and 1970, noting that ‘Burnham pointed to the way in which the ideal systems of logical, 
mathematical, and spatio-temporal relations that characterised early post-minimalist 
work were expanded in character to include physical, biological and, crucially, social 
systems’ (2009, 52). Skrebowski observes that Burnham foreshadows Bourriaud when 
Burnham argues that ‘art does not reside in material entities but in relations between 
people and between people and the components of their environment’ (2009, 53). As 
with Bourriaud, Burnham links the importance of a systems approach in art to the wider 
technical changes in society, in which art was held to be resistant to the logic of 
technological rationality that it nonetheless mimics (2009, 55); Burnham doesn’t fully 
elaborate the status of ‘aesthetics’ within his account, and he has been criticized for 
utopianism (2009, 77) and for flattening the different tendencies within conceptual art 
(2009, 78). 
A strength of Skrebowski’s research is his historical analysis of systems art. 
Examining deployments of systems thinking among the artists Hans Haacke, Victor 
Burgin, Mel Bochner, Douglas Huebler, Hanne Darboven, Adrian Piper, Mary Kelly, and 
Mierle Laderman Ukeles, Skrebowski traces a shift from the use of systems to generate 
permutations in individual artworks to a broader, more nebulous, and self-reflexive 
adoption of systems thinking, or what Skrebowski describes as a systematic mode of 
conceptual art in which art and its institutions are examined as systems within the 
totality of the capitalist system (2009, 52). In tracing this history, Skrebowski emphasizes 
the links between conceptual art and tech art, pop art and kinetic art. As an example, 
Skrebowski mentions Haacke’s Photo-Electric View-Controlled Coordinate System (1968), 
installed at the Howard Wise Gallery. This installation converted the gallery into a 
system with an invisible grid of motion sensors that trigger light bulbs mounted on the 
walls above each sensor. ‘Lured by promises of free interaction … participation 
amounted to no more than the choreography of a routinised existence’ (2009, 128). 
Haacke said in 1970 that his aim was ‘to think in terms of systems; of the production of 
systems, the interference with, and the exposure of systems … Systems can be physical, 
biological, or social; they can be man-made, naturally existing, or a combination of any 
of the above’ (Haacke, quoted in Skrebowski 2009, 129). Skrebowski argues that 
Haacke’s statement reflects a systems-based attitude not tied to any single field or 
discipline and widely disseminated within natural and social sciences as well as the 
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anglophone art world in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This resulted in a diffuse and 
‘ambiguous character’ of systems discourse (2009, 137). Skrebowski seeks to provide a 
corrective by carefully tracing ways that certain Western artists used, thought about, 
discussed, and wrote about systems in the late 1960s and early 1970s. He also argues 
that this reclaimed narration of conceptual art is relevant when examining 
contemporary art.   
What is pertinent in Skrebowski’s study for this thesis is the reading it makes 
available on Sehgal’s statement on cleaner conceptualism. One way to interpret Sehgal’s 
cleaner conceptualism is as a claim that, by avoiding physical objects, Sehgal has 
succeeded in ‘dematerializing’ the art object and so produced better conceptualism. The 
adequacy of this argument is quickly dispatched. As with the conceptual performance 
works of Adrian Piper in the 1970s, such as Catalysis IV (1970–71), Sehgal has not 
dematerialized the art object so much as displaced its materialization onto the bodies of 
interpreters. In other words, he has not eliminated the ‘aesthetic dimension’ of the 
artwork or overcome the rift between conceptual and physical. 
In my view, Skrebowski offers an alternative, and stronger, way to read Sehgal’s 
statement on cleaner conceptualism: Sehgal is rejecting a dominant linguistic analytic 
formulation of conceptual art and reengaging with a systems-oriented perspective. 
Cleaner conceptualism is not dematerialized because it has no physical objects but 
because it pursues an alternative ontology of art. This ontology is not based on ‘physical’ 
objects contra ‘mental’ objects but on which objects are thought of as systems or 
processes in relation to other systems or processes. The word ‘cleaner,’ in this case, is a 
holistic pragmatic criterion regarding the selection of the kinds of systems that are 
deployed (i.e., those avoiding resource-extractive systems). 
I have used the phrase ‘systems or processes’ in the previous paragraph in part to 
stress the generic and ambiguous character of the word ‘system,’ which Skrebowski also 
points out. Using ‘systems’ as a unifying key activates a fragmentary and shifting 
spectrum of theoretical lineages. Skrebowski mentions Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s general 
systems theory, Norbert Wiener and Ross W. Ashby’s cybernetics, Claude Shannon’s 
information theory, and Talcott Parsons’s sociology. Such a list merges contrasting and 
contradicting notions of ‘system.’ Holistic theories such as GST are organismic, open, 
relational, and non-reductive, whereas information theory and cybernetics are geared 
towards reductive reification of technical systems. To add to the confusion, Bertalanffy’s 
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general systems theory advocates a holistic and open approach to systems and opposes 
what he viewed as the mechanistic devaluing of technical systems, but Bertalanffy also 
uses the term ‘system’ in multiple ways, and also identified GST with the wider 
development of systems approaches across other fields, as Debora Hammond points out 
(Hammond 2010, 126–31). Hammond also highlights that there were trenchant critiques 
of systems thinking. The systems communities responded to these critiques (2010, 34–
35). The resulting ambiguities, shifts, and controversies suggest there is work ahead in 
further developing Skrebowski’s proposal for a genealogy of a ‘systematic’ mode of 
conceptual art, in order to further clarify how different notions of systems were 
articulated by and between artists and artworks. It also indicates that there remains an 
opportunity to think through the notion of ‘system’ in multiple ways. 
Here I want to point to the strong affinities between Whitehead’s philosophy of 
organism and the systems lineage. Whitehead’s philosophy of organism was developed 
contemporaneously with Bertalanffy’s earliest publications on general systems theory. 
Whitehead employs concepts of ‘system’ or ‘systematic,’ describing, for example, the 
‘system of the universe’ (PR 3) and the ‘systematic character’ of societies (PR 84). A 
further deep point of connection is in the use of organismic thought by Whitehead and 
the systems communities. Members of the systems community such as Ervin Laszlo and 
James Grier Miller and were influenced by Whitehead. Laszlo, in his book Introduction to 
Systems Philosophy, mentions his indebtedness to Whitehead, even as he proposes to 
leave behind Whitehead’s philosophical categories and theism, saying Whitehead’s 
principles are debatable and permit alternative solutions (Laszlo 1972, vii). Miller 
studied directly with Whitehead at Harvard. There are multiple crossovers between 
Whitehead’s philosophy of organism and systems theorization (see Haraway 1976, 33–
63). 
This opens a third, more conjectural, reading of Sehgal’s statement on cleaner 
conceptualism. If we are already in the business of transforming the ontology of objects 
and embracing a more holistic and ecological perspective, let us consider cleaner 
conceptualism as a notion in Whitehead-centred terms. To carry this forward, and to 
loop us back to notions of the digital, in the next section I turn to software as one way of 
thinking about systems. 
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Art as Decision Procedure (revisited) 
In the previous section, I noted the connections between conceptualism and systems 
thinking. In this section, I carry this forward by discussing software systems and how 
they relate to LeWitt’s and Sehgal’s notions of artistic decision procedures.   
Software is one of the important ways artists have considered and approached 
notions of systems. Bainbridge and Hurrell’s Hardware show at the Architectural 
Association, London in 1967 was quickly followed by Cybernetic Serendipity, curated by 
Jasia Reichardt and shown at the Institute of Contemporary Arts in London in 1968. 
Kynaston McShine’s Information exhibition was presented at the Museum of Modern 
Art in 1969. Burnham’s exhibition Software, Information Technology: Its New Meaning 
for Art was shown at the Jewish Museum in 1970. These exhibitions introduced larger 
audiences to questions of the parallels between mind and software. Skrebowski 
suggests that a premise of Burnham’s show, and of conceptual art more broadly, can be 
understood as an analogy for a transition in art from ‘hardware’ to ‘software’ (2009, 89). 
Burnham placed computing technology alongside artworks in the Software exhibition on 
the basis that artistic decisions and software decisions were becoming fused, so that 
existing divisions between art and non-art no longer made sense (2009, 156). While this 
was an extreme position, other artists also began to use the notion of software as an 
analogy for thought processes. For example, Victor Burgin likened certain artworks to 
software in 1969, since the art deployed sets of conditions through which concepts 
could be generated (2009, 167).  
We keep this context in mind as we read LeWitt’s discussion of ‘idea’ in art from the 
same period. LeWitt’s well known Artforum article, ‘Paragraphs on Conceptual Art’ 
(1967) asserts that the idea is a ‘machine’ to make art. LeWitt’s proposal is based on a 
dualist cognitive model, with a hierarchical distinction between concept and percept. 
We see this when LeWitt argues that idea conception takes place ‘prefact,’ whereas 
perception takes place ‘postfact.’ The implication is that to make an artwork that is 
conceptual rather than perceptual, as much as possible of the artistic activity must be 
moved to the ‘prefact’ stage. Such an arrangement requires that ‘all of the planning and 
decisions are made beforehand, and the execution is perfunctory’ (LeWitt, 1967, 80). 
This way, the subjective decision-making during execution is minimized, so that ‘caprice, 
taste, and other whimsies would be eliminated from the making of the art’ (ibid.). 
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In LeWitt’s schema, the artist is an individual with the capacity to ‘discover’ ideas 
through what he terms ‘mystic’ intuition. One reading of this is that, as industrial 
machines became capable of executing more complex software decision procedures, 
artists such as LeWitt sought to secure a role for art (as something different from both 
software and hardware) by locating it in the invention of new decision procedures. 
Successful art is then art in which the role of the artist, as an inventor of novel decision 
procedures, is ‘implicit in the work’ as it is finally manifested, though how precisely this 
is done is left vague.  
Piper expands LeWitt’s notion of an idea as a kind of decision procedure, writing: 
By using the permutation of selected formal properties of an object—its sides, 
dimensions, or geometrical shape—as a decision procedure for generating the final form 
of the work as a permutational system, LeWitt moved that system itself, and the idea of 
that system, into the foreground of the work as its self-reflexive subject matter. Here it is 
not only the object as a unique particular that has primacy, but that object as the locus 
and origin of the conceptual system it self-reflexively generates (quoted in Skrebowsk 
2009, 162). 

 
Sol LeWitt. Wall Drawing 56. A square is divided horizontally and 
vertically into four equal parts, each with lines in four directions 
superimposed progressively. Black pencil. August 1970. 

In LeWitt’s and Piper’s early work and in other permutation-based works at that 
time, the artists held that it was important to ‘exhaust’ the possibilities of the decision-
making procedure in the work, to run through all the permutations, so as to ‘complete’ 
the object as the locus and origin of the idea. Running through all the permutations 
served to highlight the distinction between finite idea-machine decision procedures and 
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the human capacity to invent decision procedures. The ‘more-than’ of art was 
contrasted with the decision procedure as merely repetitive technical operation. Art, as 
intuitive discovery, offered a path for the human to escape ‘the system.’ 
In this way, LeWitt located the artwork as a conceptual ideal. One outcome of this 
arrangement is that the material manifestations of the idea take on a complex status. 
For example, LeWitt’s wall drawings are often executed by teams who use pencils to 
create hand-drawn lines. The individual variations and decisions by multiple actors are 
part of the production of the work but not, according to LeWitt, part of the art, since for 
him art is the invention of the decision procedure, not its execution. The ‘code’ or 
software for the work was held to be distinct from the ‘hardware’ used to execute it, 
though the paradoxes that this raised were left unaddressed.24 
LeWitt’s and Piper’s ‘decision procedures’ are pertinent for us here because they 
provide a comparison with Tino Sehgal’s constructed situations. In Sehgal’s works, his 
‘decision procedures’ are collectively distributed between Sehgal and the multiple 
interpreters and participants in his pieces. Instead of creating a program for art as a kind 
of algorithm and then exhausting its permutations to manifest the artwork prior to 
exhibition, Sehgal’s decision procedures are constructed with unsaturated ‘gaps’ that 
are left partial and incomplete until the moments of spontaneous encounter between 
participants and interpreters. The ‘idea’ of the work, in its description as given in the 
oral contract during a purchase, requires that the buyers re-involve Sehgal or his 
assistants each time the work is exhibited. Sehgal and his team are active in all stages of 
production, monitoring and modifying works throughout the exhibition period, so that 
the script of the work, i.e. the description of the decision procedure, is also modified as 
part of the production of the work. Additionally, activity where possible, is body-to-
body, and not through other mediating devices. In this arrangement, there is no easy 
split between the idea/script and its execution, since the script is modified during the 
execution. With the emphasis on body-to-body activity, there is also no easy 
identification of a split between the work of a human and a machine. And as a 
participatory practice that choreographs movement together with spontaneous 
                                                        
24 LeWitt’s vagueness regarding the connection between the idea and its manifestation has led some 
scholars to label LeWitt’s approach to Conceptualism as transitional or weak. Peter Osborne writes ‘LeWitt is 
not really thinking ontologically about art’s object-hood here at all; even if we consider the object 
intentionalistically, as an idea. Rather, more simply, he is concerned to valorize the intellectual element of 
the process of its production, which he associates, psychologistically, with the workings of the artist’s mind’ 
(Osborne 2013, 54). The systems-based account presented here and by Skrebowski opens another avenue 
for assessing LeWitt’s importance.   
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elements, there is no straightforward hierarchy between percept and concept, that is, 
between the work as idea and the work as embodied activity.  
Furthermore, when Sehgal stages the acquisition process of the work as an oral 
contract, the acquisition is likened to a constructed situation itself. This raises a question 
regarding the division between the business operations of the work and the artistic 
operations of the work, as we discussed in terms of Tino’s handshake earlier. The Tate 
curator Jessica Morgan has spoken about how some of these shifts altered her role as 
curator. She notes that the usual curatorial cycle of selecting, presenting, documenting, 
and educating is largely an interpretive role. In the Sehgal’s installations this is replaced 
with one of hiring, managing, and carrying out the mechanics of the piece. The 
interpretive role is instead internalized in the work and self-interpreted by the 
interpreters of and participants in the piece. Morgan herself trained as an interpreter in 
the piece (Morgan and Raza 2012, 38:30) 
I summarise some of the key differences of the two approaches as they pertain to 
notions of a ‘decision procedure’ in the table below: 
 
LeWitt’s Paragraphs Sehgal’s Constructed Situations 
 
Procedure is a machine. Only human actors. No machines. 
 
Procedure is distinct from its material 
activation context (hardware/software 
split). 
 
Procedure is situated in an ecology. No 
clear hardware/software binary.  
Procedure is finite and must be 
‘exhausted’ to produce the work. 
 
Procedure has ‘gaps’ that are filled 
spontaneously in moments of activation. 
Interpretation takes place after 
procedure execution is complete, i.e., 
extrinsic to procedure. 
 
The human ‘interpreters’ are intrinsic to 
the procedure. 
Procedure creation takes place prior to 
execution. 
The procedure and its execution are 
mutually modifying during execution. 
 
Procedure creation occurs in concept, 
‘prefact,’ which is hierarchically separated 
from percept, ‘postfact.’ 
Procedure creation occurs in collectively 
distributed shared embodied activities 
and memories of multiple actors. 
 
Procedure eliminates individual caprice, 
taste, whimsy. 
 
Procedure elicits individual caprice, taste, 
whimsy. 
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One of LeWitt’s preoccupations is with a decision procedure understood in terms of 
‘machine’ logical function. He investigates how art can take place through a division 
between two orders of becoming—the creative capacity of ‘mystical’ human intuition 
versus the operative functioning of idea-machines. Said another way, within his 
conceptualism, there is a concern with distinguishing between human and logical orders 
of experience. Logical idea-machines merely follow decisions procedure, whereas 
human conceptual art is engaged in the discovery of idea-machines. Such a division 
advances a dualist critique of technological rationality. It promotes a bifurcation of the 
digital in which logical function and human experience are fundamentally different. 
Sehgal’s notion of decision procedure has a far more ambivalent attitude regarding 
this division. In focusing on human actors and stressing an open, distributive, and 
embodied model of activity, Sehgal’s notion of function has little to say about logical 
function. It bears a much stronger resemblance to what, in Chapter 4, I described as 
‘general function,’ as a kind of mapping activity.  
In particular, Sehgal’s decision procedures are unsaturated, incomplete, or open. 
They contain ‘conformal’ requirements. Sehgal sets out many such requirements in the 
scripted elements within his work, including prompts that the interpreters must give and 
the instructions on the coordination of time schedules and opening hours. At the same 
time, they also explicitly introduce non-conformal or spontaneous parameters, selected 
by the interpreters, participants, and administrators, so that, at different levels, there 
are degrees of leeway. In such a model, the information (‘in-formation’) is what is 
formed through the combinations of con-formation and non-conformation which arise. 
It is this folding of fixed requirements and free aspects together that is able to ‘express 
the concurrence of mathematical-formal principles with accidental factors’ (ESP 128). 
Sehgal’s ambivalence does not exclude digital function. As I have argued, Sehgal 
presupposes the availability of digital technologies to produce his works. In my view, his 
refusal to incorporate media technologies within the presentation of his works is not an 
ideological rejection of the digital as an alien ‘other’ but a pragmatic technique to focus 
attention on a model of activity. The tacit assertion is that, if the digital is a pervasive 
and peripheral condition, then, rather than fixating on the digital as a mythic ‘other,’ we 
must search for systems of art that properly locate the digital on the peripheral horizon. 
The digital then becomes one aspect in the intense complex patterning of our finite 
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resources of attention in the works, which layer conformal and non-conformal patterns 
onto many other conditioning patterns. 
If we accept this view of constructed situations as a way to model general function, 
this suggests Sehgal’s cleaner conceptualism and anti-object stance are not purism but 
monism. That is, he is not fixated on body-based activity in the pursuit of the media-
specificity of dance, for example. Instead, the narrow focus on embodied activity is a 
way to arrange situations that model certain kinds of non-dualistic decision procedures 
in art. These decision procedures investigate a general function that is open, 
distributive, self-interpreting, and, at all levels, patterned by both conformal and non-
conformal urges.  
In short, my claim is that, as artology, Sehgal’s cleaner conceptualism can be usefully 
thought in Whiteheadian terms. 
Conclusion 
In the previous section, I suggested that Sehgal’s constructed situations can be 
interpreted as staging a monist approach to art. Such a practice represents one way for 
exploring, intervening with and recomposing operations of general function. More 
specifically, Sehgal’s practice embodies a way of investigating permutations of pattern 
and conformance, always presupposing a digitally networked social order. In this 
respect, his art practice is a kind of existence proof or prototype. It is one strategy 
employed today to critically investigate what I have called peripheral digital activity—
that is, activity concerning the unplanned or unexpected effects that arise in conjunction 
with the use of digital networked technologies.  
The ramifications of Sehgal’s project are far from complete. Yet as I write that, I also 
am compelled to attend to a second movement. It is a movement intrinsic to this thesis. 
It is a movement that began a decade ago with One mile long line, shown on the first 
page of the Preface. Tracing this arc, as it is expressed in the body of the text, we see 
that in each chapter, I have described modifications to what I call a ‘decision procedure.’ 
In Chapter 1, I first outline a decision procedure’s base characteristics. In subsequent 
chapters, I have further described the decision procedure, incorporating notions of 
analogy, material, mental, and logical relations, and finally discussing it in terms of 
Sehgal’s artistic practice and arriving at this conclusion. It is a view of the thesis as its 
own subject, not an explanation of Sehgal’s practice but instead as its own kind of 
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decision procedure, the final satisfaction of which is its explanation of the concrete 
experience of One mile long line. From this view, we can observe that each chapter 
includes a commentary on part-whole relations—in the discussion of decision 
procedures in Chapter 1, analogies in Chapter 2, maculate conception in Chapter 3, 
muddling in Chapter 4, and finally this concluding remark. Each chapter is also the 
outcome of modulations, contestations, and reappraisals as I have encountered a large 
community of texts and artworks.  
My contention here is that the entire thesis, in its way, examines and reconfigures 
the peripheral activity that took place within the event of One mile long line. The 
unprovable (since subjective) claim is that practice-based research, with its interweaving 
of extrinsic and intrinsic activity, provides a second performative strategy for critically 
investigating peripheral digital activity.  
The proposal, in short, is that there are a plurality of different modes or manners of 
decision procedures, related to different material conditions. The hope is that, through 
art’s spirit of investigation and adventure, we may discover decision procedures that 
elicit an expanded peripheral digital awareness.  
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Coda: Anonymous Painting  
In this coda, I turn to the painter Laura Owens. My claim in what follows is that Owens’s 
proposal of ‘anonymous gesture’ can be read in Whiteheadian terms as another 
approach for interrogating peripheral digital activity. I do not here attempt a detailed 
Whitehead-centred analysis in terms of the decision procedures of art. Instead, my aim 
is to internalize Whitehead’s proposals and then adopt a more open analysis, pointing 
more conjecturally towards future research directions.  
Laura Owens 
Pavement Karaoke / Alphabet by Californian painter Laura Owens is an exhibition of 
seven large-scale paintings shown at Sadie Coles HQ in London in 2012, together with a 
number of smaller works. One of the series, Untitled (2012), recently was exhibited in 
the Painting after Technology room of the permanent collection of the Tate Modern, 
curated by Mark Godfrey.  
The title of Owens’s series refers to the American indie band Pavement, as well as to 
karaoke bars. Large-scale letters spelling out the word ‘karaoke’ spread across seven 
canvases, creating a visual element that unifies the individual paintings as part of a 
larger ordered sequence. Each painting is hung at a distance from the others, resulting 
in a series of discrete but connected works.  
The paintings contain many elements, executed using a jumble of effects and 
materials. These include the use of masking tape, layering, freehand drawing, 
silkscreening of news classifieds, collage, impasto brushstrokes, grids, lattices, trompe 
l’oeil drop shadows, and letterforms. The images are executed in oil, acrylic, Flashe vinyl 
paint, resin and bits of pumice stone glued to the canvas. 
The paintings feature oversize scrawls. Some scrawls were produced first as 
drawings or paintings that are captured as digital images. Other scrawls were created by 
‘drawing’ or ‘erasing’ with a computer mouse or graphics tablet. The resulting digital 
images are projected on the canvas and then painted. In this way, mark-making by hand 
becomes intermixed with other kinds of technical operations, including the use of digital 
devices, software, projectors, and digital cameras, screen printing, collage, etc.  
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Laura Owens, Untitled 2012 from Pavement Karaoke / Alphabet.  
Oil paint, acrylic paint, acrylic resin, fabric and pumice on 
canvas. 2745 x 2134 x 41 mm 
 
Laura Owens and Ooga Booga #2, 12 Paintings, 356 South 
Mission Rd., 2013 
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The resulting images are reminiscent of the compositional layering and windowing 
found on computer screens. Owens asserts that Photoshop imagery is linked to the 
traditions of printmaking, in that CMYK prints and Photoshop images are compositions 
from multiple layers. Like etching or silkscreening, she says, Photoshop is ‘a natural, 
conceptual extension of printmaking.’ This made it ‘feel like a natural part of painting 
that shouldn’t be avoided or, on the other hand, given too much meaning, because it 
just comes out of hundreds of years of printmaking, as the newest version of it’ (Lehrer-
Graiwer and Owens 2013, 235). 
In addition to their mixed and layered mode of production, the paintings are also 
striking for the way they combine experiments with different manners of technical 
production and multiple art-historical references. They are a bricolage of cross-cultural 
references: a Mary Heilmann slapdash pink, a gingham fabric, Miró-esque lines, a 
Photoshop effect, a Roy Lichtenstein graphic element, Frank Stella graph paper, 
newspaper clippings, an Agnes Martin grid. All compete for attention within the same 
composition. There are also many self-references to Owen’ss previous works, such as 
her use of textile patterns from Peru and India.  
Owens follows an approach of composing and producing using a grab bag of 
disparate resources—diverse elements that are rehearsed and practiced, co-mingled 
and recombined. The grab bag might include something that has just occurred or an 
appropriated historical event. It could be something that happened directly to Owens, 
or it might be a story, technique, or reference from an assistant.  
Impasto shapes in Owens’s works are further accentuated by their painted drop 
shadows. Looking at one of Owens’s paintings, you can easily become fixated on one of 
the chunks of thick impasto pigment. If your eye drifts, a flip-flop occurs when you 
encounter an area of illusory trompe l’oeil drop shadow. This kind of flip-flopping, given 
the large scale of the paintings and the overlapping of actual shadows and drop shadows 
at different angles and in different styles, makes it impossible to construct a sense of 
temporal consistency. There is no way of knowing which marks were created in which 
order. The paintings are not built up a layer at a time but present an incongruous 
disparity of shifting registers. To see the large graphic forms spanning multiple canvases, 
one has to move back and stand at a distance. From this perspective, the connecting 
themes between canvases become apparent, but the details become vague. Visitors 
who seek to integrate these elements must move around the exhibition space, so, in a 
 105 
certain way, their movements become one more disparate element coordinated by 
Owens. 
In 2013 Owens secured the 356 South Mission Road, a large industrial space in Los 
Angeles that was a former lithographic workshop. With support from gallerist Gavin 
Brown, Owens used the space as a studio to create a new series of works, called 12 
Paintings (Fiduccia 2014). After completing them, she installed the paintings as a six-
month-long exhibition. 
Each painting was hung as a discrete entity, so that each painting stood for itself. But 
with some forms spanning multiple paintings, the impression is that there was some 
shared or underlying whole. This interest in part-whole relations is a long-standing 
concern for Owens. As she writes of a painting of animals she created in 2000: 
It was a single painting, but the multiplicity of marks and animals creates internal 
moments that talk to one another and gel into one whole thing. There is an idea of 
painting within a painting that runs throughout the history of art, whether it is a Matisse 
window painting, a Chinese scroll, or Baldessari’s A Painting That is Its Own 
Documentation [1966–68]. This is not only a formal device but also a way of including 
disparate pieces of paint, techniques, spaces, and concepts within one painting so that 
the work requires a participatory viewer. For me, it was a way of addressing the space 
within the painting not unlike the space of a room or an installation. (Lehrer-Graiwer and 
Owens 2013, 232) 
Owens argues that ‘painting does things, and why wouldn’t you want to use all the 
things that it does?’ (Lehrer-Graiwer and Owens 2013, 232). The ‘doing’ that she 
associates with painting is more than simply the reproduction of signs. For some artists, 
she suggests, painting is deployed without much attention to painterly technique, so 
that it becomes merely an index of ‘and-I-do-this-painting-thing-too.’ For Owens, the 
aim is to create internal ‘pressure’ through painting. For example, when deciding on the 
paintings for South Mission Road, Owens toyed with the idea of making really small 
paintings or making paintings that were part of architectural wall partitions. In the end, 
she chose a rectangular size that she felt was ‘called for’ by the exhibition space. By 
eliminating ironic tricks or gimmicks with the painting’s size or hanging, she sought to 
increase the emphasis on what each painting must hold within its frame. 
Owens’s emphasis on artistic production is coupled with open-ended collaboration 
with others, including organizing events, running a bookshop, and hosting other 
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activities such as screenings and talks. In conjunction with the show Pavement Karaoke, 
the press release from Sadie Coles HQ announces that a karaoke party would be part of 
the exhibition. At South Mission Road, Owens invited the Los Angeles bookshop Ooga 
Booga to open an outlet in the entrance. Owens organized a series of screenings, talks, 
readings, and performances. The site was subsequently used as an exhibition space for 
invited artists. In Owens’s curation of her spaces and events, and in her collaborations 
with assistants in and around her artistic production, her practice appears to move in 
multiple directions.  Yet Owens consistently seeks to return the attention to her 
painting, insisting that her work is about pushing what painting can be. Owens does not 
view painting as a dead end or as a nostalgic conservative form for art. She insists that in 
painting there is always the possibility of doing something else.  
Owens discusses her works in terms of the gesture. She aims to ‘emphatically try to 
inhabit the gesture. The gesture is simultaneously the mark inside of painting, the act of 
painting, and the decision to rent the space and make the exhibition’ (2013, 236). 
Owens distinguishes two models of gesture. One model is what she describes as the 
signature, male, instantaneous gesture, akin to a male orgasm or a DNA imprint that 
replicates itself over and over, similar to the way language is repeated and reinforced. 
The other model she relates to female production: 
The female orgasm has no use, no mark, no locatability. It can’t even be located in 
time. There’s no moment when ejaculate comes out, really. I want to think about how 
that can be the model for a new gesture. What is that gesture in art, or in painting? … 
I’m specifically locating production that’s telegraphing itself, which feels very old-
fashioned. (2013, 236) 
Owens contrasts this model with the artists Maurizio Cattelan and Richard Prince, 
who, according to Owens, make many different kinds of things while also emphasizing 
their own narratives and biographies as part of the practice. She critiques works that 
cultivate a ‘clever’ narrative around what gestures happened when, noting that Damien 
Hirst’s spot paintings ‘exist as discourse before anything’ (2013, 239). Instead, Owens 
aims to emphasize the particular circumstances of a single show, space, exhibition, 
object, and time. By making 12 paintings onsite, Owens suggests, the paintings are not 
shown in a space that is ‘foreign’ to their activities of making. She mentions Mike Kelley 
and Jason Rhoades as two Los Angeles artists whose installations influenced her 
approach, adding, ‘When you privilege the artist’s overarching narrative, you’re saying 
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he’s the one, he’s the one who makes, he’s the one who owns the gesture. When 
everyone makes a painting, the gesture becomes more anonymous’ (2013, 239). 
Two Responses: Atemporality and Flux 
In this section, I look at the responses of Laura Hoptman and David Joselit in order to 
outline two distinct attitudes towards the digital that have been linked to Laura Owens’s 
practice: one is based on the notion of atemporality, the other on a notion of flux. 
In The Forever Now at the Museum of Modern Art, the curator Laura Hoptman 
staged an important exhibition of contemporary painters, including Owens.25 
Acknowledging the huge variety of different techniques and evocations found in the 
paintings she selected, Hoptman described the heterogeneous ‘anything goes’ approach 
through a notion of ‘atemporality.’ According to Hoptman, Owens belongs to a 
generation of post-internet painters for whom referencing a technique or history of 
imagery is as easy as clicking on a link. It is, says Hoptman, ‘the era of the remix, the 
mash-up, and the sample. The rise of a “plus/and” rather than an “either/or” culture of 
instantaneous creativity …’ (Hoptman 2014, 47). Works by painters such as Owens, 
according to Hoptman, presuppose the internet and smartphone culture in which data is 
accessible non-hierarchically and instantly (Hoptman 2014, 16). Digital technologies 
have enabled us to ‘access data contemporaneously … and non-hierarchically, erasing 
time-honored indicators of significance and value. One result of this is the enormous, 
international expansion of the contemporary art discourse’ (2014, 16). She quotes Jörg 
Heiser’s description of a cultural landscape existing as a ‘computational aggregate,’ 
permutations of multiple influences and sources (2014, 18). Within this landscape, when 
Hoptman turns to the ‘problem’ of why we should continue to look at paintings, her 
response is that paintings resonate now precisely because they are objects with limitless 
art-historical baggage. She offers the analogy of zombies. Like zombies, paintings can be 
reanimated in new permutations, bringing back to life what was thought to be done and 
dusted.  
Hoptman takes the term ‘atemporality’ from the cyberfiction author William Gibson, 
who describes it as ‘a new and strange state of the world in which, courtesy of the 
                                                        
25 Owens was one of seventeen artists in the exhibition The Forever Now curated by Hoptman for the 
exhibition, which ran December 14, 2014 to April 5, 2015. The other artists were Richard Aldrich, Joe 
Bradley, Kerstin Brätsch, Matt Connors, Michaela Eichwald, Nicole Eisenman, Mark Grotjahn, Charline von 
Heyl, Rashid Johnson, Julie Mehretu, Dianna Molzan, Oscar Murillo, Amy Sillman, Josh Smith, Mary 
Weatherford and Michael Williams. 
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internet, all eras seem to exist at once.’ (2014, 13). Hoptman also links the notion to St. 
Augustine’s idea of the eternal present—a doctrine in which the past, present, and 
future are fully known and so available simultaneously. If atemporal painters allow that 
a painting may potentially go anywhere, or include anything, the dizzying array of 
different techniques and historical references of Owens’s paintings means that viewers 
cannot locate her painting within any tradition of painting. For Hoptman, the result is 
not painting about painting, about the strategies or gestures that contribute to a res 
gesta, where one painting communicates with another. Instead, she asserts, ‘they are 
paintings, period’ (2014, 14).  
This notion of atemporality proposes that information encodes a network of 
possibilities that stretches across time periods, recycling and flattening historical 
conventions and so refuting the possibility of chronological classification. It understands 
information to be transmissible and exchangeable. A bit is a bit. If a JPEG image is held 
on two different servers through digital replication of information, it contains the 
identical bit pattern—it is the same image.  
If atemporality is one pole, there is a second pole embedded within Hoptman’s 
account. She mentions the art historian David Joselit, who proposes that we consider a 
contemporary painting not as an ‘object’ but instead as a broadcast medium. In a series 
of texts (Joselit 2009, 2011, 2016; Hochdörfer, Joselit, and Ammer 2015; Graw and Lajer-
Burcharth 2016), Joselit explores this idea, tracing it to Martin Kippenberger in the 
1990s. He argues that contemporary painting is held within a network and acts as a kind 
of transmitter or broadcaster of information. 
Hoptman is intrigued but not convinced. She writes, ‘The notion that a painting—or 
at least the information that it carries—is perpetually in motion is invigorating … 
However, rechristening an object as an activity is, in the end, a rhetorical magic trick. It 
doesn’t make the obsolescent thingness of painting (its awkward but crucial relationship 
to the world of digital information notwithstanding) disappear.’ (2014, 23).  
Although Hoptman does not pursue Joselit’s notion further, by including his notion 
in her text she acknowledges a tacit opportunity. If rhetoric does perform magic, if we 
are already contemplating the rhetorical magic tricks of zombies and eternities, if 
painting can go anywhere, and if we are in the era of ‘plus/and’ rather than ‘either/or,’ 
then logically we should pursue the notion of a painting as a verb rather than a noun. 
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Let us click on the link that converts paintings from atemporal informational objects into 
fluxing activities. 
We are now taking up a more processual perspective and contemplating a painting 
as an embodied, local, affective, perceptual transmitter. It is here that we note that, 
while Owens includes many different sources and techniques into her paintings, she also 
treats digital technology mundanely and practically, as one more tool in the collection of 
tools used to make marks. She insists that digital tools shouldn’t be avoided or given too 
much meaning. Digital tools are simply the latest iteration in the history of how we 
produce. They are nothing more than ‘a natural, conceptual extension of printmaking,’ 
sets of operations and functions, always with histories and legacies, capable of 
impacting and modifying what gestures we can do here, at this location, in this time, 
with these materials. 
This is less of an informational approach to the digital, where information is 
conceived of as a timeless substance. It is more a recognition that digital tools are 
processes enfolded and intermingled with other tools and processes. A digital bit 
doesn’t occur in a vacuum; it arises somewhere, in some particular circumstance, in 
relation to other circumstances or activities. In this immanent attitude towards the 
digital, a JPEG image, held on two different servers, is unquestionably two distinct JPEG 
images. The two images may share a similar patterning of data—both are recognizably 
the same species, if you like—but they are individual specimens, their own vibratory 
collections of electromagnetic impulses. There is a potential that one may become 
corrupted or lost while the other endures. Bits participate in different histories and 
reside at different electronic ‘addresses.’ Within this immanent empiricist attitude, each 
bit on the planet is its own unique entity. To say two bits of information are the same is 
already to have abstracted from the nature of bits as concrete hunks of factuality. It is to 
presume certain habits and expectations regarding how bits ought to behave, presuming 
a cosmic piece of radiation doesn’t interfere. Once we adopt this immanent attitude, we 
look at Owens’s paintings not as atemporal information but as material conglomerations 
which continue to be shaped by active processes.  
It is important to stress that neither attitude—atemporality or flux—by itself is 
adequate. Joselit recognizes this. He argues that contemporary painting cannot be 
reduced to one state or another. Rather painting denotes an unstable and perceptual 
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circulation between registers (Hochdörfer, Joselit, and Ammer 2015, 177), so that 
network painting exists paradoxically as both ‘picture’ and ‘passage.’ Joselit:  
The painterly mark of our time embodies a paradox: between touch as an index of 
affect, and touch as the automatic transcription of information. It carries a new kind of 
artificial intelligence. (Joselit 2016) 
 My view is that there is no paradoxical relation between the atemporal ‘picture’ 
aspects and fluxing ‘passage’ aspects of one of Owens’s paintings. Rather, these notions 
together are constitutive of information. I see this in Whiteheadian terms. For 
Whitehead, ‘atemporality’ corresponds to what he calls the infinity of potentiality, 
whereas flux is marked by the sequences of ‘cuts’ that divide potentiality into atomic 
facts of actuality. ‘Passage,’ then, marks the transition from potentiality to the actuality. 
In each moment, we contend with both aspects, one of potentiality and one of stubborn 
actuality. If there were only atemporality, there would be no notion of a passage of 
time. If there were only flux, with indivisible ‘cuts’ where potentiality is made to stand 
still, there could be no experience of difference. Like a coin with two sides, both are 
necessarily a part of experience.  
Yes, when I stare at Owens’s painting, I notice the newsprint screen-printed on one 
corner, with the date 21 April 1947. I wonder how that date was selected, and I am soon 
lost in the infinite play of ‘what could be’ of potential meanings. Yes, as I walk in the 
exhibition, my foot scuffs on the floor, I notice a few granules under my shoe, perhaps a 
piece of pumice stone, and I note that the painting is not atemporal, but concrete 
matter that is slowly undergoing change. Whitehead’s demand is that we think both 
notions together. 
Anonymity 
In this section, I wish to further expand on Owens’s question of how a mark might be 
produced as an ‘anonymous gesture’ in painting.  
In the model of production Owens pursues, while there are sequences of marks held 
internally within the painting, the layered approach to construction obscures the 
connections between maker and mark. The question of temporality—the issue of ‘who’ 
did ‘what’ and ‘when’—becomes vague. A viewer might scrutinize the painting at 
multiple scales and from different perspectives, attempting to ascertain whether a 
discernible feature is a handmade pigmented mark, a piece of glued-on pumice, or the 
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result of some chain of technical operations. Such scrutiny may fail to yield an answer, 
leading the viewer to doubt the intelligibility of the task.  
Owens asks, in a space of male imprimatur, ‘Is it even possible for a woman artist to 
be the one who marks? … At the same time, in 2013, does anyone at all have this ability, 
or is it an antiquated and sentimental idea?’ (2013, 236). This is what is at stake when 
Owens introduces the notion of an ‘anonymous gesture.’ What counts as gesture now? 
How is a gesture named or associated with one individual or another? What are the 
possibilities that anonymity and masking might open up? Can anonymity be used to free 
up hypostatized notions of the subject, authorship, and language?  
In what follows, I bracket these issues, in order to further highlight a dimension 
introduced by digital technologies. 
When Owens uses Photoshop in her paintings, one or more individuals co-create 
marks in collaboration with digital sensors, projectors, and computational algorithms. 
This yields marks that are not the result of an individual’s expressive gestures or the 
result of automated processes but a hybrid of both. Digital tools offer opportunities to 
ambiguate, overlay, decenter, or mask the relations between an individual’s gestural 
activity and the corresponding marks. Is that squiggle there one that Owens produced 
spontaneously, with a brush, in a moment, perhaps in solidarity with the gestural 
painters of the 1950s, which Hochdörfer calls ‘the last remaining bastion of artistic 
license from which the integrity of individual expression might be defended’ 
(Hochdörfer, Joselit, and Ammer 2015, 15)? Or no, is it a digital image of someone else’s 
mark that has been projected and studiously rendered by an assistant? Such slippage is, 
according to Owens, part of what she seeks to produce in her paintings. 
There is another way think of the strategies of appropriation and masking and 
decentring taking place in Owens’s paintings. Within the widely deployed sensory arrays 
of the digital, and through reverse engineering, spyware, industrial partnerships, or the 
intersection of these techniques, digital technologies can be made to function in 
reverse. They can ‘unmask,’ exposing relations between an individual and their activities 
even when they were thought to be hidden. To produce an anonymous gesture, in a 
digital epoch, one must consider marking/unmarking in terms of a complex play of 
techniques of masking/unmasking. 
This is illustrated by the story of Reality Winner, an American intelligence specialist 
and NSA contractor who was arrested in June 2017 and charged with leaking an 
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intelligence report to The Intercept. Online images of a leaked report were published by 
The Intercept. It later transpired that the images were snapshots of a document that 
had originally been printed by a model of colour printer that included a microdot 
pattern in its output. The pattern is imperceptible to the naked eye but visible through 
software analysis. FBI agents were able to analyse the online images, decode the 
microdot pattern, and discover that the printer involved had model number 54, serial 
number 29535218 and had printed the document on 9 May 2017 at 6:20 (Hawkins 
2017). An internal audit revealed the individuals who had printed out materials on that 
date and printer, one of them being Reality Winner. Investigators searched Winner’s 
work computer and found that she had emailed The Intercept from a personal account, 
using what appeared to be a coded message. When Winner was confronted with this 
evidence, she admitted to having leaked the document.  
This story shows how digital production technologies embed codes into non-digital 
objects that, in conjunction with an intersection of multiple sensor techniques, support 
unmasking individual actions. New sensor technologies have increased the range of 
available technical analysis and unmasking options. An analyst may retrieve the DNA 
fingerprints of all those who have touched the painting’s surface. Not to mention X-ray, 
wide-spectrum, 3-D scanners, ultrasonic, or many other kinds of sensing technologies 
within the nascent field of the computational analysis of art. 
Although such computational analysis may not be currently widely deployed (our 
mobile phones do not yet include DNA scanners), we already experience a version of this 
kind of analysis.  
It is not uncommon, while one is standing in front of an artwork, to reach for a 
smartphone to look up the artwork on the internet, perhaps to affirm or reject a 
proposition or learn of related works. This mode of technical ‘looking’ is a way of 
expanding a ‘microdot,’ that is, of unpacking the digital traces that are interwoven with 
a painting and its caption. 
It is here that a pivot occurs. For when we ‘look’ at a painting with the aid of a digital 
technology, the painting ceases to be a broadcast mechanism and turns into a capture 
mechanism. Joselit observes that people take photos of art in museums with their 
smartphones, storing the art for later, since, he argues, there are so many artworks it is 
impossible to spend the time to appreciate them all. But storage is only one of the 
functions being invoked. Today’s visitors take selfies with art, literally pivoting their 
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bodies to take a photograph, leading to the odd spectre of a group of viewers with their 
back to a painting. The aim is less to secure an image of the work and more to 
rebroadcast a new image, one showing the co-presence of the individual beside the 
work. 
 
 
Viewers taking selfies in front of the Mona Lisa. Video still from 
online video (Nikkhah 2015). 
Even if a viewer does not explicitly take a selfie in front of an artwork, their 
smartphone registers its location in its audit trail, using a timestamp and a GPS 
coordinate. A person does not need to carry a smartphone for such a digital registration 
to arise. Paintings are in many cases geospatially stable, mounted, secured objects in 
habitats with access controls, accompanying surveillance cameras, and other digital 
sensors. Paintings function as effective ‘fiducial’ markers. They are low-maintenance 
data-gathering sites providing for the capture of a continual stream of digital traces 
about individuals. These can be analysed computationally and fed into data-mining 
algorithms, generating further patterns and preference profiles while supporting the 
task of unmasking.  
Functional Augmentation  
The line of thinking I am pursuing—in which a painting pivots from an emitter into a 
sensor—is an approach I would describe in terms of functional augmentation. To explain 
this, I return to the debates between functional and object-oriented programmers.  
Purist OOP developers advocate object-based programming languages on the basis 
that they model thing-like behaviour, which is well understood and has an established 
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history. FP programmers stress the mathematical elegance of well-behaved pure 
functions. Such functions have no ‘side effects’ (i.e., the entire outcome of the function 
is encapsulated in its result). These functions can be composed and overlaid in flexible 
ways. Functionalist idioms are being introduced as add-on libraries in object-oriented 
frameworks, rather than as wholesale replacements of OOP approaches, resulting in 
object-functional systems combining both models at once. (N. Ford 2014).  
I mention this because a similar trend can be seen in a shift towards augmentative 
digital techniques more broadly. Virtual-reality headsets may have been a symbol of the 
digital, promoting the narrative that digital technology might replace or overtake 
sensory inputs. But there is a broader digital transformation taking place.  
To gain a sense of the scale of change, consider this remark by George Perec in 1974: 
There are few events which don’t leave a written trace at least. At one time or 
another, almost everything passes through a sheet of paper, the page of a notebook, or 
of a diary, or some other chance support (a Metro ticket, the margin of a newspaper, a 
cigarette packet, the back of an envelope etc.) on which, at varying speeds and by 
different technique depending on the place, time or mood, one or another of the 
miscellaneous elements that comprise the everydayness of life comes to be inscribed 
(Perec 2008, 12 [1974]). 
Notably, all of the chance supports listed by Perec have been supplemented by 
digital technologies. We now write notes and read news using smartphones, shop with 
our tablets, send instant messages electronically, and sign for our food delivers by 
smudging a finger across a screen. Perec’s model of inscription as a written trace on a 
chance support is increasingly being augmented by a digital trace generated by 
embodied activity and transmitted for analysis and further manipulation by algorithms. 
Where Perec scrupulously recorded the infra-ordinary by writing lists with his 
MontBlanc pen, now we snapchat, tweet, post, and gram. Perec approached his world 
and language through the texture of the written trace. Today, there are few events that 
don’t leave a digital trace at least.   
E-cigarettes are an example of the ‘augmented’ approach being pursued by the 
digital industry. In such augmented approaches, digital functionalities are added to and 
overlaid on existing objects and habits. When we vape, our lungs ingest reactive 
chemicals, changing our affective body states, fulfilling a similar role to tobacco 
cigarettes. In parallel, computational mechanisms monitor the vaping process, and, in 
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some devices, wirelessly share vape data with mobile phones. Vaping is the 
productization of nicotine-producing cigarettes overlaid or augmented with digital 
functions that track vaping patterns. Similar augmentative strategies are being pursued 
in many other arenas—such as contactless travel cards, electronic toothbrushes, car 
keys, telephones, pens, thermostats, and even the London congestion-charge zone 
(based on number-plate readers). Augmentation is a driving logic for the internet of 
things. A frying pan with a built-in digital sensor can be sold for more than a frying pan, 
while also providing additional data flows back to the manufacturer, conveying 
household frying signals that can be linked to other marketing patterns.  
Functional augmentation strategies are redirections, placing less emphasis on 
extending or replacing a thing or body, and more on delivering add-on functions. Data 
flows are layered in parallel onto or beside an existing thing or habit, minimally 
invasively. The aim is to provide a way of up-channelling data to multiple other 
individuals, aggregators or agents, so that sensing and emitting can be coupled with 
logging, auditing, monitoring, or verifying. When a garden furniture manufacturer prints 
a URL on the back of a chair, this allows people to access the company’s website to 
purchase similar items. At the same time, it provides a back-channel of data to the 
company about those browsers, their locality, which device they are using, and so on. 
Augmentative strategies can be deployed in stages. For example, in 2007 the BBC 
launched its iPlayer, allowing viewers to watch broadcast TV on computer screens. In 
recent months, iPlayer was modified to require users to register and ‘sign in’ to the 
iPlayer. Viewers can watch TV programs online, as before, with the added ‘convenience’ 
that the iPlayer remembers what they have watched. Simultaneously, through 
functional augmentation, iPlayer can transmit data on individual channel-surfing 
patterns to the BBC for aggregation and analysis.  
As another example, in the photo booths being installed in airport customs halls, 
individuals are required to stand in front of a camera, scan their passport, and then have 
their photo taken. This is advertised as a feature to improve passenger transit efficiency. 
An unannounced functional augmentation is that digital full-face portraits, captured 
under controlled lighting, in the presence of a passport ID barcode, can be forwarded to 
national facial-recognition databases used to automate CCTV tracking technology.  
Functional augmentation therefore corresponds to the tendency to create data 
flows in multiple directions at once. Within a highly interconnected digital context, 
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invoking a digital function enables the function to open a channel to record how it has 
been invoked. But such functional augmentation is not an ahistorical or a universalizing 
concept. It is a strategy applied locally, parasitically, modifying highly particular objects 
and habits, in some cases targeting a single object or system. One of my colleagues 
attached an alerting device he created to his elderly father’s walking stick in case his 
father became lost. Another individual proudly had me touch the place on his chest 
where a Wi-Fi pacemaker modulates his heart. In addition, it transmits statistics 
wirelessly, over the internet, to physicians who will call him by phone if the signal shows 
any anomalies. 
Augmentation occurs at industrial scales. When Apple renamed ‘applications’ as 
‘apps’ on its iPhones, the suggestion was that they are like mini-applications. But unlike 
applications, apps are premised on the notion that they cannot take over primary 
system functions that Apple integrates into the device, including its phone functions. 
Apps are quarantined, or ‘sandboxed.’ This corresponds to an augmentative mindset—it 
is part of Apple’s strategy to distinguish the device, which it owns and controls, from the 
apps that are ‘add-ons’ to augment the device. 
Functional augmentation presupposes an entity on which function is hoisted, the 
attachment point that provides the capacities for sensing, powering, computing, and 
emitting. However, such functioning can also result in unanticipated functional side-
effects.  
Painting as Diagnostic 
Discussions of functional augmentation seem foreign to the phenomenal discourse of 
the specificity of Owens’s paintings as objects. Then again, simply by contemplating a 
painting in terms of its specificity, you have already begun the process of engaging 
filtering and selectivity functions through which rectangles on a wall, positioned at 
certain heights, are joined with the use of the word ‘specificity’ in an email, unmasking 
you in a data stream as someone with a ‘specificity’ attitude towards a painting’s 
function. Which is to say that, from a data analyst’s perspective, functional 
augmentation, as an add-on feature of the digital, is conducted beside and parallel to 
other phenomenal object-based strategies and discourses. Put another way, to inhabit 
an anonymous gesture in painting today is to be concerned with more than the mark, 
the act of painting, and the decision to rent space and exhibit works. It is also to attend 
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to the digital gestures the painting elicits as a fiducial marker—considering ways that a 
painting functions to mask or unmask its viewers. Owens seeks to produce anonymous 
gesture through a plurality of different motifs and techniques in paint. She presents the 
paintings in an exhibition space she controls, and then observes viewers observing her 
paintings. This can be interpreted not only as the production of an atemporal picture 
with its embedded flux and passage, but also as a way of performing a kind of 
diagnostic. 
Consider Joselit’s discussion of painting as a part of a network involved in passage. 
He writes: 
‘Painting as model’ is how Bois once put it; in the case of much recent abstraction, it 
is a model of how information travels and a method for measuring the distance— 
geographic, temporal, social, and psychic—between enunciations of the same picture. In 
painting, the space of transmission can itself be, as Rosenberg contended with regard to 
Abstract Expressionism, ‘an arena in which to act.’ (Joselit 2011) 
Joselit is identifying how a painting, transformed into a tweet or Instagram post, 
becomes a broadcaster within in a ‘space of transmission,’ as a node in a network. I 
agree and would go further. When an entity is placed in a network, it is not a broadcast-
only transmission. Paintings are not only models in a static sense. The paintings become 
a part of the circuit through which data flows occur in all directions. Owens’s 
anonymous gesture can be understood as a strategy for tracing and intervening in these 
peripheral digital data flows. 
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